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RESUME 
L'integrite des infrastructures utilisees pour la distribution de l'eau potable est d'une 
importance capitale afin de minimiser le risque de contamination de l'eau entre l'usine 
de traitement et les consommateurs. Les problemes relies au reseau de distribution les 
plus preoccupants en terme d'impact potentiel sur la sante publique ont recemment ete 
souleves (NRC, 2006). Les installations et reparations de conduites (priorite elevee) 
ainsi que les faibles pressions transitoires et intrusions (priorite moyenne) ont ete 
mentionnees. Des pressions faibles ou negatives en reseau de distribution peuvent 
resulter de pratiques operationnelles et d'activites d'entretien telles que le depart/arret 
des pompes, la manipulation rapide de vannes ou de bornes-fontaines, le rincage de 
conduites, les bris de conduite ou encore des pannes de courant. Le lien entre une 
contamination de l'eau distribute et la realisation de travaux d'entretien en reseau est 
souvent base sur des cas specifiques de contamination lorsque des epidemies de 
maladies d'origine hydrique sont rapportees. Peu de donnees sont disponibles pour 
evaluer l'impact de l'operation d'un reseau et des travaux d'entretien en conditions 
normales d'operation. 
L'objectif principal de ce projet de recherche est d'evaluer les conditions pouvant 
mener a l'intrusion de contaminants microbiologiques en reseau associees a l'operation 
du reseau et a diverses activites d'entretien. De facon plus detaillee, ce projet cherche a: 
1. Demontrer, a partir d'une etude de bases de donnees, qu'une fraction 
significative d'evenements de non-conformite (presence de coliformes a l'eau 
distribute) est liee a l'operation du reseau et a la realisation de travaux 
d'entretien. 
2. Investiguer, en reseau reel, le lien entre (i) la realisation de travaux, (ii) les 
variations hydrauliques en reseau, et (iii) les changements potentiels de qualite 
d'eau (avec une emphase sur les pressions negatives et les intrusions de 
microorganismes). 
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3. Effectuer la modelisation en regime transitoire et la modelisation des intrusions 
pour evaluer les volumes potentiels d'intrusion associes aux evenements de 
pressions negatives en reseau de distribution. 
La premiere phase du projet a consiste a developper et appliquer une approche 
d'integration de donnees basee sur la combinaison et la consideration (simultanee) de 
donnees relatives a la qualite de l'eau, a la structure du reseau, a 1'operation et aux 
activites d'entretien, de Finformation provenant d'un modele hydraulique et d'un 
systeme d'information geographique. Un outil de requetes et de visualisation a ete utilise 
pour l'analyse. Au total, 140 cas de presence de bacteries coliformes detectees dans cinq 
reseaux de distribution ont ete analyses et les resultats ont montre que le role de 
Foperation du reseau et des travaux d'entretien sur Fapparition des coliformes etait 
variable d'un reseau a Fautre. Selon le reseau, un minimum de 9% jusqu'a 45% du 
nombre de cas de coliformes a pu etre associe a Foperation ou a Fentretien. 
Afin d'obtenir des informations supplementaires a F etude de bases de donnees, des 
travaux sur le terrain ont ete realises. Ces derniers ont consiste en un suivi de certaines 
activites pouvant affecter Fintegrite physique ou hydraulique du reseau. Les 
changements potentiels de qualite d'eau associes a ces activites ont ete mesures en 
reseaux reels. Les activites pour lequel un suivi a ete effectue sont les suivantes : 
reparations de bris ou fuites de conduites, rincages (ou vidanges) de conduites, tests de 
debit aux bornes-fontaines, arrets et departs de pompes ainsi que Foperation normale du 
reseau. Deux routes potentielles d'intrusion de microorganismes ont aussi ete 
caracterisees: le sol et l'eau des tranchees entourant les conduites enfouies ainsi que 
l'eau provenant des chambres de vannes air-vacuum inondees. Le suivi a ete effectue sur 
les reseaux des villes de Laval et de Montreal. Toutefois, la majorite des travaux ont ete 
effectues sur le reseau de Laval, dans la meme zone ou Payment et collegues (1991, 
1997) ont realise leurs etudes epidemiologiques et dont les resultats ont montre un taux 
plus eleve de maladies gastro-enteriques associe a la consommation de l'eau du robinet. 
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L'impact des reparations de conduites (planifiees) sur la qualite de l'eau est estime 
faible suite aux resultats obtenus. Des evidences d'intrusion ont ete observees a sept des 
seize sites investigues. Toutefois, les resultats suggerent que l'etape de rincage lorsque 
la reparation est terminee est efficace pour minimiser la contamination (pour le type de 
reparation evalue). Des coliformes totaux ont ete detectes dans 17 echantillons d'eau sur 
424 (4.0%) et ces echantillons ont presque tous ete preleves lors de l'etape de rincage. 
La frequence de detection de microorganismes indicateurs de contamination fecale dans 
le sol et l'eau des tranchees etait faible dans les deux reseaux ou les travaux etaient 
effectues. Le suivi a egalement permis d'observer des variations du residuel de 
disinfectant et de la turbidite a l'exterieur de la zone de travaux lorsque des 
changements hydrauliques etaient engendres. 
Un suivi a long-terme de la pression a ete effectue en conditions d'operation normale 
du reseau de Laval de juin 2006 a novembre 2007 et des suivis ponctuels ont ete realises 
lors de certaines activites d'entretien. Des pressions transitoires ont ete observees lors de 
reparations de conduites, rincage de conduites, test de debit aux bornes-fontaines et 
associees a l'operation de pompes. Toutefois, la principale cause de pression negative 
sur le reseau de Ville de Laval a ete identifiee comme etant les pannes de courant 
affectant l'operation des pompes a l'usine de traitement. 
L'etablissement d'un lien entre un evenement de pression negative dans un reseau de 
taille reelle et les changements de qualite d'eau engendre par cet evenement represente 
un defi considerable. Une occasion "unique" d'echantillonner la qualite de l'eau suite a 
un evenement de pression negative soutenue sur le reseau de Laval s'est presentee. 
Toutefois, l'etablissement d'un tel lien s'est avere difficile, meme si des echantillons de 
plus grand volume ont ete preleves. Les concentrations de chlore residuel dans ce reseau 
ont considerablement augmente ces dernieres annees, principalement du a des dosages 
plus eleves en sortie de l'usine de traitement. 
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A cause des difficultes associees avec la mesure de volumes d'intrusion en reseau 
reel, la vulnerabilite d'un systeme a la contamination par intrusion peut-etre evaluee par 
l'utilisation de la modelisation transitoire. Un evenement de faible pression a l'usine de 
traitement pour lequel des pressions negatives ont ete mesurees en reseau a ete simule. 
Meme si la version actuelle du modele predit des pressions negatives plus faibles (pires) 
que celles mesurees, les profils de pression obtenus en differents points du reseau ont 
montre une bonne correspondance entre les donnees mesurees et simulees. Les volumes 
d'intrusion potentiels durant cet evenement ont ete simules selon differents scenarios. 
Les resultats ont montre que 1'intrusion via les vannes air-vacuum submergees etait plus 
importante que l'intrusion via les fuites dans les conduites. De plus, la caracterisation 
microbiologique de ces deux routes potentielles a montre que des indicateurs de 
contamination fecale etaient detectes plus frequemment et a des concentrations plus 
elevees dans l'eau des chambres de vannes inondees que dans le sol ou l'eau des 
tranchees. Les volumes d'intrusion simules sont probablement plus eleves qu'en realite. 
Toutefois, ces resultats indiquent un risque potentiel associe avec les chambres ou des 
vannes air-vacuum sont installees et dont le niveau d'eau se situe au-dessus de l'orifice 
de la vanne. 
Suite aux resultats obtenus durant ce projet, des travaux additionnels sont requis pour 
evaluer avec confiance le risque d'intrusion associe aux pressions negatives en reseau. 
La modelisation realisee durant ce projet etait plutot de nature exploratoire et a permis la 
prediction des endroits et des volumes d'intrusion dans le reseau etudie. La prochaine 
etape devrait inclure la modelisation permettant d'evaluer l'effet du residuel de 
disinfectant sur les microorganismes introduits. Si on se refere au concept de 
"quantitative microbial risk assessment (QMRA)", les travaux presentes dans cette these 
pourraient etre consideres comme des travaux de fond fournissant de l'information 
nouvelle sur la caracterisation de 1'exposition aux microorganismes introduits suite a des 
evenements de pression negative et aux reparations de conduites. Les travaux futurs 
considerant l'impact du residuel de disinfectant contribueront a raffiner cette entree dans 
un eventuel modele evaluant l'impact sur la sante publique. 
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ABSTRACT 
The integrity of the infrastructure used to deliver drinking water from the treatment 
plant to the customers is of paramount importance to minimize the risk of water 
contamination. Recent work by a committee of experts (NRC, 2006) highlighted 
distribution system issues of greatest concern in terms of their potential health risk. The 
issues listed included new and repaired water mains (high priority) and low pressure 
transients and intrusion (medium priority). Low pressure may result from a wide variety 
of distribution system operational practices and maintenance activities such as pump 
starting or stopping, rapid opening or closing of valves, hydrant flushing, main breaks, 
and loss of power. The link between contamination of distributed water and occurrence 
of operation and maintenance activities in a distribution system is often based on 
specific cases when waterborne disease outbreaks are reported. Few data are available to 
evaluate the impact of operation and maintenance activities under normal operating 
conditions. 
The main objective of this research project was to assess the conditions leading to 
intrusion of contaminants in a system during a set of standard operations and 
maintenance activities in order to identify solutions to minimize such events and protect 
public health. On a more detailed level, this project seeked to: 
1. Demonstrate through data mining that a significant portion of non-compliance events 
may be linked to distribution system operation and maintenance activities; 
2. Investigate, in full-scale distribution systems, the link between O&M activities, 
distribution system hydraulics and potential water quality changes (with an emphasis 
on the occurrence of negative transient pressures and microbial intrusion); 
3. Achieve transient and intrusion modeling to assess the potential level of intrusion 
associated with negative pressure events in a full-scale distribution system. 
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The first part of the study consisted in the development and application of a data 
integration approach based on the combination and simultaneous consideration of water 
quality data, network structural data, system O&M data, information from a hydraulic 
model and a geographical information system (GIS) for data visualization. The 
Interactive Data Analyzer tool was used for the analysis. A total of 140 total coliform 
samples in five distribution systems were investigated. The results showed that the role 
of O&M activities on the occurrence of coliforms was variable from one system to 
another, explaining a minimum of 9% and up to 45% of the number of coliform cases 
investigated in each system. 
In order to complement the information obtained from the data-based study, field 
work was conducted and consisted in monitoring some activities that could affect the 
physical/hydraulic integrity of a system and verify how these activities could lead to 
changes in water quality in full-scale distribution systems. The activities monitored 
included: repairs of water main breaks/leaks, water main flushings, hydrant flow tests, 
pump start-up and shutdowns, and normal distribution system operation. Two potential 
pathways of microbial intrusion were also investigated: soil and shallow groundwater 
surrounding buried water mains and water from flooded air-vacuum valve vaults. 
Monitoring took place in the Laval and Montreal distribution systems with most of the 
work conducted in the Laval system, in the same area where Payment and colleagues 
(1991, 1997) conducted their epidemiological studies and measured an increased rate of 
gastrointestinal illnesses associated with the consumption of tap water. 
The impact of (planned) water main repairs on water quality was found to be low. 
Evidence of intrusion was observed at seven sites out of 16 but the results suggest that 
adequate pipe flushing after a repair is completed is effective to minimize contamination 
for the type of repair investigated. A total of 17 water samples out of 424 (4.0%) were 
positive for total coliforms and the positive samples were almost all collected during the 
flushing operation. The frequency of faecal microbial indicators detection in the soil and 
trench water surrounding the mains was low in the two systems investigated. Hydraulic 
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changes were also shown to induce variations in chlorine residuals and turbidity outside 
of repair areas. 
Long-term pressure monitoring was conducted in the Laval distribution system from 
June 2006 to November 2007 as well as targeted pressure monitoring during some O&M 
activities. Although transient pressures were observed during standard system operation 
(repairs of water main leaks, flushing, hydrant flow tests, pump operation), the main 
cause of negative pressures in the Laval distribution system was identified as power 
failures affecting the operation of pumps at the water treatment plant. 
Establishing a link between the occurrence of negative pressure in a full-scale system 
and resulting changes in water quality is a big challenge. A "unique occasion" to sample 
water following the occurrence of a sustained negative pressure event in the Laval 
distribution system took place. However, such a link was found to be difficult to 
establish, even using larger sample volumes. The free chlorine residual concentrations in 
this distribution system were found to increase over the years, mostly because of 
increased dosages at the water treatment plant. 
Because of the difficulties associated with the actual measurements of intrusion 
volumes in full-scale distribution systems, the vulnerability of a system to contamination 
may be evaluated using transient modeling. One low pressure event at the WTP that was 
found to result in negative pressure in the distribution system was simulated. Although 
the model predicted lower negative pressures than measured, the pressure profiles at 
various locations showed a good correspondence between field and model data. 
Potential intrusion volumes during this event could be simulated under different 
scenarios. Intrusion through submerged air-vacuum valves was found to be more 
important than intrusion through pipe leaks. Moreover, the microbial characterization of 
these two pathways of intrusion indicated that faecal contamination was recovered more 
frequently and at higher levels in the water from the flooded air-vacuum valve vaults 
than in the soil or trench water. Intrusion volumes obtained from the model are likely to 
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be higher than in reality, however, such results indicated the potential risk associated 
with flooded air-valve vaults in this distribution system. 
From the results obtained during this project, additional research is therefore needed 
to assess with confidence the risk of intrusion associated with the occurrence of transient 
negative pressures. The modeling work performed during this study was rather 
exploratory and allowed the prediction of locations and volumes of intrusion in the 
distribution system. The next step should include modeling to assess the effect of the 
residual disinfectant on the intruded microorganisms. Based on the quantitative 
microbial risk assessment concept, the work presented in this thesis may therefore be 
considered as background work bringing new information for the characterization of the 
exposure to intruded microorganisms due to transient negative pressures and pipe 
repairs. The future consideration of the impact of the residual disinfectant will help 
refining this input. 
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CONDENSE EN FRAN£AIS 
L'integrite des infrastructures utilisees pour la distribution de l'eau potable est d'une 
importance capitale afin de minimiser le risque de contamination de l'eau entre l'usine 
de traitement et les consommateurs. Les problemes relies au reseau de distribution les 
plus preoccupants en terme d'impact potentiel sur la sante publique ont recemment ete 
souleves (NRC, 2006). Les installations et reparations de conduites (priorite elevee) 
ainsi que les faibles pressions transitoires et intrusions (priorite moyenne) ont ete 
mentionnees. Les faibles pressions (meme negatives) en reseau de distribution peuvent 
resulter de pratiques operationnelles et de multiples activites d'entretien telles que le 
depart ou l'arret des pompes, la manipulation rapide de vannes ou de bornes-fontaines, 
le rincage de conduites, les bris de conduite ou encore des pannes de courant. Toutefois, 
le lien entre une contamination de l'eau distribute et la realisation de travaux d'entretien 
en reseau est souvent base sur des cas specifiques de contamination lorsque des 
epidemies de maladies d'origine hydrique sont rapportees. Peu de donnees sont 
disponibles pour evaluer l'impact de l'operation d'un reseau et des travaux d'entretien 
en conditions normales d'operation. Dans les annees 1990, les etudes epidemiologiques 
realises par Payment et al. (1991, 1997) ont montre qu'entre 14 a 40% des cas de gastro-
enterites etaient relies a la consommation d'eau du robinet qui rencontrait les standards 
de qualite en place et que le reseau apparaissait comme potentiellement responsable de 
ce niveau endemique de maladies. De tels resultats ont done souleve des questions 
relatives a l'integrite des reseaux, et ce meme en conditions normales d'operation. 
L'objectif principal de ce projet de recherche est d'evaluer les conditions pouvant 
mener a l'intrusion de contaminants microbiologiques en reseau associees a l'operation 
du reseau et a diverses activites d'entretien. De facon plus detaillee, ce projet cherche a: 
1. Demontrer, a partir d'une etude de bases de donnees, qu'une fraction 
significative d'evenements de non-conformite (presence de coliformes a l'eau 
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distribute) est liee a 1'operation du reseau et a la realisation de travaux 
d'entretien. 
Investiguer, en reseau reel, le lien entre (i) la realisation de travaux, (ii) les 
variations hydrauliques en reseau, et (iii) les changements potentiels de qualite 
d'eau (avec une emphase sur les pressions negatives et les intrusions de 
microorganismes). 
Effectuer la modelisation en regime transitoire et la modelisation des intrusions 
pour evaluer les volumes potentiels d'intrusion associes aux evenements de 
pressions negatives en reseau de distribution. 
La premiere phase du projet a consiste a developper et appliquer une approche 
d'integration de donnees basee sur la combinaison et la consideration (simultanee) de 
donnees relatives a la qualite de l'eau, a la structure du reseau, a l'operation et aux 
activites d'entretien, de l'information provenant d'un modele hydraulique et d'un 
systeme d'information geographique. Un outil de requetes et de visualisation a ete utilise 
pour l'analyse. Cette approche a ete utilisee pour determiner les causes potentielles de 
problemes de qualite (historiques) dans plusieurs reseaux de distribution. Au total, les 
donnees relatives a 140 cas de presence de bacteries coliformes detectees dans cinq 
reseaux de distribution ont ete analysees. A partir des donnees fournies par les 
municipalites, les resultats ont montre que le role de l'operation du reseau et des travaux 
d'entretien sur l'apparition des coliformes etait variable d'un reseau a l'autre. Selon le 
reseau, un minimum de 9% jusqu'a 45% du nombre de cas de coliformes a pu etre 
associe a l'operation ou a l'entretien. Cette etude a done fourni des evidences spatio-
temporelles (ainsi qu'hydrauliques) d'un lien entre la detection de coliformes et 
l'operation et les activites d'entretien. Toutefois, les echantillons preleves par les 
municipalites provenaient principalement de leur suivi de routine, a des points 
specifiques du reseau. Par consequent, les resultats obtenus ne donnent qu'un apercu de 
l'impact des activites d'entretien pour les travaux realises a proximite des points de suivi 




Afin d'obtenir des informations supplementaires a l'etude de bases de donnees, des 
travaux sur le terrain ont ete realises. Ces derniers ont consiste en un suivi de certaines 
activites pouvant affecter l'integrite physique ou hydraulique du reseau. Les 
changements potentiels de qualite d'eau associes a ces activites ont ete mesures en 
reseaux reels. L'intrusion de microorganismes etait specifiquement ciblee ici. Les 
activites pour lequel un suivi a ete effectue sont les suivantes : reparations de bris ou 
fuites de conduites, rincages (ou vidanges) de conduites, tests de debit aux bornes-
fontaines, arrets et departs de pompes ainsi que l'operation normale du reseau. L'impact 
potentiel des reparations de conduites sur la qualite de l'eau a ete directement evalue lors 
des reparations. Pour les autres activites, leur impact sur l'integrite hydraulique a 
d'abord ete evalue par le suivi des pressions afin de detecter si des pressions faibles ou 
negatives pouvaient etre engendrees lors de ces activites. Deux routes potentielles 
d'intrusion de microorganismes ont aussi ete caracterisees : le sol et l'eau des tranchees 
entourant les conduites enfouies ainsi que l'eau provenant des chambres de vannes air-
vacuum inondees. Le suivi a ete effectue sur les reseaux des villes de Laval et de 
Montreal. Toutefois, la majorite des travaux ont ete effectues sur le reseau de Laval, 
dans la meme zone ou Payment et collegues (1991, 1997) ont realise leurs etudes 
epidemiologiques et dont les resultats ont montre un taux plus eleve de maladies gastro-
enteriques associe a la consommation de l'eau du robinet. 
L'impact des reparations de conduites (planifiees) sur la qualite de l'eau est estime 
faible suite aux resultats obtenus. Le protocole d'echantillonnage developpe consistait en 
la prise d'echantillons d'eau et de sol dans la tranchee afin d'en verifier le contenu 
microbiologique et ainsi determiner le potentiel d'intrusion. Des echantillons d'eau ont 
ete preleves chez les consommateurs situes dans la zone de reparation ainsi qu'a 
l'exterieur de cette zone et a la borne-fontaine utilisee lors de l'etape de rincage. Des 
echantillons etaient preleves avant, pendant et apres les travaux. Le suivi a ete realise en 
2004-2005. L'evidence d'intrusion (base sur la detection de coliformes totaux, E. coli ou 
des endospores aerobies) a ete observee a sept sites sur un total de seize sites 
investigues. Toutefois, les resultats suggerent que l'etape de rincage lorsque la 
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reparation est terminee est efficace pour minimiser la contamination (du moins pour le 
type de reparation evalue). La frequence de detection de microorganismes indicateurs de 
contamination fecale dans le sol et l'eau des tranchees etait faible dans les deux reseaux 
ou les travaux etaient effectues. Considerant l'ensemble des points d'echantillonnage et 
les etapes de prelevement, des coliformes totaux ont ete detectes dans 17 echantillons 
sur 424 (4.0%). Ces echantillons ont presque tous ete preleves lors de l'etape de rincage 
(16 echantillons sur 17). Le suivi a egalement permis d'observer des variations du 
residuel de disinfectant et de la turbidite a l'exterieur de la zone de travaux lorsque des 
changements hydrauliques etaient engendres par la fermeture de vanne pour isoler le 
secteur a reparer (creation de cul-de-sac et changements de direction de l'ecoulement). 
Des capteurs de pression (permettant jusqu'a 20 lectures de pression par seconde) ont 
ete utilises pour determiner la frequence et l'amplitude des evenements de pressions 
transitoires faibles ou negatives en reseau de distribution. Un suivi a long-terme a ete 
effectue en conditions d'operation normale du reseau de Laval de juin 2006 a novembre 
2007 et des suivis ponctuels ont ete realises lors de certaines activites d'entretien. Le 
suivi a long-terme s'est deroule en 4 periodes avec un maximum de 12 capteurs installes 
a des bornes-fontaines selon la periode. 
Des pressions transitoires ont ete observees lors de reparations de conduites, rincage 
de conduites, test de debit aux bornes-fontaines et associees a l'operation de pompes 
sans toutefois resulter en pressions negatives. Sans considerer les pressions associees au 
pompage, la plupart des activites pour lequel un suivi a ete effectue ont ete realisees 
dans des zones de reseau ou la pression initiale etait relativement elevee (en moyenne 
entre 290 et 558 kPa (42 et 81 psi)). Des chutes de pressions variant de 14 a 379 kPa (2 a 
55 psi) ont ete enregistrees de telle sorte que si ces activites sont realisees dans des 
secteurs de reseau ou la pression est initialement plus faible, des pressions negatives 
pourraient potentiellement resulter. Toutefois, la principale cause de pression negative 
sur le reseau de Ville de Laval a ete identifiee comme etant les pannes de courant 
affectant l'operation des pompes a l'usine de traitement. La zone d'etude sur le reseau de 
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Laval s'est averee vulnerable aux pressions faibles et negatives avec neuf evenements de 
faible pression a l'usine de traitement durant la premiere annee du suivi (Juin 2006-
Juillet 2007). 
Lorsque des pressions negatives surviennent, 1'intrusion de microorganismes dans le 
reseau peut survenir via les fuites dans les conduites (ou autres orifices). Pour le reseau 
de Laval, le pourcentage d'eau estime perdu via les fuites est d'environ 20%. Pour ce 
reseau, une autre source potentielle d'intrusion a ete identified comme etant les vannes 
air-vacuum dont l'orifice est submerge d'eau du a une inondation de la chambre 
souterraine abritant la vanne. Durant l'ete 2007, 45 chambres de vannes dans lesquelles 
se trouvait soit (i) des purgeurs d'air, (ii) des vannes air-vacuum, ou (iii) des vannes a air 
combine ont ete visitees. Dans 30 de ces chambres, des echantillons d'eau ont pu etre 
recoltes et pour 10 de ces chambres, le niveau de l'eau se trouvait au-dessus de l'orifice 
de la vanne permettant a l'air d'entrer dans la conduite. Le sol, l'eau de tranchee ainsi 
que l'eau provenant des chambres de vannes ont ete caracterises pour determiner leur 
contenu microbiologique. La frequence de detection d'organismes indicateurs de 
contamination fecale etait plus elevee pour l'eau des chambres de vannes et les 
concentrations detectees egalement. Seulement un echantillon de sol sur 16 s'est avere 
positif pour E. coli tandis que ce microorganisme a ete detecte dans 68% des 
echantillons de chambres de vannes. 
L'etablissement d'un lien entre un evenement de pression negative dans un reseau de 
taille reelle et les changements de qualite d'eau engendre par cet evenement represente 
un defi considerable. Pour qu'une intrusion survienne, trois conditions sont necessaires: 
(i) pression negative, (ii) route d'entree, et (iii) source de contamination. Ces trois 
conditions doivent survenir simultanement en un meme endroit. Une occasion "unique" 
d'echantillonner la qualite de l'eau suite a un evenement de pression negative soutenue 
sur le reseau de Laval s'est presentee lors de la fermeture planifiee d'une conduite de 
large diametre (400 mm). Comme de faibles pressions et des changements de direction 
de l'ecoulement etaient anticipes lors de ces travaux, une campagne d'echantillonnage 
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de la qualite de l'eau a ete realisee. Le rincage de la conduite avant sa reouverture a 
resulte en deux episodes de pressions negatives de plus de cinq minutes chacun a un des 
trois points ou des echantillons d'eau etaient preleves. L'etablissement d'un lien entre 
l'evenement de pression negative et la qualite de l'eau s'est avere difficile, meme si des 
echantillons de plus grand volume (1 L au lieu de 100 mL) ont ete preleves. Des 
concentrations de chlore residuel libre d'environ 0.2 mg/L ont ete mesurees a ce point 
tout au long de la fermeture. D'ailleurs, les concentrations de chlore residuel dans ce 
reseau ont considerablement augmente ces dernieres annees, principalement du a des 
dosages plus eleves en sortie de l'usine de traitement. 
A cause des difficultes associees avec la mesure de volumes d'intrusion en reseau 
reel, la vulnerability d'un systeme a la contamination par intrusion peut-etre evaluee par 
l'utilisation de la modelisation transitoire. Un evenement de faible pression a l'usine de 
traitement pour lequel des pressions negatives ont ete mesurees en reseau a ete simule a 
l'aide du logiciel commercial InfoSurge. La version actuelle du modele predit des 
pressions negatives plus faibles (pires) que celles mesurees, ce qui peut-etre explique par 
des incertitudes telles que la demande aux noeuds et la vitesse de l'onde de pression. 
Egalement, les vannes air-vacuum n'ont pas ete incluses dans le modele comme 
equipement de protection. Malgre ces differences, les profils de pression obtenus en 
differents points du reseau ont montre une bonne correspondance entre les donnees 
mesurees et simulees. Les volumes d'intrusion potentiels durant cet evenement ont ete 
simules selon differents scenarios. Les resultats ont montre que l'intrusion via les vannes 
air-vacuum submergees etait plus importante que l'intrusion via les fuites dans les 
conduites. De plus, la caracterisation microbiologique de ces deux routes potentielles a 
montre que des indicateurs de contamination fecale etaient detectes plus frequemment et 
a des concentrations plus elevees dans l'eau des chambres de vannes inondees que dans 
le sol ou l'eau des tranchees. Les volumes d'intrusion simules sont probablement plus 
eleves qu'en realite puisque (i) le modele predit des pressions negatives pires que celles 
mesurees, (ii) l'equation d'orifice utilisee pour simuler les intrusions predit que chaque 
noeud ou la pression exterieure est superieure a la pression dans la conduite subira 
XX 
l'intrusion (il est faux de penser que toutes les conduites sont submergees - sous la 
nappe d'eau - dans un reseau) et (iii) des incertitudes existent quant a la modelisation 
via les vannes air-vacuum. Toutefois, ces resultats indiquent un risque potentiel associe 
avec les chambres ou des vannes air-vacuum sont installees et dont le niveau d'eau se 
situe au-dessus de l'orifice de la vanne. 
La question a l'origine de ce projet de recherche etait: quel est le risque de 
contamination microbiologique associe aux pratiques operationnelles en reseau et aux 
activites d'entretien? L'etude de bases de donnees a montre qu'un lien pouvait etre etabli 
entre l'operation, l'entretien et l'apparition de coliformes. Les resultats des travaux 
terrain ont montre une contamination limitee associee aux reparations de conduites 
planifiees et (un) evenement de pression negative soutenue. Sur cette base, le risque de 
contamination associe aux reparations (reparations planifiees dans des excavations 
relativement "propres") peut etre estime comme etant faible. Toutefois, les evidences 
sont moins claires pour 1'evenement de pression negative. II peut etre suppose que des 
microorganismes indicateurs auraient ete detectes dans plus d'un echantillon si la 
situation avait ete critique. Les concentrations de chlore mesurees dans ce secteur du 
reseau offrent probablement une certaine protection. Toutefois, la modelisation des 
intrusions souleve le risque d'intrusion associe aux vannes air-vacuum submergees 
durant les evenements de pressions negatives. Cette route d'entree des microorganismes 
dans le reseau devrait, et peut facilement etre eliminee par l'inspection systematique des 
chambres de vannes. 
Suite aux resultats obtenus durant ce projet, des travaux additionnels sont requis pour 
evaluer avec confiance le risque d'intrusion associe aux pressions negatives en reseau. 
La modelisation realisee durant ce projet etait plutot de nature exploratoire et a permis la 
prediction des endroits et des volumes d'intrusion dans le reseau etudie. La prochaine 
etape devrait inclure la modelisation permettant d'evaluer l'effet du residuel de 
disinfectant sur les microorganismes introduits. Si on se refere au concept de 
"quantitative microbial risk assessment (QMRA)", les travaux presented dans cette these 
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pourraient etre considered comme des travaux de fond fournissant de 1'information 
nouvelle sur la caracterisation de 1'exposition aux microorganismes introduits suite a des 
evenements de pression negative et aux reparations de conduites. Les travaux futurs 
considerant l'impact du residuel de disinfectant contribueront a raffiner cette entree dans 
un eventuel modele evaluant l'impact sur la sante publique. 
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HL,I Line (interior) head 
HPC Heterotrophic plate count 
ID Identification 
in inch 
INRS Institut National de Recherche Scientifique 
IPIU Immunoperoxidase infectious unit 
Km Kilometer 
kPa KiloPascal 
KR Coefficient of restraint for longitudinal pipe movement 
L Liter 
L Length 
L/min Liter per minute 
Log logarithm 
m Meter 
MgCl2 Magnesium chloride 
Mgd Million gallon per day 
mg/L Milligram per liter 
mL Milliliter 
ML/d Million liters per day 
mm millimeter 
MPN Most probable number 
MPNCU Most probable number of cytopathic units 
m/sec meter per second 
MSX Multi-Species extension 
ug Microgram 
uS Micro Siemens 
N Normal 
N50 Median infection dose 
NA Not available 
NH2CI Monochloramine 
NSERC National Sciences and Engineering Research Council 
NTU Nephelometric turbidity unit 
NW North West 
O&M Operation and maintenance 
p Level of statistical significance (p-value) 
PC Polycarbonate 
PCR Polymerase chain reaction 
PDF Probability density function 



























Pounds per square inch 
Polyvinyl chloride 
Intrusion flowrate 
Quantitative microbial risk assessment 
Residence time 
Reverse transcription-polymerase chain reaction 
Supervisory control and data aquisition 
A laser scanning cytometer 
Stainless steel 
pipe tickness 
Initial system condition 




Unplasticized polyvinyl chloride 
United-States 
United-States Environmental Protection Agency 
Velocity 
Viable but non-culturable 
Waterborne disease outbreaks 
Water quality 
Water treatment plant 





The integrity of the infrastructure used to deliver drinking water from the treatment 
plant to the customers is of paramount importance to minimize the risk of water 
contamination. A significant portion of waterborne disease outbreaks (WBDOs) has 
been shown to be caused by distribution system deficiencies (Craun and Calderon, 
2001). These authors showed that, for the period 1971 to 1998, 18.3% of the outbreaks 
reported in public water systems in the U.S. were caused by chemical and microbial 
contaminants entering the distribution system. The main distribution system deficiencies 
responsible for the outbreaks during this 27-year period are listed in Table 1-1. Recent 
data show that for the year 2001-2002, 20% of the WBDOs associated with drinking 
water in the U.S. (total n=25) were caused by distribution system deficiencies 
(Blackburn et al., 2004). For the 2003-2004 report, a new classification for deficiencies 
was established by the Center for Disease Control which provides a clear distinction on 
where the contamination takes place (in the system under the jurisdiction of a water 
utility or at a point outside the jurisdiction of the water utility or point of use). For these 
last two years, 11 WBDOs were related to drinking water with deficiencies originating 
from source water, treatment or distribution (in system before water meter or property 
line). Overall, 14 deficiencies were reported and distribution system deficiencies 
(including storage) accounted for 43% of these (Liang et al., 2006). Although the actual 
number of WBDOs reported since 1980 has decreased, the proportion of WBDOs due to 
distribution system contamination is increasing (NRC, 2006). Equivalent figures in 
Canada are not systematically reported, but similar numbers are to be expected. 
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Table 1-1: Distribution system deficiencies causing outbreaks for the 1971-1998 period 
in the U.S. (modified from Craun and Calderon, 2001) 
Deficiency 
Cross-connection / backsiphonage 
Contamination during storage 
Corrosion / leaching of metals 
Broken or leaking water mains 
Contamination of household plumbing 
Contamination of mains during construction / repair 
Inadequate separation of water main and 
Total 
sewer 
Public water systems* 



















* Public water systems = data for community water systems and noncommunity water systems 
Cases of water contamination due to distribution system deficiencies, leading to 
illnesses and even deaths in the supplied population, have been witnessed over the last 
few years. In 1997, the failure of a 600 mm (24 in.) diameter pipe supplying the city of 
Le Havre in France, and the subsequent depressurization of the network was identified 
as being the cause of about 300 cases of diarrhea out of a population of 50,000 
(Mansotte and Beaudeau, 1999). In the small town of Cabool (Missouri), an outbreak of 
hemorragic E. coli serotype 0157:H7 caused 243 known cases of diarrhea and four 
deaths out of a population of 2090 inhabitants, between December 15, 1989 and January 
20, 1990. Two major distribution line breaks were the suspected sources of 
contamination (Geldreich et al., 1992). Inadequate maintenance of a municipal water 
storage tank was identified as the cause of a Salmonella serovar typhimurium outbreak 
reported in Gideon (Missouri) in 1993 (Clark et al., 1996; Angulo et al., 1997). The tank 
had an improper roof vent and an uncovered hatch that allowed free access to wild birds 
resulting in water contamination from bird droppings. Out of a population of 1104, 
almost 600 people were affected with diarrhea and seven people died. These two U.S. 
distribution systems did not use residual disinfection at the time of the outbreaks. 
Distribution system deficiencies that result in waterborne disease outbreaks constitute 
obvious breaches to the integrity of the distribution networks, however, the integrity of 
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distribution systems under normal operating conditions has also been questioned. In the 
1990's, the studies by Payment et al. (1991; 1997) indicated that between 14 and 40% of 
the gastrointestinal illnesses were related to tap water meeting the current water quality 
standards and that the distribution system appeared to be partly responsible for this 
endemic level of illnesses. These studies are almost systematically referred to in 
numerous research papers dealing with distribution system water quality and greatly 
contributed to the increased attention devoted to the distribution system as being the last 
and vulnerable barrier between the treatment plant and the customers. 
In order to reflect the need to protect this last barrier, work has been undertaken, 
particularly in the U.S., to evaluate the distribution system aspects that could lead to 
potential risks to consumers. It started in 2000, with a recommendation issued to the 
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (US EPA) by the Federal Advisory Committee 
for the Microbial/Disinfection By-products Rule. In 2003, the US EPA, in its 
commitment to revise the Total Coliform Rule (which relates to microbial water quality 
in the distribution system), agreed to explore the possibility of providing a 
comprehensive approach for addressing water quality in the distribution system 
environment, therefore encompassing the concept of distribution system integrity as part 
of the rule (NRC, 2005). For this process, the US EPA, along with other external 
experts, has produced a series of nine distribution system white papers on aspects that 
could lead to potential health risks in distribution systems. The topics are listed below: 
Intrusion of contaminants from pressure transients (LeChevallier et al., 2002) 
Cross-connections and backflow (USEPA, 2002a) 
Deteriorating buried infrastructure (American Water Works Service Co., Inc., 
2002) 
Permeation and leaching (AWWA and Economic and Engineering Services, 
Inc., 2002a) 
- Nitrification (AWWA and Economic and Engineering Services, Inc., 2002b) 
- Microbial growth and biofilms (USEPA, 2002b) 
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Finished water storage facilities (AWWA and Economic and Engineering 
Services, Inc., 2002c) 
- Water age (AWWA and Economic and Engineering Services, Inc., 2002d) 
- New or repaired water mains (AWWA and Economic and Engineering 
Services, Inc., 2002e) 
To further refine the process, the US EPA has mandated a committee of the National 
Academies' Water Science and Technology Board to identify and prioritize the issues of 
greatest concern (in terms of their associated potential health risks) for distribution 
systems. In its first report (NRC, 2005), the committee achieved the following 
classification, based on their review of the available literature (Table 1-2): 
Table 1-2: Prioritization of distribution system issues by the National Academies' Water 






Cross-connections and backflow 
New and repaired water mains 
Finished water storage 
Premise plumbing 
Distribution system operator training 
Biofilm growth 
Loss of residual via water age and nitrification 
Low pressure transients and intrusion 
Other effects of water age 
Other effects of nitrification 
Permeation 
Leaching 
Control of post precipitation 
Among the issues listed in Table 1-2, cross-connections, new and repaired water 
mains and low pressure transients are probably the most susceptible to result in the 
intrusion of microbial contaminants in the distribution system. These have been ranked 
as high priority issues, except for the low pressure transients, classified as medium, only 
because there are insufficient data to indicate whether it is a substantial health risk or not 
(NRC, 2005). In their study of pathogen intrusion in distribution system, Kirmeyer et al. 
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(2001), out of an expert panel workshop, have identified these three issues as pathogen 
routes of entry presenting a high risk potential (in terms of severity of disease, 
probability of waterborne disease outbreak, volume contaminated, and frequency of 
intrusion). Water treatment breakthrough was the other high risk route also listed. 
The general aging and deteriorating state of the infrastructure used to distribute water 
is a threat to the integrity of distribution systems and increases the vulnerability of 
distribution systems to water contamination to a level that is not known today. The 
American Society for Civil Engineers allocated a D- for the poor state of drinking water 
infrastructures in the U.S. (ASCE, 2005). For the city of Montreal (Quebec), it is 
estimated that 33% of the mains reached their useful life in 2002 and that an additional 
34% will reach this state before 2020 (Proulx et al., 2002). Maintenance activities such 
as repairs of pipe breaks, rehabilitation of existing pipes and installation of new mains 
are therefore likely to increase in number and frequency. Furthermore, the presence of 
pipe leaks, that may lead to the loss of about 30% of the produced water in Canadian 
distribution systems (Environment Canada, 2005), provides multiple potential entry 
points for intrusion of microbes into treated drinking water during negative or low 
pressure events. These low/negative transient pressures may originate from various 
routine activities (pump starting or stopping, rapid opening or closing of valves, hydrant 
flushing) and other events such as main breaks or loss of power (Kirmeyer et al., 2001). 
The integrity of the distribution system is therefore at risk every time these routinely 
occurring actions take place. 
The role of distribution system operation and maintenance (O&M) activities on the 
occurrence of system contamination (usually measured in terms of coliforms) resulting 
in non-compliance with the regulations in place is not clear. Microbial contamination in 
the distribution system may be caused by a wide variety of conditions, i.e. treatment 
breakthrough (Morris et a l , 1996), intrusion (Blackburn et al., 2004) and microbial 
regrowth (LeChevallier et al., 1987). However, the relative importance of these 
contamination pathways is unknown. Although the occurrence of positive coliform 
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samples in distribution systems has traditionally been associated with coliform regrowth 
(LeChevallier, 1990), it is hypothesized, as the basis of this Ph.D. work, that system 
operation and occurrence of maintenance activities may play a role in distribution 
system contamination. 
Up to this day, it has been shown that low or negative pressure transients occur in 
full-scale distribution systems (Kirmeyer et al., 2001; LeChevallier et al., 2004; Gullick 
et al., 2004; Gullick et al., 2005; Hooper et al., 2006), that the soil and water surrounding 
water mains may be contaminated with faecal pollution (Karim et al., 2003), and that 
intrusion of contaminated water takes place under negative pressure transients, as 
verified under pilot system simulation conditions (Boyd et al., 2004a; Boyd et al., 
2004b). However, evidence of water contamination under such conditions in full-scale 
distribution systems has not been assessed yet. No studies have been conducted in full-
scale distribution system to actually monitor changes in distributed water quality when 
routine activities take place. Therefore, this Ph.D. work intends to fill this gap by 
assessing the risk of water contamination induced by system operation and routine 
maintenance activities. 
1.2 STRUCTURE OF DISSERTATION 
The next chapter (Chapter 2) will provide an overview of the current knowledge 
related to water contamination in distribution systems. The goals of the proposed project 
and the methodology are then presented in Chapter 3. In Chapter 4 through Chapter 6, 
the reader will find papers that have been either published or are currently under revision 
in peer-reviewed journals. Chapter 4 completes the literature review by providing an in-
depth review of the studies where microbial intrusion was simulated and the impact of a 
residual disinfectant investigated. Chapter 5 presents the results of our data-based study 
where the proportion of coliform occurrences potentially associated with O&M activities 
in distribution systems is assessed. In Chapter 6, the outcomes of our field study on the 
impact of water main repairs on water quality are presented. In Chapter 7, a draft of a 
paper completes the discussion of the field work performed during this PhD work. The 
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occurrence of negative pressure events in a full-scale distribution system is presented 
along with the modeling work performed to assess the risk of intrusion during such 
events. Finally, a general discussion is provided in Chapter 8. The conclusions and 




This literature review seeks to answer the three following questions: 
(i) what are the microorganisms that have been identified in distribution system 
water samples? 
(ii) how can they enter the distribution system? and 
(iii) what happens once they are introduced into the system? 
The first part of this literature review will therefore consist in identifying the major 
pathogens that have been involved in waterborne disease outbreaks associated with 
drinking water. The second section will review the various pathogen routes of entry that 
have been reported in the literature. Thirdly, a review of the various experiments related 
to the intrusion of microorganisms into simulated distribution systems will be provided 
and finally, the concept of risk, linked to the intrusion of microorganisms into 
distribution systems will be discussed. 
2.1 P A T H O G E N I C M I C R O O R G A N I S M S RESPONSIBLE F O R 
W A T E R B O R N E DISEASE OUTBREAKS 
In developed countries, even if water treatment technologies are available and usually 
in place, waterborne disease outbreaks still take place, affecting various numbers of 
people. In order to identify the pathogenic agents usually involved in these outbreaks, 
the following table (Table 2-1) offers an overview of the disease and microorganisms 
that were reported in various countries over different time periods (12 to 29 years). The 
causes of the outbreaks listed in Table 2-1 are not differentiated and include outbreaks 
from untreated contaminated surface water, untreated contaminated groundwater, 






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Among these outbreaks, the most "spectacular" is probably the waterborne 
Cryptosporidium infection that took place in Milwaukee (WI), in 1993. This outbreak 
affected more than 400 000 people and an estimated 104 deaths (Morris et al., 1996). 
Treatment breakthrough, associated with a dramatic increase in turbidity level was 
associated with the outbreak. In Canada, the waterborne disease epidemic in Walkerton 
(ON), where more than 2300 individuals experienced gastroenteritis and seven people 
died in 2000 certainly raised some concerns in the population about the risks of drinking 
water contamination (Hrudey et al., 2003). E. coli 0157:H7 and Campylobacter jejuni 
were the pathogens identified as responsible of the illnesses. This was followed by the 
North Battleford (SK) waterborne cryptosporidiosis outbreak in 2001 where inadequate 
filtration was found as being the cause of the breakthrough of the pathogenic parasite 
into treated water (Stirling et al., 2001). From Table 2-1, it can be seen that the most 
common pathogenic agents (in terms of occurrence in different countries) determined as 
causes of waterborne disease outbreaks are Campylobacter (5 countries out of 5), 
Salmonella, Ciyptosporidium and Giardia (in 4 countries out of 5). Between 1991 and 
1998, G. lamblia and C. parvum have caused 32% of all reported outbreaks in the U.S. 
(Craunetal., 1998). 
In the U.S., a synthesis has been completed by Craun and Calderon (2001) on the 
main pathogenic agents involved in outbreaks due to distribution system deficiencies 
during the 1971-1998 period, as listed in Table 2-2 (care must be taken in considering 
the variety of pathogenic organisms listed in Table 2-1 and 2-2 as the etiology of 
outbreaks is often unidentified, so it is likely that such a list is incomplete; moreover, it 
is known that the number of waterborne outbreaks is likely to be underreported as 
reliable estimates on the number of outbreaks that can go unrecognized are not available 
(Blackburn et al., 2004)). 
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Table 2-2: Etiology of outbreaks caused by distribution system deficiencies, Period 






Salmonella, Shigella, Campylobacter, E. coli 0157:H7, Vibrio cholerae 
Giardia, Cyclospora 
Norwalk-like virus, Hepatitis A 
In Table 2-2, Cryptosporidium is not listed as being involved in outbreaks caused by 
distribution system deficiencies. However, this pathogen should not be left out as a 
potential contaminant of distributed water as it has been associated with two 
cryptosporidiosis outbreaks in the UK where the suspected source was distribution 
system contamination (Craun et al., 1998). However, for both outbreaks, the most likely 
sources of Gyptosporidium could not be identified. A recent investigation by Aboytes et 
al., (2004) showed that infectious Cryptosporidium (mostly C. parvum) could be 
detected in filtered drinking water from conventional treatment plants (using cell culture 
- polymerase chain reaction) and that it could be responsible for about 52 infections/10 
000 people/year. Consequently, this parasite could be responsible for an endemic level 
of illnesses in distribution systems. 
2.1.1 Opportunistic pathogens 
In addition to pathogenic microorganisms, opportunistic pathogens can also be found 
in distribution systems. Opportunistic pathogens are bacteria that may invade and cause 
disease in individuals with weakened immune systems (elderly people), those with 
compromised immune systems (AIDS patients, cancer survivors, organ transplant 
patients), and infants with underdeveloped immune barriers (AWWA, 1999). As birth 
rate generally declines, a growing proportion of the population is over 65 years of age. 
In Canada, it is estimated that by the year 2031, about 20% of the total population will 
be seniors (Centre of Canadian Studies at Mount Allison University, 2005). 
Furthermore, the number of immunocompromised persons is also increasing (NRC, 
2005). In 1996, this segment of the population represented almost 20% of the population 
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in the United-States (Gerba et al., 1996). Consequently, the risk of contamination of 
distributed water with opportunistic pathogens should not be minimized as the severity 
of the diseases is likely to be much higher in this population category. Opportunistic 
pathogens include: (i) Legionella spp., Aeromonas spp., and Pseudomonas aeruginosa, 
which are known to colonize distribution system biofilms (Szewzyk et al., 2000; 
Flemming et al., 2002); (ii) Helicobacter pylori that can cause gastritis and an increased 
risk of gastric cancer (WHO, 2006), has been identified in municipal tap water samples 
(Hulten et al., 1998) and Helicobacter sp. has been detected for the first time in 
distribution system pipe biofilm by Park et al. (2001); (iii) Mycobacteria that have been 
detected in water and biofilms of distribution systems (Falkinham III et al., 2001; Le 
Dantec et al., 2002) with Mycobacterium avium known to be a major cause of deaths in 
AIDS patients; (iv) Microsporidia, a parasite, for which a possible water route of 
contamination was suspected in a microsporidiosis outbreak affecting HIV infected 
persons (Cotte et al., 1999). Four species of bacteria - Legionella, the Mycobacterium 
avium complex, Aeromonas hydrophila, and Helicobacter pylori- have been recognized 
as emerging pathogens of concern by Health Canada (2006). However, according to the 
reference used, the list of microorganisms defined as emerging pathogens may vary and 
also includes other pathogenic agents such as viruses and protozoa (Szewzyk et al., 
2000). 
Some of these microorganisms have been included in the US EPA final drinking 
water contaminant candidate list (CCL2) which includes nine microbiological 
contaminants, as listed in table 2-3 (USEPA, 2005). This list includes unregulated 
contaminants that are known or expected to occur in public water systems, that may pose 
a risk in drinking water, for which historical databases of occurrence are not available, 
and that could eventually be regulated. Gerba et al. (2003) tested the disinfection 
resistance of these microorganisms and found that Mycobacterium spp. is the most 
resistant to chlorine, indicating that it will be difficult to control in distribution systems 
even when a disinfectant residual is present. That could cause concerns in area supplying 
immunocompromised population. 
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Cyanobacteria (blue-green algae), other freshwater 
algae, and their toxins 
Helicobacter pylori 





Microsporidia (Enterocytozoon & Septata) 
2.1.2 Possible sources of microbial contamination in distribution systems 
In the context of an accidental contamination of a distribution system, due to a main 
break located in the vicinity of a leaking sewer main, or caused by other types of system 
deficiency, raw sewage becomes a likely source of contamination. Intrusion of raw 
sewage in distribution system pipes could lead to the introduction of many pathogenic 
organisms. The types and numbers of microorganisms typically found in untreated 
wastewater and their corresponding infectious dose (when available) are presented in 
Table 2-4. Rao et al. (1986) report that more than 120 different virus types are known to 
be excreted in human faeces by infected persons. These viruses belong to the groups of 
enteroviruses (polioviruses, coxsackieviruses, echoviruses, hepatitis A), reoviruses, 
adenoviruses and parvo-viruses. Meschke et al. (2002) indicate that human enteric 
viruses are shed in human feces at levels exceeding 106 units/g. Consequently, the 
intrusion of faecally contaminated water or soil particles into water mains would 
certainly represent a health risk that would be more or less influenced by site-specific 
conditions such as the volume of intruded sewage, the residual disinfectant present, and 
the type of microorganism introduced. 
Table 2-4: Typical microorganisms found in untreated wastewater and corresponding 















Cryptosporidium parvum oocysts 
Entamoeba histolytica cysts 




































The infectious dose necessary to infect individuals is quite variable and depends on 
the type of pathogenic agent. In general, the infectious doses for viruses and parasites 
are very low in comparison to the number of bacterial pathogenic organisms necessary 
for infection. Furthermore, viruses and parasites are more resistant to chlorine 
disinfection than bacteria (USEPA, 2001a). In the case of water contamination due to 
distribution system deficiency where the only protection consists in the presence of a 
disinfectant residual, it can therefore be anticipated that the inactivation of virus and 
protozoa will be much less than for bacteria. This subject will be discussed more in 
detail in Section 2.3 dealing with the intrusion of microorganisms in experimental 
settings. 
Another likely source of pathogenic microorganisms in distribution system is the soil 
and shallow groundwater surrounding the buried water mains. A field study by Karim et 
al. (2003), consisting in the collection of soil and water samples at sites immediately 
exterior to drinking water pipelines during pipe repairs, was conducted in order to assess 
the occurrence of indicator microorganisms and the potential for pathogen intrusion due 
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to pressure transients (which is a route of entry that will be discussed in Section 2.2.2.3). 
As listed in Table 2-5, these authors detected indicator microorganisms and enteric 
viruses (detected by cell culture and reverse transcription-polymerase chain reaction 
(RT-PCR)) in more than 50% of the samples examined (from a total of 65 samples). Out 
of 32 sites investigated, 18 (56.2%) were positive by either cell culture or RT-PCR for 
one of the three viruses tested (Enterovirus, Norwalk virus, and Hepatitis A virus). Such 
results therefore suggest that opportunities do indeed exist for pathogens to intrude into 
the distribution system, either during pressure transients or during pipe repairs. 
Table 2-5: Indicator microorganisms detected in soil and water samples collected from 











































2.1.3 Colifonn bacteria as the indicator of bacteriological water quality 
Routine monitoring of treated and distributed water quality does not involve the 
measurement of any specific pathogenic or opportunistic pathogenic microorganisms in 
water samples. This is considered as being of little value on a day to day basis (detection 
methods development and availability, necessary resources and expertise, etc.) (Allen et 
al., 2000). Rather, it relies on the presence/absence or enumeration of total coliforms and 
faecal coliforms/is. coli in water samples to assess the microbiological quality of the 
water. Theoretically, the absence of such indicator bacteria should guarantee the 
consumer a good quality water, free of any pathogenic organisms. However, the validity 
of using coliforms as indicators of the microbiological quality of drinking water may be 
questioned, since: 
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- they are sometimes detected when there is no evidence of contamination. 
Many water utilities have experienced coliform occurrences in distribution 
system water samples that could not be directly linked to contamination from 
treatment barrier breakthrough or intrusion (Martin et al., 1982; Ludwig et al., 
1985; LeChevallier et al., 1987; Colbourne et al., 1991; Emde et al., 1992; Oliver 
et Harbour, 1995; Lu et al., 1997). In such cases, coliforms have been shown to 
survive under favorable conditions in the biofilm on pipe surfaces or in corrosion 
or loose deposits. 
- they are sometimes not detected when pathogenic organisms are found in 
the water. Waterborne disease outbreaks have occurred in U.S. water systems 
that have not violated the coliform regulations (Moore et al., 1994; Kramer et al., 
1996; Craun et al., 1997). Craun et al. (1997) reported coliforms detection during 
most (64%) of the waterborne illness outbreaks caused by bacteria, viruses and 
unidentified agents in the 1983-1992 period in the U.S., but during relatively few 
(35%) of the outbreaks caused by protozoa. Similar results have also been 
reported in the UK (Furtado et al., 1998). In their review of the WBDOs reported 
in the U.S. between 1991-1998, Nwachuku et al. (2002) concluded that coliform 
bacteria were inadequate to assess an increased risk of waterborne outbreaks 
caused by Giardia and Cryptosporidium as well as for some viruses. The more 
rapid chlorine inactivation of the coliform organisms in comparison to protozoa 
or other types of enteric viruses (Snead et al., 1980; Payment, 1999) and the fact 
that enteric pathogens are generally less susceptible to chlorine injury than 
coliforms (McFeters and Singh, 1991; McFeters, 1997) are factors playing 
against the validity of coliforms as indicators. 
As coliform bacteria comprise a large part of the population of organisms in warm-
blooded animal and humans feces, they are often correlated with faecal contamination 
and may indicate the presence of potentially disease-causing pathogenic organisms in 
the water. However, many strains of coliforms are also naturally occurring in the aquatic 
environment, originating from soil and vegetation (Krieg and Holt, 1984). Consequently, 
17 
the presence of these non-faecal coliforms in distributed water does not necessarily 
represent faecal contamination but is more indicative of a breach in the water system. 
Accordingly, the magnitude of the health risk associated with their presence has been 
somewhat mitigated - a tolerance of 5% for water samples testing positive for non-faecal 
coliforms on a monthly basis is allowed in the US (USEPA, 1989)). In the province of 
Quebec, up to 10% of positive total (non-faecal) coliform samples can be collected over 
a 30-day period (MDDEP, 2005). 
To improve the link between faecal contamination and regulations, Escherichia coli, 
(the only coliform that is solely derived from faecal material) has been proposed as a 
better indicator than total coliforms since simple analytical techniques are now available 
(Edberg et al., 2000). Moreover, many regulating agencies are suggesting the 
abandonment of a rule on total coliforms to concentrate only on E. coli as the main 
indicator of faecal pollution (Australian Government, 2003). Table 2-6 gives an 
overview of the microbiological parameters that must be monitored in order to comply 
with microbial drinking water regulations in the province of Quebec and in some other 
countries. 
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Limit / details 
- Max of 10 cfu/100 mL if enumeration 
method is used 
- No more than 10% of positive samples 
on a 30-day period 
Absent 
0/100 mL 
- If number of samples collected <10: no 
sample should be positive 
- If number of samples collected >10: no 
consecutive sample should be positive; 
not more than 10% of samples should be 
positive 
0/100 mL 
- If number of samples collected 
<40/month: not more than 1 positive 
sample 
- If number of samples collected 
>40/month: not more than 5% are 
coliform positive samples (Monthly 
MCL violation) 
- Acute MCL violation: 1 repeat sample is 
E. coli or faecal coliform positive; 1 
routine sample is E. coli or faecal 
coliform positive followed by total 




















The detection of total coliforms therefore do not pose nor necessarily indicate a health 
risk (Allen and Edberg, 1997). However, it is often one of the few tools (with HPC 
measurements) that water utilities use to monitor the bacteriological quality of their 
water. Consequently, when detected, utility personnel should determine the reasons of 
the coliform occurrences and take the appropriate actions to resolve such a problem. 
2.2 MECHANISMS OF MICROORGANISMS INTRODUCTION INTO 
DISTRIBUTION SYSTEMS 
Two primary mechanisms are responsible for the introduction of coliform bacteria 
and other microorganisms into distribution systems. They may breakthrough into treated 
water as a result of inadequate or breach of treatment or be introduced as a result of 
intrusion into the distribution system downstream of the treatment plant. The first route 
of entry will only be briefly discussed as the scope of this Ph.D. work is centered on the 
risk of pathogen intrusion directly in distribution systems. In this latter section, a 
detailed review of the potential causes of distributed water contamination will be 
provided. 
2.2.1 Inadequate treatment 
Coliform presence in treated water is seldom reported, which is logical since the 
treatment is usually designed to inactivate or remove, at least, bacterial contamination 
and its efficiency is evaluated using coliform-indicator bacteria. Nevertheless, this 
absence of coliforms in treated water may only be apparent as: 
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- only a very small fraction of treated effluents are monitored, making the 
detection of a time-limited breakthrough illusory (the fraction of the volume 
sampled for coliform analysis usually ranges from 1/106 to 1/109). 
- the microorganisms may remain undetected due to the culture-based techniques 
used for their detection: coliform injured bacteria following disinfection may not 
be able to grow on traditional agar media but can be recovered using modified 
cultivation techniques (McFeters, 1990; McFeters et al., 1986; LeChevallier et 
McFeters, 1985). Craddock and Castle (1997) detected injured coliforms in 
10.4% of 173 treated water samples from four treatment plants in the UK, while 
routine bacteriological tests indicated that only 0.6% of the samples were 
coliform-positive. 
- Viable but non-culturable (VBNC) cells may be present and consequently not 
detected at all by culture-based detection methods. Baudart et al. (2002) and 
Baudart et al. (2005) showed that a significant proportion of enterobacteriaceae 
could be present in treated drinking water under the form of VBNC cells using 
the DVC-FISH-ScanRDI detection method. 
Lack of, or inadequate treatment has led to the detection of pathogenic organisms in 
treated water such as Giardia, Cryptosporidium and enteric viruses (Gofti-Laroche et al., 
2003; Ali et al., 2004), without the occurrence of waterborne disease outbreak in the 
supplied population. However, in some cases, waterborne disease outbreaks have 
resulted in systems fed with treated surface water (as in Milwaukee and North 
Battleford, see Section 2.1; Rab et al., 1997), treated groundwater (Fogarty et al., 1995; 
Hrudey et al., 2002), and untreated groundwater (Kukkula et al., 1997; Maurer and 
Sturchler, 2000; Hafiiger et al., 2000). The use of new and improved detection methods 
is suggesting that pathogenic microorganisms could even be released in treated water 
following adequate treatment. Monitoring studies for the detection of specific 
microorganisms in treated drinking water meeting the required water quality regulations 
(absence of indicators) have shown that: 
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- viable enteroviruses could be detected in treated water (Grabow et al., 2001; 
Vivier et al., 2004). Using integrated cell culture/nested PCR approach followed 
by restriction enzyme analysis, Vivier et al. (2004) detected Coxsackie B viruses 
in 11% and 16% of water samples from two surface water treatment plants (out 
of a total of 172 samples). 
- infectious Cryptosporidium could be detected in 1.4% of 1690 100L finished 
water samples collected from 22 out of 82 surface water treatment plants, using 
cell culture-polymerase chain reaction (Aboytes et al., 2004). Water quality and 
treatment plant characteristics were no different for the positive sites than for the 
sites that had no oocyst detections. 
Consequently, the use of molecular techniques for the detection of pathogenic organisms 
is gradually confirming that the acceptable water quality indicators may not necessarily 
reflect the virus and parasitical content of treated water. 
One mechanism playing an important role in treatment breakthrough is the release of 
particulate matter in treated water, which may facilitate the introduction of coliforms and 
other microorganisms into the distribution system. Particles released from granular 
activated carbon (GAC) filter beds were shown to be colonized with coliform bacteria 
(Camper et al., 1986). The particulate matter that embeds bacteria offers the 
microorganisms protection against disinfection (Gauthier et al., 1999; Morin et al., 1999; 
Stringfellow et a l , 1993; Berman et al., 1988; Herson et al., 1987; Ridgway and Olson, 
1982). Coliforms may also be associated with other types of particles such as 
invertebrates. These organisms (nematodes, rotifers and protozoa) have been observed in 
treatment plant effluent by many authors, e.g. van Lieverloo (1997), Schreiber et al. 
(1997), Gauthier et al. (1997) and Brazos and O'Connor (1996). Protection of bacteria 
against disinfection may be provided through ingestion by the protozoa (amoebae and 
ciliates), nematodes and amphipods (Locas et al., 2007; Ding et al., 1995; King et al., 
1988; Levy et al., 1986). Particulate matter and invertebrates might thus protect some 
microorganisms from treatment plant disinfection and allow them to be transported into 
the distribution system. 
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2.2.2 Distribution system intrusion 
Intrusion of pathogenic microorganisms into the distribution system can be expected 
if deteriorated and badly maintained infrastructure is in place. Waterborne disease 
outbreaks have been linked with the contamination of poorly maintained storage tank 
(with an inappropriate roof vent and an uncovered hatch allowing free access to wild 
birds) (Clark et al., 1996; Angulo et al., 1997), and to the combination of lack of 
chlorination, equipment failure, and back-siphonage in a distribution system (Mermin et 
al., 1999). In another case, without being in a situation of disease outbreak, the lack of 
water pressure and cross-contamination between the municipal water supply and sewer 
system was associated to an increased number of gastrointestinal illnesses in a study 
where self-reported incidence of diarrhea was compared between two groups (with and 
without access to piped water) (Semenza et al., 1998). 
However, intrusion of pathogenic microorganisms may take place even in well-
maintained systems. Four direct pathogen routes of entry have been identified by 
Kirmeyer et al. (2001). These are: (i) covered and uncovered storage facilities, (ii) water 
main installation and repair sites, (iii) cross-connections, and (iv) transitory 
contamination events through water main leakage points. Figure 2-1 illustrates the 
different components that may lead to intrusion along with the links between each main 
route. Backflow of non-potable water through cross-connection and transitory 
contamination are linked as the latter may be considered as a subset of backflow events. 
Water main installation and repair is in itself a possible pathway for pathogen intrusion, 
which also involves the operation of valves and hydrants which can lead to transient 
pressures. Main repair sites therefore appear as particularly vulnerable locations for 
intrusion. The four main routes of pathogen intrusion are described below. 
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Transitory contamination events 
through water main leakage points 
>DS operation 
Controlled pump startup and shut down 
Cross-connection 
Booster pump startup and shut down 
. , . 
Malfunctioning air release / vacuum valve 
Malfunctioning pressure relief valve 
Altitude valve closure 
Air valve slam 
Check valve slam 
Surge lank draining 
Feed tank draining 
> Service interruptions 
Pump trip due to power failure 
Loosing an overhead storage tank 











Main installation and repair 
>Pipe storage and handling 
^-Construction and repair 
Operation of valves 
Operation of hydrants 
Tank filling 
Figure 2-1: Direct pathogen routes of entry into DS (modified from Kirmeyer et al. 
(2001) and Friedman et al. (2004)) 
2.2.2.1 Uncovered and covered storage facilities 
Uncovered storage facilities located in distribution systems are subject to microbial 
contamination through the dejection of birds and small mammals that comes in contact 
with the water. LeChevallier et al. (1997) has measured increased protozoa 
concentrations following open reservoir storage, however, the organisms appeared to be 
non-viable. In their study of the factors influencing the occurrence of coliform bacteria 
in distribution systems, LeChevallier et al. (1996) have confirmed that the presence of 
open finished water reservoirs is one of the factors responsible for increasing the number 
of coliform occurrences. To the knowledge of the author, the use of open water reservoir 
to store treated drinking water is not or rarely used in the province of Quebec. 
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For covered storage facilities, appurtenances such as access hatches, overflow pipes, 
vents, roofs, and poorly constructed sidewall joints are potential portal of entry for 
microorganisms (that would be airborne) (Kirmeyer et al., 2001). Inadequate 
maintenance of a municipal water storage tank was identified as the cause of a 
Salmonella outbreak reported in Gideon (Missouri) in 1993 (Clark et al., 1996; Angulo 
et al., 1997). Tears or rips in floating covers could lead to loss of chlorine residual 
(Harvey et Kopansky, 2007) or contamination of treated water with accumulated rain 
water, potentially contaminated by bird droppings (Kirmeyer et al., 1999). 
Contamination of untreated well water in a storage facility, cleaned the previous month, 
has led to a Campylobacter jejuni outbreak in Minnesota in 1993 (Kramer et al., 1996). 
2.2.2.2 Cross-connections 
Cross-connections, defined as connections between a potable drinking water supply 
and a non-potable, undesirable or contaminated source, may pose a threat to distribution 
system integrity (Herrick, 1997) if they are not protected or if the device used for 
protection fails. Contaminated water may be introduced into distribution pipes from the 
backflow of water through the cross-connections due to a differential in pressure 
between the connected systems, especially during low pressure events in the distribution 
system (backsiphonage) or increased pressure from a non-potable source (backpressure). 
Lahti and Hiisvirta (1995) reported two outbreaks in Finland caused by cross-
connections involving sewage and seawater, both showing evidence of the presence of 
E. coli. In the United-States, US EPA has compiled data from 459 backflow incidents 
and estimated 12 093 illnesses due to those incidents between 1970 and 2001 (USEPA, 
2002a). In the Netherlands, dual water supply was installed in some new housing estates 
but cross-connection incidents between the drinking water supply system and water 
supply for non-potable use was one of the reasons leading to the termination of the dual 
water projects owned by water companies in this country (Oesterholt et al., 2007). 
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In the white-paper discussing the issue of cross-connection, USEPA (2002a) 
describes the common types of cross-connections (that can lead to either chemical or 
biological contamination) that include: irrigation, fire systems, garden/washdown hoses, 
and boilers. One study by Duranceau et al. (1998) showed that fire systems may be less 
of a risk in terms of microbial contamination. A detailed investigation of the water 
quality in 84 wet-pipe fire sprinkler systems showed that total coliforms were mostly 
absent from those systems. USEPA (2002a) reports that biological contaminants 
introduced through cross-connections are most often reported as sewage or non-specific 
microbes. Pathogens such as E. coli and Giardia have been associated with cross-
connection contamination events. Because of the pressure drop induced (and some other 
site-specific favorable conditions), some maintenance activities (meter repair, main 
shutdown for valve replacement, and main break) have resulted in backflow of 
contaminated water into distribution systems. 
Most cross-connections generally take place inside the private plumbing system of 
the customer. In a survey answered by 719 water utilities, Lee et al. (2003) report that 
16% of documented cross-connections were in areas under the direct control of the water 
utility while 83% were in private buildings. The authors also report that 55.5% of the 
identified cross-connections by utilities were connected to non-health hazards, 39% to 
health hazards, and 5.5% to sewage. Along with this survey, the authors also performed 
computer modeling to assess transient flow conditions created by sudden changes in 
demand (modeled through hydrant opening). The results showed that drastic transient 
flow conditions could be generated and result in significant pressure loss and flow 
reversal in distribution systems of any sizes. However, such results were obtained with 
hydrant opening times of two seconds. The representativeness of such a short opening 
time with respect to field conditions may be questioned. 
In the U.S., although the program requirements may vary widely between states, 50 
states have a requirement for the control of cross-connections and/or backflow 
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prevention (USEPA, 2002a). In the province of Quebec, municipalities are not 
compelled to apply such cross-connection control programs. 
2.2.2.3 Transitory contamination events through water main leakage points 
Transitory contamination events are related to the occurrence of negative or low 
pressures in water mains that would result in the introduction (backflow) of untreated 
water into the main (conditional to an available pathway such as pipe fracture or orifice, 
cross connection, leaking joints, etc.). A high potential risk of introduction of pathogenic 
microorganisms into the distribution system exists when transient negative pressure 
events occur in pipelines (LeChevallier et al., 2003). Pressure transients are caused by 
abrupt changes in the velocity of water and, as shown in Figure 2-1, multiple factors 
may lead to their occurrence (distribution system operation, service interruptions and 
sudden changes in demand), some of which can be controlled whereas some others 
don't. 
The scientific evidence available today shows that: 
low and negative pressure transients have been measured in full-scale 
distribution systems. One of the first occurrences of low pressure transients to be 
reported in the literature was by Walski and Lutes (1994). More recently, 
monitoring of distribution systems with high speed pressure transient data loggers 
has been conducted. Low distribution system transitory pressures have been 
measured by Kirmeyer et al. (2001) in network areas with history of low-pressure 
problems and in association with fire flow from hydrants. During their 18-month 
monitoring of the Davenport (Iowa) distribution system, LeChevallier et al. (2004) 
reported only five occasions (out of a combined 3 190 days of pressure monitoring) 
where the pressure dropped below 138 kPa (20 psi), while no negative pressures 
were recorded. For this same study, considering additional data, Gullick et al. 
(2005) reported nine low pressure events (P < 138 kPa (20 psi)) but still no negative 
pressure events for a combined 3 286 days of pressure monitoring. In a multiple 
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distribution system study, fifteen negative transient pressures events were measured 
by Gullick et al. (2004) in four out of the eight systems monitored. The main cause 
of negative pressure was a sudden shutdown of pumps at a treatment plant or pump 
station. Null or negative pressures lasted from 0.55 to 165 seconds. Based on a total 
of 499 days of logger data in a distribution system with about 60 000 connections, 
Hooper et al. (2006) recorded 11 low pressure events where the pressure was below 
138 kPa. The minimum pressure that could be recorded by the loggers used in this 
study was 0 kPa. 
indicator microorganisms and enteric viruses have been detected in soil and 
water surrounding water mains. The work of Karim et al. (2003) previously 
discussed in Section 2.1.2 showed that recovery of these organisms was common in 
the systems investigated. Early work conducted by Harris (1959) showed that 
elevated bacterial densities were found in trench bottoms next to existing pipes and 
that moisture content increased the counts substantially. The potential for bacterial 
contamination from damp soil near a leaking main is therefore elevated. Sewerage 
from leaking sewer mains can certainly contaminate the soil surrounding drinking 
water pipes as microorganisms are transported through soil. A review by Abu-
Ashour et al. (1994) showed that microorganisms can migrate significant distance in 
soil through macropores, worm holes, cracks and fractures. The transport 
mechanisms involve advection and dispersion, that are influenced by the effects of 
filtration, adsorption, desorption, growth, decay, and sedimentation. Common 
engineering standards typically call for an horizontal separation of three meters (10 
ft) and vertical separation of 0.45 meters (18 in) between drinking water and sewer 
lines (Kirmeyer et al., 2001). In the province of Quebec, the Directive 001 
(Ministere de l'Environnement du Quebec, 2002) calls for a 0.3 meters (12 in) 
horizontal separation between the closest drinking water and sewer pipe walls and a 
0.3 meters (12 in) vertical separation between the bottom of the drinking water main 
and the top of the sewer main, the drinking water main being located above the 
sewer main. If there is any increased risk of potential contamination, a minimal 
28 
three meters (10 ft) horizontal distance between the drinking water and sewer main 
is required. In older sections of distribution systems, it can be wondered if such 
standards are always observed. 
Intrusion volumes have been measured in a pilot-scale test rig that has been used 
to simulate intrusion associated with transient pressures (Boyd et al., 2004a; Boyd et 
al., 2004b). Intrusion volumes were assessed using three methods: a chemical tracer 
(cesium) method, a volumetric method and using theoretical estimates. The 
chemical tracer method showed average intrusion volumes of 11.4 and 71.2 mL for 
a 0.91 m (3 ft) external head and orifice diameters of 3.2 mm (1/8 in) and 6.4 mm 
(1/4 in.) respectively. Although higher values were obtained by the other two 
methods, the chemical tracer method clearly showed that the water that intruded was 
not merely re-extruded during the transient event. Although differences exist 
between a test rig and a full-scale distribution system, this study provides strong 
laboratory evidence that intrusion can occur during transient pressure events and 
that part of the intruded material remains in the pipe. Prior to this study, intrusion 
volumes had been modeled for three full-scale distribution system sections using 
surge analysis with the SURGE 5.2 model from the University of Kentucky 
(Kirmeyer et al., 2001). This model includes a so-called leakage/intrusion element 
that can be placed at nodes susceptible to low pressure conditions. The volume of 
intrusion/leakage is then calculated at each specified node depending on pressure 
conditions. Different conditions were used for simulation: (i) transient duration 
(from 20 to 120 seconds), (ii) external head (between 0.3 and 3 m (1-10 ft), (iii) 
orifice diameter (between 0.8 to 51 mm (1/32 to 2 inches)), and (iv) assumed 
leakage flow (assumed or derived from utility records). However, the calculated 
intrusion volumes under different scenarios (power loss, main break, and fire flow) 
were not field verified and served as a comparison purpose only. LeChevallier et al. 
(2004) also performed intrusion simulations for 14 cases modeled using surge 
analysis as part of the Davenport (Iowa) study using the Surge2000 model 
(University of Kentucky). Intrusion volumes in the distribution system varied from 
29 
0 to 20 L (5.27 gallons) for a simulation of power outage resulting in seven pump 
trip. A wave speed of 914 m/sec (3000 ft/sec) and an external head of 0 m were 
used. 
Distribution system characteristics and conditions that contribute to the occurrence of 
low and negative pressure have been investigated by Fleming et al. (2006). Using the 
results of transient (or surge) modeling for 16 distribution systems, the authors observed 
that systems delivering less than 38 ML/d (10 mgd), using groundwater as the source 
water and with few floating storage facilities were more susceptible to low or negative 
pressures. Other characteristics found to increase susceptibility within a system 
included: located near a pump station with downstream velocity greater than 0.9 m/sec 
(3 ft/sec), located greater than 1.6 km (one mile) away from elevated storage, elevation 
greater than 12-15 m (40-50 ft) above surroundings, located near a dead-end or near a 
hydrant on a major main. 
However, the missing link between the evidences mentioned above (occurrence of 
transient negative pressures, microbial contamination of soil and water surrounding 
water mains, and intrusion volumes obtained through laboratory settings or modeling) is 
the actual measurement of intruded material in a full-scale distribution system due to the 
occurrence of a low/negative pressure transient. Recently, a Giardia outbreak in a trailer 
park was related to a power outage that created a negative pressure transient in a 
distribution system. Contamination entered the system either through a cross-connection 
or a leaking pipe close to a sewer crossing (Blackburn et al., 2004). In England, a case-
control study of sporadic cryptosporidiosis showed a strong association between self-
reported diarrhea and reported low water pressure at the faucet (Hunter et al., 2005). The 
methodology used was based on the completion of a postal questionnaire where the 
respondents were asked if they had had a case of diarrhea within the two weeks 
preceding the reception of the questionnaire. Among other things, they were asked if 
they had a loss of water pressure at home during the same period. 
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Possible pathways for pathogen intrusion include the ones related to pipeline 
structural integrity: pipe fracture, deflections at flexible couplings, leaking joints, and 
deteriorating seals (Kirmeyer et al., 2001). Consequently, leak detection programs are 
usually recommended in order to minimize the risk from transitory events as well as for 
other economical and operational considerations. However, leak detection programs 
could sometimes result in a decline in water quality due to increased stagnation time of 
water in the system due to the reduction of leaks (Deb et al., 2000). As reported by these 
authors, the Boston Water and Sewer Commission experienced such a situation 
throughout the course of their leak reduction program. However, the problem was 
resolved by practicing pipe flushing and replacing larger mains with smaller ones where 
warranted. Colombo and Karney (2003) argue that the presence of leaks offers a 
protection against pipe bursting as leakage is an important mechanism for mitigating 
transient pressures in distribution system. However, a quantitative analysis of this effect 
is not straightforward. 
Cross-connections (as described in Section 2.2.2.2) and (submerged) air-vacuum 
valves are also possible pathways for the introduction of microorganisms. Illustrating 
this last path, McMath and Casey (2000) measured sub-atmospheric pressures at one 
distribution system point downstream of the pumping station of a UK system during 
surges. The authors observed that this point (an air valve vault) was flooded with dirty 
water during wet weather, thus explaining the high coliform failure rate in the 
corresponding distribution system area. In a survey of 26 water utilities conducted by 
Kirmeyer et al. (2001), 12 utilities indicated that the number of flooded valve vaults in 
their system could vary between 0 to 80% of total vaults. Location of water mains below 
the water table may be more at risk if the external head is higher than the internal system 
pressure. 
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2.2.2.4 Main installation and repair 
Water main repair has been associated with waterborne disease outbreaks as in the 
case of Cabool, MI (Section 1.1). Record low temperatures in December 1989 resulted 
in 43 outdoor service meters to freeze and two major distribution lines to break 
(Geldreich et al., 1992). The meters had to be replaced (some were found to be 
submerged under water) and the pipes repaired. This was combined to an undersized and 
deteriorating sewer collection system that was found to overflow through manholes, 
contaminating surface soil and runoff. Consequently, this contaminated runoff could 
have entered the system while the repairs were conducted. In Sweden, a waterborne 
disease outbreak affecting 10,000 people was due to a change in pipeline (Andersson et 
Bohan, 2001). The pipeline, containing stagnant raw water was brought into use without 
being flushed first. In France, the servicing of a large transmission main (24 in. or 60 cm 
diameter) after several weeks of construction work corresponded with an increase of 
diarrhea among the population, although the number of affected people could not be 
evaluated (Deshayes et al., 2001). About 60,000 people were without drinking water for 
a 15-day period as faecal coliforms and sulfite-reducing spores were detected in the 
water. 
A list of the potential sources or pathways of microbiological contamination during 
pipe repair has been compiled by Pierson et al. (2001) from the input of the utilities 
participating to the project. The authors determined three phases where contamination 
could occur: (1) prior to construction/repair, (2) during construction/repair, and (3) after 
construction/repair, as detailed in Table 2-7. 
32 














Unsanitary human contact 




Unsanitary human contact 
Water from broken water pipe enters trench 
Groundwater enters trench 
Sewage water enters trench 
Agricultural runoff enters trench 
Rainfall fills trench 
Transitory pressure variations 
Backflow/cross-connection to service line 
Cross-connection to system (hydrant) 
Contaminated potable water supply 
























A case of contamination prior to installation has been reported by Haas et al. (1998). 
Although swabs of an internal surface of a 12 in. (305 mm) pipe stored on the curbed 
side of the street and exposed to the local environment was negative for the presence of 
total coliforms, 75% of the swabs were positive for noncoliform bacterial growth on 
membrane filters and 100% were positive for HPCs. The presence of noncoliform 
growth is used by the Philadelphia Water Department as an indicator for contamination 
such that the authors concluded that contamination may be influenced by the conditions 
of pipe storage prior to installation. 
During the repair activities, points of concern of 250 water utilities surveyed by Haas 
et al. (1998) were mainly unsanitary construction practices (for nearly 40% of the 
utilities surveyed) and contamination from soil and trenchwater exposure (for 20% of 
the utilities). As discussed previously (Section 2.2.2.3), soil and water samples from 
trenches can be potentially contaminated with microorganisms (Harris, 1959; Karim et 
al., 2003). Several factors are likely to influence the potential for contamination during 
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repair: shutdown time, nature of the excavation, method of repair, storage or cleanliness 
of materials, and size of the job (Haas et al., 1998). As such, in order to minimize the 
potential contamination, main repairs should be conducted "under pressure", i.e. the 
water main is not isolated or completely shut down by closing valves (Kirmeyer et al., 
2001). In the survey conducted by these authors, 6 of 26 water utilities reported that no 
water mains were repaired under pressure. Pierson et al. (2001) reports that potential 
cross-connections that may be associated with main repairs include backflow from a 
contaminated service connection, connection of a contaminated flushing point to the 
repaired section of main, and flow of contaminated water across a leaking or improperly 
seated isolation valve. 
LeChevallier et al. (2006) monitored male-specific coliphages (viruses that infect E. 
coli) in water samples from the Davenport (Iowa) chloraminated distribution system for 
about a year and a half and detected these microorganisms in 5.6% of the samples 
(average concentration of 0.1 pfu/100 mL - range of 0-5 pfu/100 mL). They had more 
than 77% of the positive coliphage samples that occurred within 72 hours of a main 
break. The authors speculated that the presence of coliphage could be associated with 
the unusually large number of main breaks during the winter months, although the two 
events were not closely related (Figure 2-2). They hypothesized that the poor 
effectiveness of the chloramine residual against viruses could have contributed to their 
survival in the distribution system or in biofilms. However, the association was not 
particularly strong and the authors determined that additional research was necessary to 
establish a link between these parameters. The use of GIS-linked mapping has been 
suggested. 
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Figure 2-2: Occurrence of male-specific coliphage detected from water samples and 
pipeline repairs in the Davenport distribution system (LeChevallier et al., 2006) 
After the repair is completed, flushing, disinfection (according to AWWA Standard 
C651), and water quality testing are the recommended actions for contamination control 
(Pierson et al., 2001). Haas et al. (1998) reports that another potential source of 
contamination may come from stagnant water created by closed valves adjacent to the 
area of the construction or repair. In the Netherlands, results of water quality testing 
after invasive distribution system operations provided by three water companies showed 
that 0.57% of 16,047 water samples collected after operations contained E. coli or 
thermotolerant coliforms (van Lieverloo et al., 2006). A recent study in Norway showed 
that pipe breaks and maintenance work (with presumed loss of water pressure) in 
distribution systems caused an increased risk of gastrointestinal illness among water 
recipients (Nygard et al., 2007). Following 88 low pressure episodes taking place in 
seven distribution systems, exposed and unexposed households were selected and 
interviewed within 8-14 days after the episodes. They were asked, among other things, if 
they had noticed any discolouration or strange taste of tap water or if they thought any 
work was done on water pipes recently. They were also asked about episodes of acute 
gastrointestinal (GI) illness in household. During a 1-week period after the episode, 
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12.7% of the exposed households reported GI illness compared with 8% in the 
unexposed households. Unfortunately, few water quality data were available to correlate 
with the results obtained. Water samples were available for only 18 episodes and one 
sample was found positive for E. coli. No information regarding the level of residual 
disinfectant used in the distribution systems was given. 
Using U.S. statistics on the occurrence of water main breaks compiled in 1992 and 
the total miles of mains (as of 1994), Kirmeyer et al. (2001) estimated that about 
237,600 water main repairs are performed annually in the U.S. The same type of 
estimation was not found for Canada, but the frequency of repairs is likely to be high. 
Mirza and Haider (2003) reported the results of a Canadian municipal infrastructure 
survey conducted in 1995/96 by McGill University and the Federation of Canadian 
Municipalities that showed that 59% of the water distribution networks were in 
unsatisfactory condition at that time. 
2.3 IMPACT OF DISINFECTANT RESIDUAL ON MICROBIAL INTRUSION 
2.3.1 Experimental studies 
As discussed in the previous sections, potential routes of microbial intrusion into a 
distribution system include cross-connections, intruded material remaining after repair 
work, ill-maintained storage tanks and pipe leaks or other orifices when transient 
negative pressures occur. If no residual disinfectant is used in the system, it can be 
hypothesized that microorganisms will be able to survive and colonize pipe biofilm for 
some time. However, if a residual disinfectant is in place, will such microorganisms be 
inactivated? Will they be able to colonize the biofilm? In order to provide some insight 
into these questions, this section of the literature review was reorganized into an in-
depth review paper submitted to a peer-reviewed journal (the Journal of the American 
Water Works Association) and can be found in Chapter 4. The paper discusses the data 
of published studies that simulate intrusion and examine the fate of microorganisms 
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introduced into experimental systems. Various testing scales are evaluated in order to 
determine what can be learned from these experiments. 
2.3.2 Modeling studies 
Another way to assess the effectiveness of a disinfectant residual against the intrusion 
of pathogens in distribution systems is through the use of theoretical approaches and 
modeling. While many papers are available on the simulation of chlorine (and other 
water quality parameters) in distribution systems (Munavalli and Mohan Kumar, 2004; 
Tryby et al., 2002; Rodriguez and Serodes, 1999; Gagnon, 1998; Rossman et al., 1994), 
to the knowledge of the author, two groups have published research work illustrating the 
action of a disinfectant residual on microbial intrusion in a distribution system. These 
studies are based on the use of hydraulic modeling. Upgrades to the EPANET model, 
which in its original format is limited to track the dynamics of a single component as it 
is transported through the network, now allow the modeling of the fate and transport of 
multiple dissolved constituents in distribution system (Uber et al., 2004). This new 
EPANET extension is now available as EPANET-MSX (Multi-Species extension) 
(USEPA, 2007). 
Propato and Uber (2004) developed a simulation framework based on water quality 
modeling coupled with a statistical approach to quantify the risk of delivering infected 
water to consumers. The framework includes the following elements: 
a network hydraulic model, performing an extended period simulation; 
a microbial intrusion model, where intrusions are equally likely to occur at any 
point of water consumption and modeled as constant mass flow rate of an infinite 
duration. As noted by the authors, such assumptions are more consistent with the 
worst-case scenario of intentional intrusion. The only mechanism that is 
considered for microbial inactivation is the effect of the residual disinfectant; 
- a residual maintenance strategy, that may consider booster chlorination, 
conventional dosing at the treatment plant, use of free chlorine or chloramines; 
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- a network water quality model, that uses the Chick Watson kinetics for the rate 
of inactivation of microorganisms coupled with a 1st order kinetic model for the 
decay rate of disinfectant; 
a vulnerability assessment, that provides "vulnerability curves" showing the 
probability that the fraction of the population exposed to contaminated water is 
less than or equal to a specified value. 
Case studies performed on two water distribution systems, using Giardia as the intruded 
microorganism, showed that the risk of consumer exposure was affected by the residual 
maintenance strategy employed. A chloramine residual was found to be less effective 
than free chlorine and offered only a very modest improvement when compared to when 
no residual was used. The addition of booster chlorination at storage tanks was found to 
improve consumer protection. The level of improvement of such a practice was found to 
be a function of the size of the population served by the storage tanks. 
Baribeau et al. (2005) also used the EPANET-MSX model (with first-order (Chick 
Watson) inactivation kinetics), to model the disinfectant residual effectiveness on the 
intrusion of Giardia (worst-case scenario) and Escherichia coli 0157:H7 (an average 
organism) at a specific distribution system location. The authors concluded that a free 
chlorine residual of 0.5 mg/L was insufficient to provide adequate control of Giardia 
(concentration of 5000 cysts/L) but could provide ample protection against E. coli (5000 
cfu/L). Chloramines were predicted to have a negligible effect even on a relatively 
susceptible organism such as E. coli. 
2.4 RISKS RELATED TO ACCIDENTAL INTRUSION OF 
MICROORGANISMS IN DISTRIBUTION SYSTEMS 
The concept of risk, linked to intrusion of microorganisms in distribution systems, 
may be divided into two types. First, there is the risk of microbial intrusion associated 
with system operational practices and maintenance activities. Secondly, there is the 
subsequent risk of infection associated with the consumption of contaminated drinking 
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water due to accidental microbial intrusion. These two types of risks are described 
below. 
2.4.1 Risk of microbial intrusion due to system O&M activities 
Research work has been conducted to identify distribution system locations most 
susceptible to intrusion by Lindley and Buchberger (2002). These authors have 
developed a framework based on hydraulic modeling and geographic information 
system (GIS) to integrate multiple risk factors including historical break data, locations 
susceptible to adverse pressure, susceptibility because of intrusion pathways, and 
susceptibility from existence of a contaminant source. Implementation of this framework 
involves obtaining the appropriate data sets, performing hydraulic simulations, 
estimating structural integrity, locating high-risk connections or sensitive populations 
and performing spatial data queries. 
A different type of approach, called the Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Point 
(HACCP) approach has also been used to identify potential hazards in distribution 
systems. The HACCP approach has been identified as an interesting framework for 
managing risks related to drinking water (Deere et al., 2001). The intent of HACCP is to 
focus on system control at critical points throughout a process, thereby preventing 
hazards from occurring, or reducing hazards to an acceptable level (Martel et al., 2006). 
Besides, this proactive approach is the basis of the drinking water guidelines issued in 
countries such as Australia (Australian Government, 2004) and of the water safety plans 
making up the drinking water quality guidelines issued by the World Health 
Organization (WHO, 2004). 
The first application of HAACP to drinking water supply has been performed by 
Havelaar (1994). The author identified the major hazard in distribution system as being 
the recontamination of treated water during storage and distribution. The critical control 
points have been defined as: adequate construction, maintenance of positive hydrostatic 
pressure at all times, and application of hygienic precautions when laying new mains or 
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working on existing facilities. Within the framework of an AwwaRF project, Martel et 
al. (2006) report on the prioritization of the potential hazards in the distribution system 
of the city of Austin (TX) following the application of HACCP: backflow through 
unprotected cross-connections, contamination at new construction sites, backflow from 
failing septic systems into distribution main, contamination due to water main break or 
repair and pathogen intrusion to distribution main due to leaky sewage main were the 
top five hazards out of ten listed. 
2.4.2 Risk of infection associated with consumption of contaminated drinking water 
due to accidental intrusion 
In order to estimate the potential level of infection that a pathogenic microorganism 
may induce in a population, quantitative microbial risk assessment (QMRA) is used and 
is generally based on the following four conceptual steps, as described by Haas and 
Eisenberg(2001): 
hazard identification: identification of a pathogen as an agent of potential 
significance. 
exposure assessment: determination of the microbial doses typically consumed 
by the direct user of a water and routes, amount and duration of the exposure, 
dose-response assessment: analysis of dose-response curve for which it is 
generally necessary to extrapolate a fitted curve into the low-dose region, 
risk characterization: combination of the information on exposure and dose-
response into an overall estimation of likelihood of an adverse consequence. This 
can either be presented as a point estimate of risk or as a distribution of risk. 
Haas and Eisenberg (2001) have noted some limitations of the QMRA framework for 
the assessment of microbiological risks. QMRA was initially developed for chemical 
risk assessment, and it does not consider properties that are unique to infectious disease 
transmission (secondary (person-to-person) disease transmission, long- and short term 
immunity, and the environmental population dynamics of pathogens). 
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QMRA has been used by Westrell et al. (2003) to evaluate the anticipated annual 
number of infections in a study population caused by Cryptosporidium parvum, 
rotavirus, and Campylobacter jejuni for different treatment failures (precipitation, 
filtration, disinfection malfunctions) and distribution failures (cross-connection, 
reservoir and pipe contamination). In the system studied (Gothenburg, Sweden), sub-
optimal particle removal and disinfection malfunction were the main risk incidents 
whereas distribution system incidents were less frequent and only affected a small 
proportion of the population. However, it is interesting to note that a major part of the 
potential yearly infections originated from the normal operation of the system and not 
from failures. 
A calculation method to assess the risk of contamination during distribution has been 
developed by van Lieverloo et al. (2006) within the framework of the "Microrisk" 
research project supported by the European Commission. The authors based their 
assessment on the pathogen to E. coli ratio for possible contamination sources such as 
untreated sewage, surface water and soil/shallow groundwater (surrounding water 
mains) as an index for pathogen concentrations in water samples. The representative 
pathogens selected were Cryptosporidium and Giardia for protozoan parasites, 
Campylobacter for bacteria and enterovirus for viruses. Retrospective pathogen 
exposures were calculated for different conditions such as during a waterborne outbreak 
taking place in the Netherlands in 2001, during 50 non-outbreak faecal contamination 
events recorded by seven water companies in the Netherlands from 1994 through 2003, 
and during incidental occurrence of E. coli using positive E. coli sample data supplied 
by 22 water companies from five countries. The authors used bootstrapping to multiply 
the probability density functions (PDF) of positive E. coli concentrations and pathogen 
to E. coli ratios to obtain a PDF of pathogen concentrations. Because the source of 
contamination events in distribution systems is often unknown, the authors concluded 
that the developed method was flawed mainly because of the uncertainties and variation 
of the actual pathogen to E. coli ratios between and within possible contamination 
sources. Enterovirus to E. coli ratios in soil and shallow groundwater were calculated 
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using the Karim et al. (2003) data and were found to be much higher than in surface 
water or untreated sewage calculated using data from the Netherlands and Germany. 
Mean exposure to enterovirus was almost a million times higher when assuming 
pathogen to E. coli ratios from soil/shallow groundwater than from untreated domestic 
sewage. Because of such large variations, the proposed method was found barely 
applicable to estimate pathogen concentrations and resulting infection risks to 
consumers during faecal contamination events. However, in the current absence of a 
better index of pathogen exposure it is still considered by the authors as the only method 
available to estimate the possible health effects for consumers. 
A framework for estimating the spatial and temporal distribution of health impacts 
resulting from ingestion of contaminated drinking water has been proposed by Murray et 
al. (2006). This framework considers the use of a dynamic disease model (which predict 
temporal spread of disease through susceptible, infected and recovered subpopulations), 
a dose-response curve with the potential dose calculated from flow and transport 
simulations using a hydraulic model. One potential application of this model is to help in 
designing a spatial network of sensors to detect contamination events. 
In terms of assessing the risk for public health from intrusion specifically resulting 
from low/negative pressure transients in distribution system, LeChevallier et al. (2003) 
have identified the following factors as influencing the magnitude of this risk: 
1. number and effective size of orifices (leaks) 
2. type and amount of contaminant external to the distribution system 
3. frequency of the pressure transient event 
4. duration of the pressure transient event 
5. magnitude of the pressure transient event 
6. population exposed 
The authors note that to this day, there is insufficient data to indicate whether pressure 
transients are a substantial source of risk to water quality in the distribution system. 
Mclnnis (2004) has developed a relative-risk framework (based on the QMRA concept) 
42 
for the evaluation of transient pathogen intrusion in distribution systems. The author 
used a reference groundwater contamination, intrusion volumes are obtained through 
transient modeling, and transport of contaminant is simulated using a water quality 
model (taking into account the free chlorine residual inactivation on coliform bacteria). 
The concentration data are then input into a Monte Carlo simulation which provides a 
probability distribution of the number of microorganisms ingested by a given receptor 
(which depends on the frequency distribution of the time to draw and consume water, 
time at which water is consumed during intrusion event and volume of water consumed). 
The model was not specifically used for the estimation of the actual risks to human 
health (because of the difficulty to obtain all required data) but rather for the estimation 
of the risk reduction achieved from various mitigation strategies. 
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CHAPTER 3 
RESEARCH OBJECTIVES AND METHODOLOGY 
3.1 CRITICAL REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE ON DISTRIBUTION 
SYSTEM INTRUSION 
In general, the link between the contamination of distributed water and occurrence of 
operation and maintenance activities in distribution system is mostly based on specific 
cases resulting in waterborne disease outbreaks (Geldreich et al., 1992; Mansotte et 
Beaudeau, 1999; Deshayes et al., 2001; Andersson et Bohan, 2001). It is also possible to 
know the fraction of reported outbreaks (particularly in the U.S.) which can be attributed 
to distribution system deficiencies (Craun et Calderon, 2001; Blackburn et al., 2004; 
Liang et al., 2006). However, without being in a situation of disease outbreak, water 
utilities can be faced with non-compliance events (with respect to regulations) due to the 
occurrence of positive coliform samples in their distribution system. No specific study of 
the fraction of these non-compliance events that can originate from distribution system 
activities has ever been compiled. 
Four direct pathogen routes of entry into a distribution system have been 
identified by Kirmeyer et al. (2001). These are covered and uncovered storage facilities, 
water main installation and repair sites, cross-connections, and transitory contamination 
events through water main leakage points. The concern of pathogen intrusion into 
distribution system due to negative or low pressure transients is relatively recent, with 
the first papers on this topic published in the late 1990's. It has been shown that negative 
pressure transients occur in full-scale distribution systems (Gullick et al., 2004), that the 
soil and water surrounding water mains may be contaminated with faecal pollution 
(Karim et al., 2003), and that intrusion of contaminated water takes place under negative 
pressure transients, as verified under pilot system simulation conditions (Boyd et al., 
2004a; Boyd et al., 2004b). These studies lend support to the current concern that 
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intrusion phenomena may be more common in full-scale distribution systems than 
previously believed, but evidence of water contamination under such conditions in full-
scale systems has not been assessed yet. Recent studies have suggested a link between 
the occurrence of low pressure events (associated with pipe burst and occurrence of 
other maintenance work) and increased gastrointestinal illness rate in the population 
(Hunter et al., 2005; Nygard et al., 2007). However, no measurements have been 
conducted in real networks to actually monitor changes in distributed water quality 
under the different distribution system operational characteristics that may lead to the 
occurrence of low and negative pressures either transient or sustained (standard 
operation, service interruptions and sudden changes in demand). 
For the other intrusion pathways, most of the data available to assess their importance 
in terms of pathogen intrusion rely on the occurrence of waterborne disease outbreaks, 
surveys among water utilities, and intuitive thinking. Although field studies assessing 
the impact of cross-connections can be relatively difficult to accomplish, such studies 
can certainly be conducted to investigate main installation and repairs, and provide a 
basis on which to evaluate risks. 
By looking at the links existing between each main route of intrusion (Figure 2-1), 
main repair sites appear as a particularly vulnerable location for intrusion because of the 
operational characteristics involved as part of this maintenance activity (repair procedure 
itself, operation of valves and hydrants). Moreover, the conclusions of our literature 
review of experiments simulating intrusion of microorganisms suggest that conditions 
experienced when pipe break repairs are conducted in full-scale systems are likely the 
most favorable to pathogen persistence in a water system. To this day, no descriptive 
studies have been conducted on the impact of repair procedures on water quality. 
Although it is generally assumed that water utilities apply the AWWA Standard C651 
for disinfection after repairs, this is far from always being the case and disinfection is 
likely to be applied only after major repairs are conducted. Limiting the time that water 
service is interrupted is one reason for this (Burlingame and Neukrug, 1993). Moreover, 
45 
the impacts of repair procedures outside of the isolated distribution system area are 
hardly addressed in the existing literature. Only Haas et al. (1998) mentioned that 
stagnant water created by closed valves adjacent to the area of the construction or repair 
may become problematic, but no data were provided. 
Some authors have argued that monitoring for microbial intrusion, particularly from 
pressure transients, is impractical (LeChevallier et al., 2003). This is certainly true if no 
specific activities are targeted. However, it is felt that by intensively monitoring some 
specific O&M activities, it will increase the chance of measuring transient pressures and 
resulting water quality variations. 
Our in-depth review of the experimental studies investigating the fate of 
microorganisms injected in simulated distribution systems clearly showed that the 
conclusions about the efficacy of a disinfectant residual to protect against pathogen 
intrusion are not converging. The laboratory-scale (or bench-scale) systems, the pilot-
scale systems and the full-scale system all lead to different observations. To the 
knowledge of the author, a comprehensive review such as the one presented in Chapter 
4, has never been published before. 
Finally, although the HACCP concept may be used to target critical control points in 
terms of intrusion, scientific data are necessary in order to assess the importance of 
operational practices and maintenance activities on potential intrusion in distribution 
system. This first step is necessary to eventually assess the subsequent risk from 
intrusion on public health. 
3.2 OBJECTIVES 
The main question that this research seeks to answer is the following one: 
What is the risk of microbial contamination in a drinking water distribution system when 
routinely conducted operation and maintenance activities take place? 
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The main objective of this research project is to assess the conditions leading to 
intrusion of contaminants in a system during a set of standard operations and 
maintenance activities in order to identify solutions to minimize such events and protect 
public health. On a more detailed level, this project will seek to: 
1. Demonstrate through data mining that a significant portion of non-compliance events 
may be linked to distribution system operation and maintenance activities; 
2. Investigate, in full-scale distribution systems, the link between O&M activities, 
distribution system hydraulics and potential water quality changes (with an emphasis 
on the occurrence of negative transient pressures and microbial intrusion); 
3. Achieve transient and intrusion modeling to assess the potential level of intrusion 
associated with negative pressure events in a full-scale distribution system. 
The fulfillment of these objectives will allow us to bring the following innovative 
contributions: 
• The development of an approach allowing to identify the causes of water quality 
variations in distribution systems (such as the occurrence of coliform positive 
samples); 
• The characterization of potential microbial intrusion pathways in a full-scale 
distribution system; 
• A detailed field investigation of a selection of operational and maintenance 
activities and their impact on system hydraulics and water quality; 
• An assessment of potential intrusion volumes in a full-scale distribution system 
during negative pressure events obtained through modeling; 
The completion of this project is based on the following research hypotheses: 
1. Although O&M activities (such as pipe flushing for example) are beneficial on the 
long run for improving water quality in a distribution system, they can lead to short-
term negative impacts such as the occurrence of coliforms at routine sampling 
points. 
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This hypothesis may be demonstrated by comparing the spatio-temporal occurrence 
of positive coliform samples with the spatio-temporal occurrence of maintenance 
work in a system using historical databases. 
2. Main repair procedures influence the level of potential contamination inside and 
outside the isolated distribution system area. 
This hypothesis may be verified by conducting water quality samplings during 
repairs of water mains using a protocol allowing for simultaneous sample collection 
both outside and inside the distribution system area isolated for repair. 
3. Standard distribution system operation and some maintenance activities may lead to 
measurable pressure transients that may in turn cause significant contamination by 
ingress in full-scale distribution systems. 
This hypothesis may be verified by monitoring pressure, characterizing potential 
pathways of intrusion and conducting water quality samplings during some selected 
O&M activities in full-scale systems. Intrusion levels related to negative pressure 
events associated with standard system operation may be assessed by using 
transient modeling based on field monitoring data. 
3.3 METHODOLOGY 
The research plan included three main steps as described below. 
3.3.1 Demonstration, through data mining, that non-compliance events may be linked 
with distribution system O&M activities 
Testing for the presence of coliform bacteria is usually conducted by water utilities in 
order to assess the microbiological quality of their distributed water and conform to the 
regulations in place. This first task therefore consists in identifying the causes of the 
positive colifom samples collected in distribution systems to determine the fraction that 
can be attributed to O&M activities. This is done in order to identify the most critical 
activities with respect to distribution system water quality and fulfill our research 
objective #1 (Section 3.2). In 2002, a review paper has been produced by the author of 
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this thesis (Besner et al., 2002) with the main intent of explaining the occurrence of 
coliforms in distribution systems and showed that O&M activities were a likely source 
of contamination (the contribution of this paper was recognized by the American Water 
Works Association (AWWA) as it was awarded the 2004 AWWA Distribution & Plant 
Operations Division Best Paper Award). Such evidence was the starting point of this 
first research objective. 
This first research task was conducted using a data integration approach based on the 
consideration of historical databases. The concept of data visualization and database 
query was used to facilitate the identification of the spatio-temporal relationship between 
the coliform data and the other types of data available. Within the framework of the 
author's master thesis (Besner et al., 2001), a version of a simple visualization tool was 
developed in collaboration with the MADITUC group from Ecole Polytechnique 
(Professor M. Trepanier and R. Chapleau). This collaborative work with the MADITUC 
group was continued during this Ph.D. work resulting in an improved version of a 
prototype of an interactive database analyzer. Although it has been used for a research 
purpose, this innovative tool was also transferred to the participating water utilities, 
allowing them to manage their own databases. 
Databases were collected from five water utilities with different water types and 
operating characteristics. These utilities, located in North-America and Europe are the 
City of Laval (Quebec, Canada), the City of Montreal (Quebec, Canada), the City of 
Moncton (New-Brunswick, Canada), the City of Egham (United-Kingdom), and the City 
of Caen (France). The main steps of the work conducted for this task are decribed below. 
3.3.1.1 Database collection 
In order to identify the causes of the occurrence of coliforms in a distribution system, 
many parameters, and not just water quality data, must be taken into account. The 
typical parameters are listed in Table 3-1: 
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Table 3-1: Typical database parameters needed for distribution system water quality 
investigation 
Data type 
Quality data (source water, 
treated water, distributed 
water) 
DS structural characteristics 
DS hydraulics 
DS operation & maintenance 
data 
Geographical data (G1S) 
Parameters 
Coliform bacteria, heterotrophic plate count, disinfectant residual, 
conductivity, temperature, pH, turbidity, etc. 
Node elevation, pipe diameter, pipe length and roughness 
coefficient, pipe material and year of installation, presence of 
storage tanks, pumps and valves characteristics, hydrants and valves 
location, etc. 
Epanet simulated parameters (flow, velocity, pressure, residence 
time, etc.), Field measurements 
Valve/hydrant maintenance program, flushing program, pipe 
relining and cleaning, new pipe installation, pipe leaks and breaks, 
firefighter interventions, SCADA results, etc. 
Street names and lay-out, municipality limits, land use, etc. 
DS: Distribution system; G1S: Geographical information system 
For each water utility, a database, as complete as the local availability of the 
information allowed, was built to include water quality parameters, system hydraulics 
and distribution system operation and maintenance work (including accidental events, as 
far as feasible). If possible, the data for a period of at least four years was requested. 
The goal was to integrate all these different types of data under the same platform, 
designed to include a geographical component allowing data visualization. This may 
seem straightforward at first, but database management may be quite variable between 
and within water utilities. Data are often dispersed among different departments 
(laboratory, public works, planning, etc) and can also be available under different 
formats (from paper to electronic files to ready-to-use GIS files). 
3.3.1.2 Data formatting and geocoding 
Data formatting consisted in correctly classifying data, along with their associated 
attributes (complementary information used to describe an event such as a date, an 
address, a description, etc.), in fields in Microsoft Excel spreadsheets. This software is 
used to store data as it presents the advantages of being universal and very flexible to 
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import/export data with the different types of information management systems 
available in utilities. 
A data geocoding step (i.e. allocation of geographical (x-y) coordinates) was then 
performed to achieve data visualization using a GIS-type software. In databases, the data 
referenced using (a) a street address, (b) a street intersection, or (c) an item ID (such as a 
valve or hydrant) do not implicitly contain the (x-y) coordinates necessary to locate the 
information on a map. Geocoding was achieved using a correspondence file where (x-y) 
coordinates are available for each civic address, intersection or item. However, this type 
of file was not always directly available, and its availability depended on the extent of 
GIS development at a utility. 
3.3.1.3 Database queries 
Using the prototype tool that was developed, a systematic study of all the positive 
total coliform samples collected in each distribution system was conducted. The tool was 
used to perform multi-table (simultaneous queries in different databases) and multi-
criterion (according to hydraulic, spatial, temporal and specific parameter values) 
database queries for each positive coliform occurrence available in the utility databases. 
A total of 140 positive coliform samples in five distribution systems were investigated. 
Results of the queries were directly viewed with the GIS software, allowing the 
identification of all the events that could have affected the water quality at the studied 
location. For each water utility, matrices were constructed with the potential causes of 
each positive coliform sample identified from the database study. From this, the main 
O&M activities associated with the occurrence of coliform samples could be identified 
as well as the fraction of coliform occurrences attributable to O&M activities. 
The causes of coliform occurrences identified are naturally linked with the types 
of data available. Also, the fact that coliform samples are generally collected at fixed 
distribution system sampling locations and at specific frequencies, only gives a picture 
of what is taking place in the close area of these points at the time of sample collection. 
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This supports further investigations and is the main reason a field study was conducted 
to complement the information obtained from this task. 
3.3.2 Investigation of the link between O&M activities, distribution system hydraulics 
and water quality variations in full-scale distribution systems 
Maintenance of a distribution system physical and hydraulic integrity is an essential 
condition to minimize potential water contamination (NRC, 2006). When O&M 
activities are conducted, a possibility exists that the physical and/or hydraulic integrity 
of the system may be lost. Examples include repairs of water mains, where the physical 
integrity of the system is obviously affected as the system is opened to the atmosphere. 
Even under normal system operating conditions, loss of hydraulic integrity is possible, 
such as when power failures occur and affect pump operation at a WTP resulting in the 
decreased ability of the system to supply water at the required flow and pressure. 
The field work conducted as part of this task therefore consisted in monitoring some 
activities that could affect the physical/hydraulic integrity of a system and verify how 
these activities could lead to changes in water quality in full-scale distribution systems. 
Microbial intrusion was specifically targeted here. As illustrated in Figure 3-1, the 
activities monitored included: repairs of water main breaks/leaks, water main flushings, 
hydrant flow tests, pump start-up and shutdowns, and normal distribution system 
operation. The potential impact of water main repairs on water quality was directly 
assessed during the monitored repairs. For the other selected activities, their impact on 
hydraulic integrity was first assessed by monitoring pressures to detect low and negative 
transient pressures that could be induced. Two potential pathways of microbial intrusion 
were investigated: soil and shallow groundwater surrounding buried water mains and 
water from flooded air-vacuum valve vaults. 
52 
Repairs of water mains 
Flushing activities 
Hydrant flow tests 
Pump start-up/shut-downs 
Normal system operation 
Figure 3-1: Study of link between O&M activities, distribution system hydraulics and 
water quality 
Because of the climatic conditions experienced in the Montreal area, the field work 
was conducted mostly during summertime (usually between May and October) from 
2004 to 2007. During wintertime, cold weather and freezing conditions make the access 
to distribution systems more difficult and monitoring equipment such as pressure sensors 
cannot be installed outside (such as on fire hydrants). 
3.3.2.1 Characterization of potential pathways of intrusion 
3.3.2.1.1 Soil / Shallow groundwater surrounding buried water mains 
Soil and shallow groundwater samples were collected during repairs of water mains 
that took place in the Laval and Montreal distribution systems during the summer of 
2004 and 2005. Soil samples were collected in the vicinity of the exposed main using a 
sterile trowel. The samples were put into large plastic (Ziploc® type) bags. Water 
samples were collected using four autoclaved one-liter plastic bottles. 
3.3.2.1.2 Water from flooded air-vacuum valve vaults 
A list of the location of valve vaults where either (i) an air-release valve; (ii) an air-
vacuum valve; or (iii) a combination air-valve was positioned was provided by the city 
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of Laval. These sites were visited from July to October 2007 and water samples were 
collected if some standing water was found in the vault. When completely flooded, a 
pump was used to pump the excess water and verify that the valve was in fact an air-
valve. Water samples were collected using seven autoclaved one-liter plastic bottles 
(with 0.01% (w/v) sodium thiosulfate to neutralize residual chlorine if necessary). When 
possible, water samples were collected directly by dropping the bottle into the standing 
water. When not possible, a manual pump (Attwood, Lowell, MI) and 6 mm (0.25 in.) 
PVC tubing were used to fill the sampling bottles. 
3.3.2.1.3 Bacteriological and coliphages analyses conducted on soil/water from pipe trenches 
and water from flooded air valve vaults 
For soil samples, 20 grams of soil were mixed with 200 mL of saline and stirred on a 
magnetic stirrer for 1 minute. The sample was left to stand for 30 minutes and the 
supernatant was then recuperated for bacteriological and coliphages analysis. For water, 
the 1-liter samples were pooled and stirred on a magnetic stirrer for 1 minute, left to 
stand for 30 minutes and 250 mL of supernatant were recuperated for bacteriological and 
coliphages analysis. These analyses were conducted by the INRS-Institut Armand-
Frappier laboratory, an external laboratory, through a collaboration with Dr. Pierre 
Payment. 
Samples were assayed for the presence of aerobic endospores, Clostridium 
perfringens, E. coli, total coliforms (not assayed in 2004) and Enterococci (only in water 
from flooded valve vaults) within 24 hours of sampling using membrane filtration 
methods. Two 10 mL and two 1 mL portions (or appropriate dilutions) of the sample 
were assayed on each culture media. Tryptic soy broth (Difco Laboratories) with 0.01% 
triphenyl tetrazolium chloride was used to enumerate aerobic endospores. Samples were 
filtered on a membrane, placed in a 50 mm Petri dish containing a pad saturated with the 
medium, pasteurized during 15 minutes at 75°C in a water bath and incubated at 35°C 
for 24 hours. Red colonies were counted as aerobic endospores (Barbeau et al., 1997), 
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and the vast majority of these organisms are species of Bacillus. The method described 
by Armon and Payment (1988) was used to enumerate C. perfringens by membrane 
filtration using mCP agar and incubation at 45°C for 18-24 hours. In 2005 and 2007, MI 
(Difco Laboratories) agar was used for the simultaneous detection of E. coli and total 
conforms after 24 hours at 35°C (USEPA, 2002c). Blue colonies were reported as E. coli 
and fluorescent colonies under longwave ultraviolet light (366nm) (including the blue 
colonies under ambient light) as total coliforms. In 2004, E.coli were detected with 
mTEC agar by membrane filtration (USEPA, 2002d). The dishes were incubated at 35 ± 
0.5°C for 2 h. After a 2h incubation at 35 ± 0.5°C, the plates were transferred at 44.5 ± 
0.2°C for 22-24 h. An absorbent pad was placed in the lid of the same petri dish, and 
saturated with Urea Substrate Medium. The membranes from mTEC Agar were 
transferred to the saturated absorbent pad and kept at room temperature for 15-20 min. 
Yellow, yellow-green, or yellow-brown colonies were counted as E. coli. Method 1600 
of the U.S. EPA was used for the detection of Enterococci (mEI agar, 41°C for 24 hours) 
(USEPA, 2002e). Blue colonies or colonies with a blue halo were counted as 
Enterococci. 
For the coliphages assay, method 1602 of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 
(USEPA, 2001c) was used with E. coli CN-13 as host strain for somatic coliphages and 
E. coli F-amp as host strain for male-specific coliphages. Volumes of 1 and 10 mL were 
assayed for each coliphages in duplicate. 
3.3.2.1.4 Virus detection in soil/water from pipe trenches and in water from flooded air valve 
vaults 
As for the previous microbiological analyses, virus detection was conducted by the 
INRS-Institut Armand-Frappier laboratory. Soil (lOOg) was weighed, mixed for 30 
minutes with 400 mL of 3% beef extract and then centrifuged for 15 minutes at 3000 x 
g. The supernatant was transferred into a sterile bottle for organic flocculation (pH 3.5 
and FeCl3 0.1%) followed by centrifugation for 15 minutes at 4°C at 3000 x g. The 
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supernatant was discarded, the pellet resuspended in glycine buffered medium (pH 9) 
and the volume completed to 15 mL with Minimum Essential Medium (MEM) with 
antibiotics (1% penicillin-streptomycin and 0.1% gentamicin). The pH was adjusted to 
7.2 and the concentrate stored at -80°C until the viral assay was performed. For water, a 
sample of 4 liters was centrifuged for 15 minutes at 3000 x g. The supernatant and the 
pellet were conserved for virus analysis. 
A volume of 50 mL of MgC^ (final concentration of 0.05M) was added to the 
supernatant. The supernatant was then adjusted to pH 6 with HC1 1.2N and filtered on a 
series of 142 mm filters: a prefilter AP25 (Millipore), a 0.45 urn and a 0.5 urn. The 
filters were eluted using 150 mL of beef extract (1.5%, pH 9.75) and reconcentration 
was done by organic flocculation (pH 3.5 and FeC^ 0.1%) followed by centrifugation 
for 15 minutes at 4°C at 3000 x g. The supernatant was discarded, the pellet resuspended 
in glycine buffered medium (pH 9) and the volume completed to 15 mL with Minimum 
Essential Medium (MEM) with antibiotics (1% penicillin-streptomycin and 0.1% 
gentamicin). The pH was adjusted to 7.2 and the concentrate stored at -80°C until the 
viral assay was performed. The pellet was weighed and beef extract (3%) was added in a 
1:4 ratio. After 30 minutes of mixing, it was centrifuged at 3000 x g for 15 minutes. The 
supernatant was kept and reconcentration of viruses was done by organic flocculation 
(pH 3.5 and FeCl3 0.1%) followed by centrifugation for 15 minutes at 4°C at 3000 x g. 
The supernatant was discarded, the pellet resuspended in glycine buffered medium (pH 
9) and the volume completed to 15 mL with Minimum Essential Medium (MEM) with 
antibiotics (1% penicillin-streptomycin and 0.1% gentamicin). The pH was adjusted to 
7.2 and the concentrate stored at -80°C until the viral assay was performed. 
Before the virus assay, every concentrate was treated with 1,1,2 
trichlorotrifluoroethane and 5% penicillin-streptomycin 100X to remove toxic 
compounds, contaminants and debris. MA-104 (African green monkey kidney cells) 
cells were grown until they produced a confluent monolayer in 25 cm2 plastic flasks. 
One milliliter of the concentrate (or an appropriate dilution) was placed on the cells and 
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the flasks were incubated at 37°C for 60 minutes on a rocker platform. Ten mL of 
culture media containing antibiotics (1% penicillin-streptomycin and 0.1% gentamicin) 
were then added to each flask. Flasks were incubated at 37°C for 11 days, freeze-thawed 
at -20°C and a second passage was performed for 7 days on fresh cell cultures in 24 well 
plates (using one well for each first passage flask). The cells were fixed with absolute 
methanol containing 1% hydrogen peroxide (to destroy indigenous peroxidase). The 
fixed monolayers were submitted to an immunoassay developed in our laboratory using 
commercial hyper-immune human serum globulins to detect viruses in infected cells 
(Payment and Trudel, 1987). Infected cells appear dark brown under an inverted 
microscope making it easy to detect the viral infection even in the absence of a 
cytopathic effect. The number of viruses in the original samples was calculated using the 
number of positive (cytopathic effect or immunoperoxidase positive) and negative wells 
after the second passage and estimating the most probable number of infectious unit per 
liter as described previously (Payment and Trudel, 1987). 
3.3.2.2 Impact of water main repairs on water quality 
The monitoring of pipe repairs took place in the Laval and Montreal distribution 
systems during the summer of 2004 and 2005. These were mostly planned repairs of 
pipe leaks, not visible at the ground surface. These are the same repairs during which 
samples of soil and trench water were collected. Ideally, distribution system areas with 
low chlorine residual or where pipes would likely be located under the water table were 
wanted. However, we had no control over the choice of the location where repairs were 
performed. 
In order to monitor the impact of pipe repair on water quality, water samples were 
collected at different times and locations within the distribution system. As the closure 
of valves usually takes place in order to isolate a section of the leaking main (Figure 3-
2), customer houses located both inside (House In) as well as outside (House Out) of the 
isolated area were used for sample collection. A flexible PVC hose (disinfected with 
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chlorine) connected to the external hose bib was used for water sampling at customer 
houses (flow was set to approximately 5 L/min). Other sampling locations included the 
hydrant used for flushing when the repair is completed. In 2005, a second house outside 
of the isolated area (House Out') was added as well as one customer house on the 
isolated section of main to study possible service line contamination (House SL). These 
are all illustrated in Figure 3-2. To simplify the analysis, results of the two sampling 


















Figure 3-2: Sampling locations during repairs 
During the repair, the water sampling sequence was as follows: 
(i) sampling at House In, House Out and House SL before valve closure, ie. initial 
system condition (To); 
(ii) sampling at House Out when valves were closed to isolate the section of main 
to be repaired; 
(iii) sampling at House Out prior to the opening of the first valve to start flushing; 
(iv) sampling at House In, House Out and at the Hydrant during flushing; 
(v) sampling at House In, House Out and Hydrant prior to the closure of the 
hydrant; 
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(vi) sampling at House SL (first flush) immediately after the hydrant closure and 
sampling at House In and House Out 15 minutes after the hydrant was closed. 
The field crews did not perform any chlorination of the repaired mains, only pipe 
flushing was conducted to remove any possible contamination. Water samples were 
collected in 1L autoclaved plastic bottles (with 0.01% (w/v) sodium thiosulfate). For 
steps (ii) and (iv), six samples were collected at 1, 2, 4, 7, 10 and 15 minutes after valve 
closure or start of flushing. One water sample was collected at each location for the 
other steps. 
3.3.2.2.1 Parameters analyzed in distribution system water 
The microbiological parameters that were analyzed in distribution system water 
(collected from House In, Out, SL and Hydrant) included the presence/absence of total 
coliforms and E. coli using the Colilert® (IDEXX Laboratories, Westbrook, Maine) 
detection method. Aerobic endospores were enumerated using the membrane filtration 
method developed by Barbeau et al. (1997) (Trypticase soy broth culture medium, 
pasteurization at 75°C for 15 minutes followed by incubation at 35°C for 24 hours). 
Heterotrophic plate counts (HPC) were enumerated using the membrane filtration 
method using R2A agar incubated at 35°C for 48 hours (method 9215D, (APHA and 
AWWA, 1998)). HPC were only monitored in 2004 as they were not found useful for 
detection of intrusion. 
The physico-chemical parameters were analyzed using the standard methods 
described in APHA and AWWA (1998): free chlorine residuals using the DPD-FAS 
method (method 4500-C1 G), pH (method 4500-H+ B), temperature, conductivity 
(method 2510), turbidity by the nephelometric method (method 2130B) and total iron 
analyzed using the phenantroline colorimetric method (method 3500-Fe B). 
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3.3.2.3 Pressure monitoring in full-scale distribution systems 
High-speed pressure transient data loggers were used for pressure monitoring in order 
to detect rapid changes in pressure, typical of transient events (where pressure variations 
may take place over a few seconds). Two types of high-speed pressure transient data 
loggers were used. The RDL 1071L/3 model from Radcom Technologies (Woburn, MA) 
that can read up to 20 pressure values per second within a range of-103 to 1551 kPa (-
15 psi to 225 psi) was installed either directly on transmission mains (via corporation 
stops), on sink's taps inside buildings, or on fire hydrants. The HPR31 model from 
Telog Instruments (Victor, NY) can read up to four pressure values per second within a -
103 to 1379 kPa (-15 psi to 200 psi) range was used to monitor pressure on fire hydrants. 
The Radcom loggers were zeroed to atmospheric pressure according to the 
manufacturer's instructions before installation. Pressure values were read every seconds 
and a tolerance of ±1.4 m (2 psi) was set for recording of pressure readings. The Telog 
loggers were set at four pressure readings per seconds, with the maximum and minimum 
pressure values recorded over intervals of 15 seconds. 
3.3.2.3.1 Pressure monitoring during selected O&M activities 
Targeted pressure monitoring was performed during the following maintenance 
activities: 
- planned repairs of pipe leaks to determine the impact of valve/hydrant operation on 
the occurrence of transient pressures (in the Laval and Montreal distribution system 
as described previously) 
- water main flushing (in the Laval system) 
- hydrant flow tests (in the Montreal distribution system) 
- pump operation associated with modified distribution system hydraulics due to 
transmission main rehabilitation (in the Montreal system) 
For water main repairs, pressure in the distribution system was monitored at one or 
two locations (hydrants) nearby the repair site on 10 occasions. For main flushing, 
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pressure monitoring was performed for three routes of a unidirectional flushing program 
in the Laval distribution system. One or two high-speed pressure transient data loggers 
were installed on hydrants either on or in the vicinity of the route being flushed. 
Pressures were also monitored during two hydrant flow tests in the Montreal system. 
These flow tests involved the consecutive opening of four orifices from two hydrants 
and did not involve any closure of valves. Three high-speed pressure transient data 
loggers were used during each flow test and were located on the nearest hydrants. 
Finally, the rehabilitation of a transmission main in the vicinity of a storage reservoir 
completely changed the supply scheme inside an area of the Montreal distribution 
system. Another reservoir had to be used to supply the area which completely modified 
the hydraulics of the system. Pressure monitoring was conducted at three locations 
(inside of university buildings) affected by these changes. These locations were very 
close to the alternative reservoir used for supply during the rehab work, which lasted a 
couple of weeks. Pressure monitoring was conducted during 36 days. 
3.3.2.3.2 Continuous pressure monitoring in the Laval distribution system 
Continuous pressure monitoring was performed in one area of the Laval distribution 
system corresponding to the same area where Payment et al. (1991; 1997) conducted 
their epidemiological studies and measured an increased rate of gastrointestinal illnesses 
associated with the consumption of tap water. The distribution system area studied is 
mostly supplied by a single WTP (Pont-Viau WTP). Apart from the clearwells at the 
WTPs, no storage tank nor pump station is located on the distribution system because of 
the ground topography. 
Pressure monitoring of this distribution system area, using the high-speed pressure 
transient data loggers, was started in June 2006. Four distinct monitoring periods were 
conducted: 
- Phase 1 (June 2006 to September 2006): Exploratory phase with 12 pressure 
sensors installed all over the distribution system area studied. 
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- Phase 2 (September 2006 to October 2006): Targeted phase with 9 pressure 
sensors installed in distribution system area prone to negative pressures. 
- Phase 3 (October 2006 to June 2007): Reduced monitoring due to wintertime 
(pressure sensors cannot be installed on fire hydrants due to cold weather and 
freezing conditions). Only two pressure sensors could be installed inside 
buildings in area prone to negative pressures. 
- Phase 4 (June 2007-November 2007): Repeat targeted sampling with 12 pressure 
sensors installed in area prone to negative pressures. This phase lasted until 
November 2007. 
From June 2006 to November 2007, pressure was continuously monitored at the outlet 
of the supplying water treatment plant. Figure 3-3 illustrates the locations of the pressure 
sensors during the different monitoring periods. 
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Figure 3-3: Locations of high-speed pressure transient data loggers in distribution 
system 
During phase 1, in August 2006, a major planned repair (closure of a 400 mm (16 in.) 
transmission main) was conducted in the distribution system, affecting about 15 000 
customers in a sub-area of the monitored network (Figure 3-4B). This pipe closure was 
expected to cause major hydraulic disturbances (flow reversals, low pressures) in this 
distribution system sub-area as water supply would be provided by another treatment 
plant under the repair conditions (WTP B instead of WTP A). 
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Figure 3-4: Distribution system area where continuous pressure monitoring was 
conducted during phase 1 (pressure loggers are the red dots); (A) Flow conditions under 
normal distribution system operation; (B) Flow conditions under repair conditions 
(shaded area represents affected sub-area) 
As low pressures were predicted by hydraulic modeling, six additional high-speed 
pressure data loggers were installed, for a total of 12 pressure sensors in the affected 
distribution system sub-area. 
3.3.3 Transient pressure and inti-usion modeling 
Transient (or surge) pressure modeling was performed to simulate (replicate) 
transient low pressure events measured at the Pont-Viau WTP during the continuous 
pressure monitoring, which resulted in confirmed or suspected negative pressures in the 
Laval distribution system. Transient modeling was necessary to simulate these low 
pressure events since they lasted typically less than five minutes. 
Transient modeling was performed using the InfoSurge software (MWH Soft, 
Arcadia, CA). This software also includes an intrusion module allowing the simulation 
of potential intrusion volumes under various assumptions. The work performed as part 
of this task intends to present the first steps of what could later be used to develop a risk 
assessment methodology on microbial intrusion due to transient negative pressures in 
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distribution systems. The modeling work presented may certainly be refined and should 
be considered as exploratory work. 
The specific steps performed to achieve transient and intrusion modeling of the Laval 
distribution system are described below. 
3.3.3.1 Construction of transient hydraulic model 
The hydraulic model used in this study is the model obtained from the city of Laval in 
August 2007. This updated version of the model was used to try to get simulated 
information that would be representative of the field measurements conducted in 2006-
2007. The previous version of the model that was available to our research group dated 
from 2001 and needed to be updated. In order to obtain a model that would be usable for 
transient modeling, the following steps were achieved: 
The hydraulic model from the city of Laval consisted in an extended-period 
simulation (EPS) with consumption data corresponding to average day demands. 
The model included nine consumption patterns (four patterns for leakage 
depending on pipe material and expected condition, residential, industrial, 
institutional, commercial and municipal usages). Because the city of Laval uses a 
different hydraulic software (Piccolo from Safege (France)), data were first 
transferred into the Epanet software (Rossman, 2000) and then into the 
InfoWater software (MWH Soft, Arcadia, CA). Results obtained using the 
Epanet and InfoWater models were validated against the results obtained from 
the Piccolo model both for steady-state and EPS modeling. This EPS model 
included 29,213 nodes and 32,266 pipes or links. Such a model size is too large 
to perform transient modeling, the InfoSurge software being limited to 20,000 
links. 
Skeletonization of the EPS model was achieved using the InfoWater Skeletonizer 
module in order to reduce the number of links below 20,000. The following 
operations were conducted: (i) elimination of the interior nodes of all series pipes 
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with same diameter, (ii) trimming of the dead-end pipes shorter than 50 m. After 
the skeletonization, the model size was reduced to 8,132 nodes and 11,185 pipes. 
Because the distribution system is composed of various pipe materials, specific 
pressure wave velocities had to be assigned. The equation for wave speed c (or 
sonic speed) is usually expressed as: 
c^Ef/pO+KREfD/Ect))' 0.5 
where Ef and Ec are the elastic modulus of the fluid and conduit respectively, D is 
the pipe diameter, t is the pipe thickness and KR is the coefficient of restraint for 
longitudinal pipe movement. Because the pipe thickness and coefficient of 
restraint are unknown, the following figure has been used to assign the wave 
speed to the various pipe materials. The ratio pipe inside diameter/pipe wall 
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The following typical wave velocities have been assigned: cast-iron: 1060 m/sec, 
ductile iron: 1200 m/sec, concrete: 600 m/sec, PVC: 300 m/sec, steel: 1200 
m/sec. This approximation was considered better than using a single wave speed 
value for all the pipes included in the model. 
3.3.3.2 Simulation of transient low pressure events 
The transient model was used to simulate some low pressure events that were 
recorded at the outlet of the supplying WTP during the field pressure monitoring. For 
each event, the following data were available: 
time of the low pressure event 
pressure profile out of the Pont-Viau WTP (one pressure value per second) 
flow out of the Pont-Viau WTP (one value per 10 minutes) 
Pressure and flow out of the other two WTPs supplying the distribution system 
(one value per 10 minutes). 
These data were used to set the boundary conditions in the model. Furthermore, pressure 
data at the monitoring locations in the distribution system were also available for 
comparison with simulation results. 
At the Pont-Viau WTP, up to nine high-pressure pumps are available to deliver water 
into the distribution system. However, no records are available to know which pumps 
were operating at a specific time in the past. Because of that, one pump providing the 
flow and pressure conditions at the time of the low pressure event was modeled. The low 
pressure event was created by simulating a pump closure using pump speed change. 
Simulation time was set to 300 seconds. 
The surge modeling was performed assuming that no surge protection devices were 
installed in the distribution system. This is not true since air-vacuum and combination 
air valves are in fact installed in some locations (as visited during the field work). 
However, because the size of these devices is not known they were not included in the 
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model. Because of this, the model will likely give negative pressures that are more 
extreme than actually measured in the distribution system. 
3.3.3.3 Simulation of intrusion volumes 
For each low pressure event modeled, the intrusion module of the InfoSurge software 
was used to simulate the potential intrusion volumes in the distribution system. Intrusion 
volumes based on a leakage factor was used. Under this model option, intrusion at all 
demand nodes is computed when the exit head value (head of water above pipe - fixed 
by the user) is above the internal pipe pressure value according to the following equation 
(derived from the work of Funk et al. (1999)): 
Qi = ((7i CDDr)/4) * [2g(Hext-HL,0]°
5 
where Q; = intrusion flowrate, Co = orifice discharge coefficient, D; = orifice diameter, g 
= gravitational acceleration, Hext = external head and Hi_,i - line (interior) head at the 
node. The leakage factor is used to set the size of the orifice. Leakage values between 5 
and 25% were simulated along with exit heads of 0 (atmospheric pressure) and 1.4 m (2 
psi). 
Intrusion through flooded air-valve vaults was also simulated. In such a case, the 
intrusion module described above was not used and intrusion was considered only 
through submerged air-vacuum valves. The locations of these vaults in the distribution 
system area studied are known and were assigned to model nodes. The flooded vaults 
were modeled as one-way feed tanks, where the water is only allowed to flow from the 
tank into the system. All the vaults visited were assumed to contain air-vacuum valves, 
which is a worst-case scenario. In reality, some vaults only contained air-release valves 
that are not specifically designed to let air into the pipe in case of negative pressures (but 
they can let some air in). For the simulation, different numbers of flooded vaults were 
assumed according to the results from the field study. The height of water above the air-
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vacuum valve was assumed to be 0.5 m. Different air-vacuum valve outlet diameters 
were also tested (12, 100 and 150 mm). 
3.3.3.4 Simulation of contamination transport into the distribution system 
Once the intrusion volumes were obtained for different scenarios, the next logical 
step was to simulate the contamination transport into the distribution system in order to 
assess the proportion of customers that could be affected. Because of the exploratory 
nature of this work, the intruded contaminant was assumed conservative. Such an 
assumption is certainly not representative of the conditions in the Laval distribution 
system but greatly simplified the simulation. 
Transport of contaminant for one case of intrusion through flooded air-valves and one 
case of intrusion through leakage points were compared. For each case, the EPS-large 
size model (about 30,000 nodes and pipes) was used and a number of microorganisms 
was introduced at each node where intrusion was determined. Geometric mean of 
microorganism concentrations in soil/trench water and water from flooded vaults was 
used as the typical pathway concentration. This was multiplied by the simulated volume 
of intrusion at each node, as determined in section 3.3.4.3. The number of 
microorganism was set as the initial water quality in the EPS simulation. The simulation 
was started at the pattern time corresponding to the time of the low pressure event and 
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DISTRIBUTION SYSTEMS: A REVIEW OF EXISTING 
STUDIES 
This chapter includes an in-depth review and analysis of the studies available in the 
literature investigating the fate of microorganisms introduced into experimental systems. 
More specifically, the efficacy of disinfectant residual on microbial intrusion was 
reviewed at various scales of experimentation. This chapter is a paper that has been 
submitted to the Journal of the American Water Works Association for publication. 
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Abstract: In order to determine the effectiveness of a disinfectant residual in the event 
of accidental microbial intrusion, we conducted a literature review of numerous studies 
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specifically investigating the fate of microorganisms introduced into experimental 
systems (laboratory-, pilot- and isolated full-scale). In these experiments, various types 
of microorganisms were monitored, including pathogens, in the presence or absence of a 
disinfectant residual. The monitoring of the organisms was performed in the bulk water 
and/or the biofilm. This review shows that the conclusions about the efficacy of a 
disinfectant residual in protecting against pathogen intrusion are not in agreement with 
conflicting observations regarding the persistence of microorganisms in biofilms in 
laboratory- and pilot-scale testing. The most critical conditions with respect to 
microorganism persistence in a water system can, however, be identified: (i) intrusion 
taking place under zero- or low-flow conditions; and/or (ii) delay between the time of 
intrusion and the onset of chlorination. 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
The integrity of the infrastructure used to deliver drinking water from the treatment 
plant to the consumer's tap is of paramount importance to minimize the risk of water 
contamination. A significant portion of waterborne disease outbreaks (WBDOs) has 
been shown to be caused by distribution system deficiencies (Craun and Calderon, 
2001). These authors showed that, for the period 1971 to 1998, 18.3% of the outbreaks 
reported in public water systems in the USA were caused by chemical and microbial 
contaminants entering the distribution system. Although the actual number of WBDOs 
reported since 1980 has decreased, the proportion of WBDOs due to distribution system 
contamination is increasing (NRC, 2005). Data from some other countries, suggest that 
36% of 42 reported waterborne outbreaks in the UK and 20-37% of the outbreaks 
reported in Scandinavia were associated with distribution system contamination (Hunter, 
1997; Stenstrom, 1994). Even under normal operating conditions, significant increases 
in gastrointestinal (GI) illnesses have been associated with water distribution, and the 
integrity of the distribution system has been questioned (Payment et al, 1997; Payment 
etal, 1991). 
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Unfortunately, some cases of water contamination due to distribution system 
deficiencies have been associated with illnesses and even fatalities in the supplied 
population. In the small town of Cabool (Missouri, USA), an outbreak of hemorrhagic E. 
coli serotype 0157:H7 caused 243 known cases of diarrhea and four deaths in a 
population of 2,090 inhabitants. The suspected sources of contamination were two major 
distribution line breaks and 43 service meter failures that occurred during unusually cold 
weather (Geldreich et al, 1992). The number of new cases declined rapidly after 
residents were ordered to boil their water and the water supply was chlorinated (no 
disinfectant was added to the water supply prior to the outbreak) (Swerdlow et al, 
1992a). In another case, inadequate maintenance of a municipal water storage tank was 
identified as the cause of a Salmonella serovar typhimurium outbreak reported in Gideon 
(Missouri, USA) in 1993 (Angulo et al, 1997; Clark et al, 1996). An improper roof vent 
and an uncovered hatch on the tank had provided access to wild birds, resulting in 
contamination of the water from bird droppings. In a population of 1,104, close to 600 
people were affected with diarrhea and 7 people died. The water supplied by this 
distribution system was not disinfected at the time of the outbreak. In Peru, pathogens 
such as Vibrio cholerae have been shown to enter the distribution network through 
cross-contamination by sewage, and to survive and cause disease in the absence of 
adequate pressure and chlorine residual (Geldreich, 1996; Swerdlow et al, 1992b). These 
examples show that some conditions or maintenance activities in distribution systems 
can actually lead to pathogen intrusion and cause outbreaks under specific conditions of 
operation. They also show the risk associated with the intrusion of pathogens in 
distribution systems in the absence of a disinfectant residual. Kirmeyer et al (2001) have 
identified four high-risk routes of entry of pathogens into distribution systems: (1) water 
treatment breakthrough; (2) transitory contamination; (3) cross-connection; and (4) 
water main repairs/breaks. Three of these routes are directly related to the distribution 
network itself, making it a vulnerable barrier. 
In view of the many potential pathways of microbial contamination in a distribution 
system and of the positive role of chlorination in limiting water distribution-borne 
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outbreaks, the maintenance of a disinfectant residual could be considered an absolute 
necessity. It is, in fact, usually recommended as a barrier against any contamination 
resulting from the loss of integrity of the system and to control microbial regrowth. 
Under this management approach, the main justifications for using a disinfectant 
residual in a distribution system include: overcoming system contamination, preventing 
the regrowth of coliform bacteria, inhibiting or controlling biofilm formation, stabilizing 
water quality, preventing the occurrence of opportunistic pathogens, and signaling 
contamination by its absence (sudden disappearance of the residual at places where it is 
usually present) (Trussell, 1999). This management approach is widely accepted in 
North America and the United Kingdom, and is endorsed by the WHO (Ainsworth, 
2004; World Health Organization (WHO), 2003). However, not all scientific experts and 
regulatory agencies favor it. In several European countries, the use of a secondary 
disinfectant such as chlorine is limited or non-existent, mostly because of concerns about 
the formation of disinfection by-products and low tolerance of chlorine taste and odor 
(van der Kooij et al, 1999). Some European utilities, located mainly in The Netherlands 
and Germany, are successfully producing and distributing hygienically safe and 
biologically stable drinking water without a disinfectant residual (van der Kooij et al, 
1999; Fokken et al, 1998). This is possible through the application of multiple treatment 
barriers, the production of biostable water and the use of biostable materials for building 
distribution infrastructures, as well as the application of protective measures to prevent 
recontamination in the distribution system (te Welscher et al, 1998; van der Kooij et al, 
1995). Van Lieverloo et al (2006) report that outbreaks are rare in The Netherlands and 
estimate that faecal contamination incidents occur 4-5 times a year in this country. 
In North America, the age and vulnerability of some distribution infrastructures make 
it difficult to adopt a low, or no, secondary disinfectant residual strategy (Haas, 1999). 
LeChevallier (1999) has suggested that, unless water suppliers can guarantee limitation 
of microbial regrowth and control of distribution system contamination, the elimination 
of secondary disinfection is not possible without increasing the risks for consumers. For 
surface-water systems (or groundwater under the influence of surface water), regulations 
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in the United States (USEPA Surface Water Treatment Rule (USEPA, 1989), the Stage 1 
Disinfectant/Disinfection By-Products Rule (USEPA, 2001a)) require a minimum of 0.2 
mg/L chlorine at the entrance to the distribution system. This residual must not exceed 
4.0 mg/L for chlorine and chloramines. Similar minimum and maximum values are used 
in Canada, while the European Drinking Water Directive (Council of the European 
Union, 1998) does not explicitly prescribe a disinfection residual, either at the system 
entrance or throughout the distribution system. 
4.2 THE FATE OF MICROORGANISMS EXPERIMENTALLY 
INTRODUCED INTO DRINKING WATER SYSTEMS 
Accidental intrusion of microbial contaminants into a distribution system may occur 
from a cross-connection, from intruded material remaining after repair work, from ill-
maintained storage tanks or through pipe leaks or other orifices when transient negative 
pressures occur. If no residual disinfectant is used in the system, it can be hypothesized 
that microorganisms will be able to survive and colonize pipe biofilm for some time. 
However, if a residual disinfectant is in place, will such microorganisms be inactivated? 
Will they be able to colonize the biofilm? In order to provide some insight into these 
questions, this paper reviews and discusses the data of published studies that simulate 
intrusion and examine the fate of microorganisms introduced into experimental systems. 
Various testing scales are evaluated in order to determine what can be learned from 
these experiments. Because the focus is on experimental systems, the assessment of the 
effectiveness of disinfectant residuals against microbial intrusion obtained from 
modeling studies will not be discussed here. If interested, the reader can refer to 
Baribeau et al (2005) and Propato and Uber (2004) for more information. 
Because of the limitations of tracking introduced organisms in full scale systems, 
results have typically come from laboratory- (or bench-) and pilot scale systems. In the 
experiments reviewed here, various types of microorganisms were used (bacteria, 
protozoa, viruses) including frank and opportunistic pathogens and indicator bacteria, in 
the presence or absence of a disinfectant residual. The organisms were usually 
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monitored for a fairly extended period of time after the introduction of the 
microorganisms into the system, both in the water and in the biofilm if the experimental 
setting allowed it. Because the interest here is on studies involving the impact of a 
disinfectant residual on microbial intrusion, an overview of the main characteristics of 
such studies (with residual disinfectant concentration >0.1 mg/L) is given in Table 4-1. 
This table summarizes the type of experimental systems used, the type and concentration 
of disinfectant residual tested, the type of intrusion simulated and the monitoring 
parameters for each study. The type of intrusion is further defined in Table 4-2 which 
lists the concentrations of microorganisms injected in the reviewed studies along with 





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































4.3 LABORATORY- OR BENCH-SCALE SYSTEMS 
4.3.1 Survival of microorganisms in bulk water in the presence of a disinfectant 
residual 
One of the first studies to simulate the contamination resulting from a cross-
connection was conducted by Snead et al (1980). These authors performed batch tests 
using small volumes (4 L) of tap water with free and combined chlorine (chloramines) 
concentrations of approximately 0.2 and 1.0 mg/L. Varying volumes (from 0.01 to 10%) 
of autoclaved raw sewage seeded with various microorganisms (coliform bacteria, 
Salmonella typhimurium, Shigella sonnei, poliovirus 1, f2 bacterial virus) were injected 
into the 4-L samples. Monitoring of the bulk water during the first 2 hours following the 
sewage injection showed that the free chlorine residual was more effective than the 
combined chlorine residual in inactivating the microorganisms in the water. The 
inactivation observed depended on the amount of sewage injected (better inactivation at 
a lower sewage concentration), and poliovirus 1 and the f2 virus were always more 
difficult to inactivate than the bacteria (with, in general, at least a 1 log difference two 
hours after microorganisms injection). In terms of resistance to chlorine inactivation, it 
is generally recognized that viruses are more resistant than bacterial cells (USEPA, 
2001b) and that free chlorine is a better disinfectant than chloramines (USEPA, 1999). 
High pH and low temperatures are also usually the least favorable conditions for 
microbial inactivation (White, 1999). Snead et al (1980) therefore concluded that free 
chlorine residual conferred protection against bacterial contamination and that its 
disappearance or decay could also be used to detect a contamination event. The lower 
efficacy of chloramines was also demonstrated by McMath et al (1999) using laboratory 
jar tests. These authors showed low levels of total coliform bacteria survival (200-
300/100 mL) after mixing chloraminated drinking water (0.2-0.3 mg Cb/L) with 
increasing volumes (1%, 5% and 10%) of sewage effluent containing 104-105£. coli/100 
mL. Although E. coli bacteria were undetectable after 30 minutes of mixing, the low 
total coliform concentrations were still present in the water 48 hours after the initial 
mixing. Residual total chlorine concentrations were still detectable at 0.17 to 0.29 mg/L. 
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Payment (1999) reported similar trends using a comparable experimental approach: 
increasing volumes of untreated raw sewage (0.1%, 1.0% and 10%) were injected into 2-
L water samples obtained directly from a drinking water treatment plant outlet (free 
chlorine residuals were 0.4 and 0.6 mg/L). A rapid inactivation of the faecal coliforms in 
the water was observed, whereas more resistant microorganisms (C. perfingens) were 
almost completely unaffected by the residual chlorine levels for several hours. The 
author concluded that the use of chlorine in distribution systems provides a false sense 
of security by providing negative total coliform and E. coli readings while potential 
pathogenic microorganisms may still be present. Unfortunately, the organisms that are 
more resistant to chlorine are the ones with low median infection doses (N50). Between 1 
and 100 organisms of viruses or protozoa are needed to cause infection in 50 percent of 
the individuals exposed, whereas approximately 108 pathogenic Escherichia coli are 
needed to result in the same level of infection (Montgomery Watson Harza (MWH), 
2005). 
4.3.2 Survival of microorganisms in biqfilms in the absence of residual disinfectant 
Researchers have used various types of laboratory reactors to study the fate of 
injected microorganisms in biofilms. Experiments conducted without a disinfectant 
residual showed that: 
(i) After the inoculation of pure strains of Klebsiella pneumoniae, Salmonella 
enteritidis and E. coli in a reactor previously fed with a dilute nutrient 
solution, the injected Enterobacteriaceae were able to form substantial 
biofilm populations within 24 hours (Jones and Bradshaw, 1996); 
(ii) Klebsiella oxytoca were able to survive on surfaces after being seeded in a 
chemostat model containing a heterotrophic bacterial population; however, 
the authors could not clearly determine whether or not the microorganism 
was slowly growing in the biofilm (Packer et al, 1997); 
(iii) E. coli and Aeromonas hydrophila can colonize a mixed-population biofilm 
after their inoculation in laboratory chemostats (Colbourne et al, 1991). In 
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that case, 0.6 mg/L of monochloramine was needed to inactivate E. coli in the 
biofilm, whereas A. hydrophila continued to survive at a concentration of 1.2 
mg/L Cl2; 
(iv) Legionella pneumophila and Salmonella typhimurium could survive in 
biofilms for prolonged periods of time (20 to >40 days) under warm-water 
conditions (24°C) (Armon et al, 1997); 
(v) Helicobacter pylori were detected using reverse transcription PCR analysis in 
a mixed species heterotrophic biofilm present on the stainless steel coupons 
of a modified Robbins device (Manz et al, 1993) for 192 hours after injection 
into the experimental system (Mackay et al, 1998); 
(vi) Cryptosporidium oocysts continue to adhere to a multi-species biofilm grown 
on glass slides for a 1 -month period (trial duration using a chemostat) with a 
significant proportion still viable at the end of the trial (Rogers and Keevil, 
1995). This last experiment shows that oocysts entering distribution systems 
may be present for several weeks within biofilms even in the presence of a 
disinfectant residual because such a residual has barely any effect on this 
organism. Subsequent sloughing could possibly lead to the release of the 
attached pathogens and infection even if the water is considered safe based 
on bacterial indicators. 
These studies therefore suggest that the absence of a disinfectant residual allows 
colonization of distribution system biofilms by intruded microorganisms. 
4.3.3 Swvival of microorganisms in biofilms in the presence of a disinfectant residual 
The effect of a disinfectant residual (free chlorine, chloramines) on the persistence of 
intruded microorganisms in biofilms has been investigated by four groups of 
researchers, as detailed below. For two of these studies, simultaneous investigation of 
microorganism survival in bulk water was also conducted. The main characteristics of 



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Using a laboratory-scale unit run as a chemostat equipped with stainless steel 
coupons and fed with groundwater (either without a disinfectant, with free chlorine or 
with monochloramine), Momba et al (1999) monitored the attachment and persistence of 
E. coli in a young biofilm. An inoculum concentration of ±2.6 x 103 E. coli per 100 mL 
was injected 24 hours after the system was started. Monitoring the attached E. coli 
during the first 96 hours after the start-up of the system (or 72 hours after the injection of 
the E. coli) showed, not surprisingly, that the attachment of E. coli to the young biofilm 
was greatest for the chemostat fed with non-disinfected groundwater. The presence of a 
monochloramine residual (0.8 mg/L) at the time of E. coli injection was more effective 
in preventing the attachment of E. coli to the biofilm (E. coli being non-detectable at all 
times) than the presence of a free chlorine residual (0.7 mg/L) at the time of injection. 
The monochloramine residual was still detectable (0.3 mg/L) 24 hours after the injection 
of E. coli, whereas free chlorine was not. 
Storey and Ashbolt (2001) investigated the persistence of two model enteric viruses 
{Bacteroides fragilis phage B40-8 and coliphage MS-2) in chlorinated experimental 
settings, slug-dosed at approximately 108 pfu/mL into an annular reactor. This reactor 
contained unplasticized PVC (uPVC) coupons of a 70-day-old naturally grown pipe 
biofilm collected from a modified Robbin's device installed in a full-scale distribution 
system. The phages were allowed to accumulate in the annular reactor biofilm for 24 
hours under no-flow conditions before the continuous supply of the reactor was restarted 
with water containing an average free chlorine residual of 0.56 ± 0 . 1 2 mg/L. The 
persistence of the phages in the biofilm was monitored for a 30-day period. Results 
showed that, even when a free chlorine residual is present, viruses may persist in the 
biofilm on uPVC pipes. Phages B40-8 were detected for the duration of the experiment 
(30 days). The virus loss/inactivation followed an initial rapid phase followed by a very 
slow phase representing a more persistent subpopulation (-0.01% of the original virus 
population). MS-2 was not detected after 22 days. 
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Laboratory polycarbonate annular reactors were also used by Camper et al (1998) to 
study the fate of pathogens in model distribution system water and biofilms. Four target 
organisms, including two enteric pathogens {Salmonella typhimurium and E. coli 
0157:H7) and two opportunistic pathogens {Aeromonas hydrophila and Klebsiellae 
pneumonia), were injected into reactors operated under warm-water conditions (20°C) 
and with enhanced nutrients (assimilable organic carbon (AOC) solution at 500 jag C/L). 
The reactors were run as chemostats for 60 hours after inoculation, (with only AOC and 
buffer feed solutions). After this period, the continuous feed of non-sterile reverse-
osmosis water (with a mixed heterotrophic bacterial population of ~104 CFU/mL) was 
started. Free chlorine was added to the influent approximately 2 weeks after the 
establishment of the biofilm (containing the target organisms) at an initial concentration 
of 0.05 mg/L, which was then raised to 0.2 mg/L. In this study, the target bacteria were 
enumerated by culture-based methods, but also by microscopy after the cells had been 
stained using specific fluorescent antibodies. Results using the culture-based techniques 
show that chlorination resulted in a rapid elimination of A. hydrophila from both the 
biofilm and the bulk water, reduced the number of K. pneumonia cells from the bulk 
water (but not always from the biofilm) and resulted in S. typhimurium cell numbers 
below the detection limit in bulk water, but still present in the biofilm. S. typhimurium 
cells from the biofilm were not recovered by culturing methods after 20 days, but were 
detectable for long periods of time using the fluorescent antibody method. To test cells 
viability, slides were removed from the reactor 60 days after the beginning of the 
experiment and incubated for 2 days in dilute nonselective broth. After this enrichment 
period, S. typhimurium formed colonies on selective media, indicating that cells were 
capable to recover their culturability. E. coli 0157:H7 was not detectable either in the 
bulk water or in the chlorinated biofilm at any time, by either culturing or fluorescent 
antibody techniques. 
Baribeau et al (2005) also tested annular reactors (polycarbonate and cast iron (CI) 
operating in series of three) under similar operating conditions (tap water treated by 
granular and biological activated carbon filtration, with added nutrients such as 
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biodegradable organic matter (BOM) at a concentration of 100 ug/L at 20°C). For a 3-
week period, the reactors were fed without disinfectant to allow biofilm colonization. 
The authors then spiked the third reactor with a continuous dose of E. coli (K-12) for a 
period of 24 hours, about a week after a low disinfectant level had been achieved at the 
outlet of the first reactor (either 1.0 mg/L free chlorine for chlorinated trains or 1.0 mg/L 
total chlorine for chloraminated trains). A high disinfectant level phase where chlorine 
was added at the influent of both reactors 1 and 3 (in order to achieve the concentration 
values specified previously at the outlet of reactor 1 and 0.5 mg/L free chlorine or 1.0 
mg/L total chlorine at the outlet of reactor 3) was then started 11 weeks after the spike. 
The results show that, after the E. coli spike, these bacteria were detected in all trains 
(chlorinated polycarbonate, chlorinated CI, chloraminated CI) for the remainder of the 
experiment (total duration of «160 days), except for the chloraminated polycarbonate 
train. A total mortality or a complete inactivation of E. coli took place in this reactor, 
both for the bulk liquid and the biofilm organisms. The authors also showed that E. coli 
in the bulk water were easier to inactivate than in the biofilm. In the CI reactors, 
chloramines were more efficient than free chlorine against E. coli in the biofilm, but this 
was not the case for the suspended E. coli. 
4.3.4 Findings from laboratoiy-, bench-scale experiments 
Results from the annular reactors experiments (Baribeau et al, 2005; Storey and 
Ashbolt, 2001; Camper et al, 1998) indicate that pipe biofilms can act as a reservoir for 
bacteria that are of significance for public health if faecal pathogenic bacteria are 
introduced into the system. However, although faecal bacteria were detected in the 
biofilm, low free chlorine levels (Table 4-3) under the tested conditions did appear to 
provide some degree of protection from bacterial pathogenic contamination of the bulk 
water (Baribeau et al, 2005; Camper et al, 1998), supporting the conclusions of Snead et 
al (1980) and Payment (1999). Although this interpretation is adequate for results 
obtained with culture-based methods, these techniques greatly underestimate the 
numbers of faecal bacteria and how long they persist when compared to the results with 
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immunofluorescence assays (Camper et al, 1998). This observation questions the real 
significance of the controls based only on the enumeration of faecal indicator bacteria by 
culture-based methods. 
The laboratory-scale experiments (considering the various settings used: beakers, jar 
tests, chemostat, annular reactors) therefore suggest that the free chlorine levels 
generally found in distribution systems (Table 4-1): (i) are able to eliminate or to 
inactivate (loss of culturability) the indicator and some pathogenic bacteria in the bulk 
water; (ii) are not efficient in rapidly inactivating more chlorine-resistant organisms 
(virus, protozoa); and (iii) have various levels of effectiveness in inactivating 
microorganisms in the biofilm, with some pathogens persisting there. This would 
indicate that, even when pathogenic microorganisms are not detected in the water 
following an intrusion, there remains a risk of contamination if subsequent biofilm 
colonization and detachment takes place due to erosion or sloughing caused by changes 
in flow conditions. When chloramine is used as the residual disinfectant, laboratory-
scale experiments (Baribeau et al, 2005; McMath et al, 1999) showed conflicting results 
regarding the inactivation of pathogens from the bulk water, but generally agreed 
(Baribeau et al, 2005; Momba et al, 1999) on the ability of chloramines to limit the 
persistence of detectable pathogens in the biofilm. 
4.4 PILOT-SCALE SYSTEMS 
Pipe loop systems varying in length from 25 m (82 ft) to 1300 m (4265 ft) have been 
used to simulate the intrusion of microorganisms in free chlorinated or chloraminated 
distribution systems (Table 4-1). Three studies were also found where intrusion in non-
chlorinated pilot-scale systems was conducted. These are discussed below for 
comparison purposes with disinfected systems. 
4.4.1 Microbial persistence in the absence of a chlorine residual 
Using a pipe loop fed with the city of Nancy (France) treated drinking water (total 
chlorine < 0.1 mg/L, nutrient level not mentioned), Fass et al (1996) and Parent et al 
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(1996) have shown that strains of E. coli are able to grow at 20°C in distribution pipes 
largely colonized by autochthonous bacteria. However, even in the absence of a chlorine 
residual, colonization by E. coli was shown to be only partial and transient. With a 
single and rapid injection of 1.12xl012 cells of an environmental strain of E. coli in a 
pipe-loop system (approximately 10 cells/100 mL), Fass et al (1996) showed a rapid 
adsorption of E. coli onto the biofilm within the first few hours. During the 18-day 
monitoring period, E. coli was measured in the bulk water (>4 log CFU/mL) as no 
chlorine was present. Growth of E. coli in the pilot was observed by the 12th day of the 
experiment (the number of E. coli in the system (bulk water and biofilm) was greater 
than the number of cells predicted by the theoretical washout curve). However, the E. 
coli growth was insufficient to allow the long-term persistence of these bacteria in the 
pilot network. Fass et al (1996) were unable to show a plateau indicating stabilization of 
the E. coli counts. The growth rate of the bacteria was slightly lower than the dilution 
rate. 
Predation through the ingestion of bacteria by protozoa is another mechanism that has 
been identified as being responsible for the disappearance of injected microorganisms in 
non-chlorinated distribution systems (Sibille et al, 1998). These authors observed that a 
single injection of 1011 cells of E. coli into the first loop of a pilot-scale network 
(approximately 107 CFU/100 mL) supplied with water filtered by granular activated 
carbon (GAC) decayed much more rapidly (in water plus biofilm) than a single injection 
of 4xl010 cells of E. coli into the first loop of a parallel network (*107 CFU/100 mL) 
supplied with nanofiltered water. This was attributed to the higher level of protozoa 
present in the first system. 
Persistence of enteric viruses in a non-disinfected pilot-scale system has been 
investigated by Quignon et al (1997). The authors injected poliovirus-1 (at about 3 to 
9xl03 MPNCU (most probable number of cytopathic units)/mL) in drinking water with 
no, or a very low, free chlorine residual (0 to 0.04 mg/L). In some cases, the viruses 
were pre-adsorbed onto clay particles before injection. The authors found that, when 
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viruses were not inactivated, they were distributed both in the water and in the biofilm. 
More viruses were recovered from the biofilm than from the bulk water (between 2- and 
10-fold). The results also demonstrated that virus adsorption onto clay favored its 
transfer to the biofilm. 
4.4.2 Microbial persistence in the presence of a chlorine residual 
The main characteristics of the pilot-scale studies investigating the fate of 
microorganisms in chlorinated water and biofilms are listed in Table 4-4. Parent et al 
(1996) used the same pipe-loop pilot system and methodology as Fass et al (1996), but 
added a continuous chlorine concentration from the 6th day following the injection of 
10 E. coli (»10 CFU/100 mL). Chlorine was continuously added to the system to 
obtain 0.5 mg/L. A chlorine concentration of 0.1 mg/L was sufficient to inactivate the E. 
coli from the bulk water, and 0.5 mg/L (reached 3 days after the onset of chlorination) 











































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































In two parallel experimental chlorinated networks (supplied with nanofiltered water 
and GAC-filtered water), Sibille et al (1997) were not able to recover faecal 
contamination indicators from the water or from biofilm samples following the injection 
of a slug dose of 10 liters of settled raw wastewater. The contamination led to an 
increase in the total number of cells (enumerated by epifluorescence microscopy after 
DAPI staining) in the bulk water and the loss of the chlorine residual. Free chlorine 
returned to its initial concentration (of about 0.25 mg/L) after 9 days in the system fed 
with nanofiltered water and 6 days in the system fed with GAC water. In both 
experimental distribution systems, total and faecal coliforms were detectable in the bulk 
water and biofilm only on the day of the injection, and faecal Streptococci were only 
detected in the bulk water. However, these three indicators disappeared from both 
systems within one day in the bulk water and in the biofilm. The authors concluded that 
faecal indicators did not, therefore, easily adapt to distribution systems fed with 
chlorinated nanofiltered and GAC-filtered water. 
McMath et al (1999) made the same observation when they injected a 25-liter slug 
dose of a treated domestic wastewater effluent (*106 total coliforms/100 mL) into a 
chloraminated, 1.3-km experimental pipe rig. At water temperatures of 9°C (chloramine 
concentration = 0.31 mg/L) and 15°C (chloramine = 0.24 mg/L), no positive coliform 
samples were collected in the water downstream of the injection point during the entire 
monitoring period (3 times weekly - for 11 months at 9°C and for 3 months at 15°C). 
This is in contrast to the results obtained by the same authors with laboratory jar tests, 
where low levels of coliforms could be detected in the water 48 hours after injection. 
Under no-flow conditions, simulating a dead-end pipe, the authors found that coliforms 
could survive in the water for a period varying from 35 days (17-22°C) to 65 days (6-
9°C). However, when the dead-end standing water was reintroduced into the main pipe 
rig, no coliform could be measured downstream. Accordingly, an increase in the flow to 
dislodge any deposits or biofilm was not conclusive, as again, no coliform could be 
detected. From these results, the authors concluded that a low chloramine residual of 
0.2-0.3 mg/L appeared to be effective in preventing the survival of the coliform within 
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the system. However, dead-end pipes are critical sites with favorable conditions for the 
survival of microorganisms. 
The effect of a long-term wastewater cross-connection on the biofilm of a pilot-scale 
distribution system (the USEPA - distribution system simulator) was investigated by 
Gibbs et al (2003). Wastewater obtained following grit removal and ahead of primary 
clarification was injected (at a ratio of wastewater to system volume of 0.3% - with 
0.1% injected every 8 hours) over a 90-day period into the pilot system supplied with the 
City of Cincinnati's tap water. The initial free chlorine concentration before the 
establishment of the cross-connection was 0.2-0.3 mg/L. Discharge water and biofilm 
were analyzed for the presence of seven types of microorganisms: total coliforms, E. 
coli, Enterococci, Salmonella, Aeromonas, aerobic endospores and heterotrophic 
bacteria (HPC). During the cross-connection, the discharge water had detectable 
amounts of all the study organisms. When the cross-connection was terminated, all the 
study organisms could be detected in the discharge water at Oh while only HPCs were 
detected after 24h. In the biofilm, study organisms were detected at low levels (no 
Enterococci or Salmonella) at Oh while only HPCs and endospores were detected at 24h. 
In agreement with the other pilot-scale distribution system studies conducted with a 
disinfectant residual (McMath et al, 1999; Sibille et al, 1997; Parent et al, 1996), Gibbs 
et al (2003) could only conclude that there was no evidence of long-term retention of the 
study organisms within an established biofilm following the termination of a long-term 
(90-day) wastewater cross-connection. HPCs in the discharge water decreased rapidly 
following the termination of the cross-connection (due to the washout of organisms from 
the system and the inactivation of organisms due to increased CI2). Removal of the 
organisms from the biofilm probably resulted from the sloughing of loosely attached 
organisms, increased chlorine and the lack of organism replacement. The only impact 
from the cross-connection was an increase in HPCs in the biofilm, which could have 
inhibited the growth of the study organisms introduced via the cross-connection. 
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In a subsequent study, under the same conditions but with a cross-connection lasting 
70 days, Gibbs et al (2004) evaluated the ability of various free chlorine concentrations 
(0, 1,2 and 5 mg/L) to inactivate the seven study microorganisms in the biofilm after the 
termination of the cross-connection. Ductile iron and PVC coupons were extracted from 
the pipe rig and placed into small (50 ml tubes) airtight static containers for the chlorine 
testing. The experimental setting minimized the flow (in order to eliminate the removal 
of organisms due to turbulent-flow conditions) to focus only on microbial inactivation 
due to disinfection (over a 72-hour period). The simulated conditions were therefore 
similar to those found in storage tanks. In unchlorinated samples, the authors measured a 
reduction in the number of organisms after 12 hours for both types of coupons, which 
indicates that the study bacteria were able to attach to the biofilm, but were not able to 
remain in it. They also found that a free chlorine concentration of 1 mg/L was sufficient 
to inactivate the study microorganisms in both the biofilm and the water column within a 
24-hour period. For all the free chlorine concentrations tested, aerobic spores were 
detected in the biofilm and in the water for 72 hours after the termination of the cross-
connection. This indicates that the biofilm can act as a reservoir for the release of 
chlorine-resistant microorganisms that could potentially be pathogenic. Biofilm 
sloughing in response to various free chlorine concentrations (0.6 to 5.0 mg/L) has been 
studied by Daly et al (1998). The authors used a biofilm (formed of 4 bacterial strains 
among which E. coli) generating system allowing the measurement of cells directly 
derived from the established biofilm (through the elution of the system with fresh 
medium prior to sampling - the reader is referred to the paper for a complete description 
of the experimental setting). Daly et al (1998) showed that a complete inhibition of 
biofilm sloughing (inhibition of bacterial loss into the planktonic phase) was only 
observed at free chlorine concentrations greater than 3 mg/L (which is higher than the 
usual distribution system residuals). Moreover, upon removal of the chlorine residual, 
biofilm detachment rapidly resumed with the detection, in the planktonic phase, of E. 
coli cells sloughed from the biofilm. Langmark et al (2005) identified desorption 
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(detachment) as one of the primary mechanisms that could affect the fate of 
microorganisms in a pilot-system biofilm. 
4,4.3 Findings from pilot-scale systems 
The pilot-scale experiments (using continuously flowing pipe loops) suggest that 
chlorine concentrations in the range of 0.2-0.5 mg/L (Table 4-4) do not allow detection 
of intruded bacteria in bulk water for more than 24 hours after the intrusion. Similarly, 
under the tested conditions, indicator microorganisms do not seem able to extensively 
colonize the biofilm and be detected in the system for more than 24 hours after an 
intrusion (or termination of a lasting cross-connection) takes place in chlorinated 
distributed water. The concentrations of injected microorganisms in these studies ranged 
from 105 to 108 CFU or MPN/100 mL (HPCs were at 1010 CFU/100 mL) (Table 4-4) 
and intrusion volumes of up to 4% of the system volume were simulated (Table 4-1). 
Even in the absence of a chlorine residual, Fass et al (1996) were not able to show a 
sustained detection of E. coli (injected at «108 cells/100 mL) in the biofilm for an 
extended period of time. However, more resistant microorganisms (such as aerobic 
endospores) were detected for a slightly longer time in the biofilm (one additional day) 
(Gibbs et al, 2003). No or low flow conditions simulated at the pilot scale showed that 
dead-end conditions still remain critical for the persistence of microorganisms in bulk 
water (McMath et al, 1999) and for allowing biofilm colonization by microorganisms 
that have intruded into the system. 
4.5 FULL-SCALE TEST DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM 
One study was found in the literature where a full-scale distribution system was used 
to evaluate the stability and effectiveness of various disinfectant residuals (free chlorine, 
chloramines and chlorine dioxide) when challenged by a sewage contaminant. Olivieri et 
al (1986) used a test distribution system consisting of several hundred feet of 4 in. (100 
mm) diameter pipe (CI) and the internal plumbing of two army barracks (galvanized, 
copper and plastic pipes - from 0.5 in. (12 mm) to 2 in. (50 mm)). The test system was 
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isolated from the Fort George G. Meade (Maryland) distribution system by a back-flow 
preventer and an air-gap at the reservoir used to supply the test system. This 1.5 m3 (400 
gal.) reservoir was filled with water from the city distribution system, and the 
disinfectant residual was adjusted for the experiment series. Raw sewage, seeded with fZ 
bacterial virus (106 pfu/mL) and a tracer dye in order to monitor the progress of the 
contamination, was injected into the test system (at a level of about 0.1%). Total 
coliforms and the f2 virus were only monitored in water samples. 
In a multi-tap, short-term test (T° 13-17°C, pH 7.3-7.7) designed to evaluate the 
effectiveness of the residuals after challenging with sewage for a contact time of less 
than 4 hours (at a system flow rate of 3.8 L/min), it was found that free chlorine 
(Co=1.04 mg/L) was the most effective residual for short contact times and consistently 
yielded the lowest level and frequency of coliform recovery. The next most efficient 
residuals were chlorine dioxide (Co=0.95 mg/L) and chloramines (Co=1.08 mg/L). For 
the f2 virus, chlorine dioxide was the most efficient and consistently yielded f2-free 
water at the tap. 
Long-term multi-tap tests (3-day monitoring, system flow of 0.38 L/min, T° 19-22°C, 
pH 7.3-8.2), showed that chloramines (Co=1.0 mg/L) performed most effectively against 
coliforms and the f2 virus. The loss of the free chlorine (Co=1.0 mg/L) and chlorine 
dioxide (Co=1.0 mg/L) residuals explained their reduced efficacy (see Table 4-5 for a 
synthesis of the results). However, when conditions favored the stability of free chlorine 
(lower T°: 10°C), this residual was more efficient than the other disinfectants in 
inactivating the coliform bacteria and f2 viruses. For both the short- and long-term 
investigations, coliforms and the f2 virus could be detected at high levels for the entire 
duration of the experiment (240 minutes and 72 hours), when no disinfectant residual 
was present. This suggests that the expected time that the slug of contaminant stands in 
the system is too short to provide pathogen reduction by natural die-away and that the 
only protection lies in the presence of a disinfectant residual. 
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FreeCl2: 1.04 mg/L 
C102: 0.95 mg/L 
NH2C1: 1.08 mg/L 
Free Cl2: 1.0 mg/L 
C102: 1.0 mg/L 
NH2C1: 1.0 mg/L 
Efficacy of the 
residual against 
a) total coliforms 
and 
b) f2 virus 
a) Free chlorine > 
chlorine dioxide > 
chloramines 
b) Chlorine dioxide > 
free chlorine > 
chloramines 
a) Chloramines > 
free chlorine and 
chlorine dioxide 
b) Chloramines > 








PFU: plaque forming unit; NA: Not available 
4.5.1 Findings from this full-scale study 
According to Olivieri et al (1986), the inactivation of microorganisms in sewage slugs 
in full-scale distribution system water seems to be heavily dependent on: (i) the type of 
disinfectant residual; (ii) the contact time; and (iii) the temperature. This view is not 
shared by Wierenga (1985) who stated that a free chlorine residual and bacterial 
sampling should not be relied on to ensure a safe potable water, based on coliform 
episodes (due to the entry of a slug of contamination into the water supply) which took 
place in the Grand Rapids (Michigan) distribution system in the presence of a substantial 
free chlorine residual (0.6 to 1.0 mg/L). The author maintained that proper design, 
operation and maintenance of water treatment and distribution facilities constitute the 
first line of defense against intrusion. 
In the case of an intrusion caused by a pressure transient, LeChevallier et al (2003) 
discussed the opportunity for effective disinfection as the volume of intruded water is a 
fraction of the water contained within the pipe network (much less than 1%). However, 
as noted by the authors, turbidity, compounds causing a chlorine demand and limited 
96 
mixing (in a relatively plug-flow condition) are factors that may affect the disinfection 
efficacy of the disinfectant residual in full-scale systems. The volume of sewage in the 
Olivieri et al (1986) full-scale testing represented 0.1% of the distribution system 
volume and they still detected some coliforms and f2 virus at the taps. However, as 
noted by Olivieri and colleagues, the injected concentration of the f2 virus (106pfu/mL) 
was much higher than the density of human enteric viruses usually present in sewage 
(lO'-lO2 mpn/mL) (Metcalf and Eddy Inc., 2003). 
4.6 DISCUSSION: WHAT CAN BE LEARNED FROM THESE 
EXPERIMENTS? 
4.6.1 Laboratory- and pilot-scale results are not converging 
In general, the results obtained from studies using laboratory settings to investigate 
the fate of microorganisms injected into water systems containing a disinfectant residual 
show that the residual (preferably free chlorine) is usually able to inactivate the bacteria 
in the bulk water, but that this is not always the case for the attached microorganisms of 
the biofilm. This result is not surprising, as chlorine disinfection is typically less 
effective against biofilm bacteria than against bulk water microorganisms (Parent et al, 
1996; Servais et al, 1995; Mathieu et al, 1992; Paquin et al, 1992; van der Wende and 
Characklis, 1990). However, the results from pilot-scale distribution system studies do 
not show the same trends in the ability of indicators and pathogens to colonize biofilm. 
Indicator microorganisms injected in continuously flowing chlorinated systems do not 
seem able to extensively colonize the biofilm and be detected in the system for more 
than 24 hours (Table 4-4). Consequently, a longer persistence of the microorganisms is 
observed in the biofilms of the annular reactors (Table 4-3). This observation is mostly 
based on the use of detection methods based on culturing techniques for the lab-and 
pilot-scale studies reviewed (Table 4-2) as will be discussed later. 
Operational characteristics of the pipe loops were not that different from those of the 
annular reactors (Table 4-6). Although Parent et al (1996) and Sibille et al (1997) used a 
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higher water velocity of 1 m/sec, Gibbs et al (2003) used a velocity of 0.3 m/sec, which 
is identical to the velocity in the annular reactors of Camper et al (1998) and Baribeau et 
al (2005). Except for Camper et al (1998) who used a short water residence time in 
annular reactors (2 hours), the other experiments (when such a value was available) had 




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































A methodological difference in the experimental procedures used for the inoculation 
of microorganisms into bench- or pilot-scale systems could explain the difference in 
persistence of microorganisms in biofilm. Microorganisms injected into annular reactors 
are usually allowed to colonize the biofilm under no-flow conditions for a certain period 
of time (from 24 to 60 hours in the studies reported here), which is not the case for the 
testing protocols used at pilot scale. Consequently, no-flow conditions seem to have an 
effect on the survival of microorganisms in biofilms. Annular reactors are also 
characterized by a very high surface to volume ratio, as compared to real pipe sections, 
and Camper (1996) observed higher concentrations of HPCs in biofilm in these reactors 
(about ten times higher) than in a 100 mm (4 in.) pipe rig fed with the same water. This 
constitutes a limitation of the annular reactor, in terms of its representation of a real pipe 
system, and could explain the increased persistence of the biofilm microorganisms in the 
laboratory studies reviewed here. Although annular reactors are very useful for the 
modeling of microbial processes in distribution systems (they are hydraulically simple to 
use, allow greater control in operational and environmental parameters), it is generally 
considered that pipe rigs are more representative of distribution system conditions than 
annular reactors (Eisnor and Gagnon, 2003). However, each scale of experimentation 
has its limitations. Pilot-scale and full-scale studies can lack experimental control 
conditions along with the ability to obtain representative samples (particularly for 
biofilm), etc. 
4.6.2 Delay in chlorination affect microorganisms survival in biofilm 
From Tables 4-3 and 4-4, it can be observed that, in general, when there is a time 
delay between the injection of microorganisms and the start of chlorination (varying 
from 1 to 38 days), greater persistence of the microorganisms in the biofilm seems to be 
favored. This would indicate that the period of contact without chlorine allows a 
stronger attachment of the microorganisms to the biofilm, which, in turn, allows the 
microorganisms to survive longer, even in the presence of chlorine. This is observed for 
both types of settings (laboratory and pilot) when there is a delay in chlorination, 
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whereas such persistence is not observed in the biofilms of pilot systems when the 
microorganisms are injected directly into chlorinated water. However, other factors may 
play a role and two of the laboratory studies (Baribeau et al, 2005; Momba et al, 1999) 
show that, even if E. coli are injected into chlorinated waters, they could persist in the 
biofilm. 
4.6.3 Results regarding persistence of microorganisms are mostly based on culturing 
techniques 
As described in Table 4-2, investigators studying the persistence of microorganisms 
in distribution systems following an intrusion event mostly used culture-based 
techniques for bacterial enumeration; however, these are known to underestimate the 
number and diversity of microorganisms (Rompre et al, 2002; Szewzyk et al, 2000) as 
they do not take into account the viable but non-culturable bacteria (Byrd et al, 1991). 
Detection of microorganisms using culture-based methods may also be more difficult 
when clumps of organisms originating from biofilms or several organisms associated 
with particles are present, necessitating a disaggregation step to improve the plate 
counts. While enzymatic methods (Colilert and Quanti-Tray/2000 by IDEXX, 
Westbrook, Maine) have been used for the detection of coliform bacteria by some 
authors (Gibbs et al, 2003; McMath et al, 1999), only Camper et al (1998) used a 
detection method that was not culture-based - a fluorescent antibody method - and 
which was significantly more sensitive. With this method, the level of detection reached 
up to five orders of magnitude higher than that obtained with the conventional culture 
methods on selective media for Salmonella typhimurium. However, the authors have 
noted some limitations of this method when used with field water samples: interference 
from particulate material, the tedium of direct microscopy, the potential for false 
positives/negatives and nonspecific staining. In addition, there is the inability to 
determine whether the fluorescent cell is viable or if it has simply retained enough of the 
antigen to cause a positive response. With whole-cell in-situ hybridizations using 
fluorescently tagged 16S rRNA-targeted oligonucleotide probes, Williams and Braun-
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Howland (2003) showed the presence of viable E. coli in biofilms exposed to 1 mg/L of 
hypochlorous acid (for 67 minutes after 2 weeks of incubation). The authors seeded flow 
chambers (their experimental settings) with bacterial concentrates obtained from 
distribution water that was determined to be free of E. coli using membrane filtration 
onto m-FC agar. Consequently, it was assumed that E. coli cells were most probably 
injured and not detected on standard selective media. The lack of culturability of the 
biofilm microorganisms in the pilot-scale studies reviewed here should not, therefore, 
lead to the assumption that the organisms were absent from the system. The use of 
detection techniques such as DVC-FISH-ScanRDI has even showed increased 
concentrations of viable but nonculturable Enterobacteriaceae cells in the bulk water of 
a distribution system at temperatures above 18°C; however, the free chlorine residual 
was below 0.1 mg/L (Baudart et al, 2005). 
4.7 CONCLUSIONS 
Whereas the laboratory-scale experiments reviewed in this paper showed that 
indicator and pathogenic microorganisms can survive for some time in the biofilm of 
water mains under the typical disinfectant residual concentrations used in distribution 
system, the pilot-scale studies indicate no evidence of long-term retention of injected 
microorganisms. Such an observation comes from results mostly based on culture-based 
methods for the enumeration of microorganisms. In general, the target microorganisms 
could not be detected in the biofilm for more than 24 hours in the pilot-scale 
experiments. However, results from both experimental scales tend to agree on the higher 
risk from the intrusion of chlorine-resistant organisms such as viruses or protozoa. 
From this review, we can identify the most critical conditions in terms of the 
persistence of microorganisms in a water system as the following: (i) the intrusion takes 
place under no- or low-flow conditions (such that the microorganisms can accumulate in 
the biofilm), and (ii) there is a delay between the time of intrusion and the time of 
application of the disinfectant. Such conditions are very similar to the field conditions 
experienced during pipe breaks and failures in full-scale distribution systems. In the case 
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of major repairs, it may sometimes take days before normal pipe flow is restored and 
chlorination is fully reinstated. Under these conditions, such results would therefore 
emphasize the need to perform extensive chlorination and flushing procedures before a 
water main is returned to service. This should be done in order to minimize the 
establishment of potentially pathogenic microorganisms in the biofilm which could 
subsequently be released in the bulk water if changes in flow conditions occur. 
As previously highlighted, nearly all the studies reviewed here are based on the 
enumeration of microorganisms by culture-based methods. The few studies tracking the 
viability of bacteria rather than their culturability seem to indicate greater abundance and 
persistence of indicator and pathogenic bacteria, although significant methodological 
hurdles remain. Research is now needed to confirm this observation and to investigate 
the sanitary risks associated with the presence of viable but nonculturable pathogenic 
microorganisms in the distribution system biofilm. 
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CHAPTER 5 
PUBLICATION #2: ASSESSING THE EFFECT OF 
DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM O&M ON WATER QUALITY 
This chapter presents the results of the application of the data integration approach for 
seven distribution systems. It summarizes the research work on the establishment of the 
causes of (historical) coliform occurrence in several distribution systems. Other water 
quality variations such as HPC events and consumer complaints are also included 
because this paper was intended as a complete summary of the data integration approach 
application. This chapter was published in the Journal of the American Water Works 
Association. 
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Abstract: The investigation of historical water quality variations was performed in 
several distribution systems using a data integration approach. Participating water 
utilities included three Canadian cities, two European cities and two American utilities. 
The proposed approach combines the use of water quality, system operation and 
maintenance data, a hydraulic model and geographical information system. Temporal, 
spatial and hydraulic proximities between events are achieved through database queries. 
The investigation included: 140 positive coliform samples in five distribution systems; 
48 HPC events in four systems; and 217 customer complaints in three systems. The 
objective of the research was to identify the main causes of water quality variations to 
eventually determine the proportion attributable to operation and maintenance activities. 
The results showed that the role of O&M activities on the occurrence of coliforms in 
distribution systems varies from one system to another, explaining a minimum of 9% 
and up to 45% of the number of coliform cases investigated in each system. About a 
third of the customer complaints investigated in each of the networks studied could be 
associated with O&M work, while its association with HPC events was negligible in 
three systems out of four. These results are of course based on the available data 
supplied from the participating water utilities. Although O&M activities are beneficial 
for water quality on a long-term basis, their short-term negative impacts should be 
understood for better prevention and control of potential water quality degradation. 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
Maintaining treated water quality throughout the distribution system up to the 
consumer's tap is the goal of every water purveyor, but it still remains a real challenge 
today. Microbial contamination in the distribution system may be caused by a wide 
variety of conditions, i.e. treatment breakthrough (Morris et al, 1996), intrusion 
(Blackburn et al, 2004) and microbial regrowth (LeChevallier et al, 1987). However, the 
relative importance of these contamination pathways is unknown. Although the 
occurrence of positive coliform samples in distribution systems has traditionally been 
associated with coliform regrowth (LeChevallier, 1990), it is hypothesized that system 
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operation and maintenance (O&M) activities may play a role in system contamination. 
Although maintenance activities (such as pipe flushing, pipe repairs/rehabilitation, etc.) 
are beneficial in the long run for improving water quality in distribution systems 
(Antoun et al, 1999; Oliver and Pimentel, 1998), they can potentially lead to short-term 
negative water quality impacts. Transitory contamination events through water main 
leakage points (caused by the opening/closing of valves and fire hydrants, service 
interruptions, sudden changes in demand) and water main installation and repair have 
been classified as direct routes of entry of pathogens into distribution systems (Friedman 
et al, 2004; Kirmeyer et al, 2001). New/repaired water mains are also an issue, and one 
which has been classified as high-priority in terms of its associated potential health risk 
by the Committee on Public Water Supply Distribution Systems of the National 
Research Council (NRC, 2005). Because of the general aging and state of deterioration 
of the infrastructure used to distribute water (ASCE, 2005), distribution system 
maintenance activities are therefore likely to increase in number and frequency in the 
future. 
In order to evaluate the proportion of positive coliform samples collected in a 
distribution system that can be attributed to O&M activities (or to other causes), a data 
integration approach was developed to study historical coliform data from numerous 
water utilities. This data integration approach is based on the combination and 
simultaneous consideration of water quality data, network structural data, system O&M 
data, information from a hydraulic model and a geographical information system (GIS) 
for data visualization. It is essential to consider all this information if we are to answer 
such questions as: (i) where and when was the water sample collected? (ii) what was the 
likely route of the water supply for the sampling location? (iii) were there any global 
factors (water temperature, organic matter concentration, disinfectant concentration, 
deficient operation of treatment plant) that could explain the presence of coliforms? and 
(iv) did any event occur in the system (planned or emergency maintenance, fire flows, 
etc.) that could have affected the system hydraulics or provided a potential route of 
intrusion? Some of this information may be difficult for water quality managers to 
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access, since they may not necessarily be aware of distribution system operation, 
maintenance and hydraulics, possibly due to the dispersion of data, to communication 
issues or to the level of training of water quality staff (if they are not familiar with 
hydraulic modeling, for example). Moreover, water quality variations may result from 
events that took place some time before the actual effect was observed. 
The data integration approach used for this study therefore allows for the 
consideration of various types of data and tools (a hydraulic model, GIS) using a single 
interface called the Interactive Data Analyzer tool as described later. The concept is 
illustrated in Figure 5-1. 
Figure 5-1: Concept of data integration approach 
The approach was initially developed to investigate the causes of historical positive 
coliform samples (Besner et al, 2001), but was also used to investigate other types of 
water quality variations such as heterotrophic plate count bacteria (HPC) events and 
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customer complaints (Besner et al, 2005), in several distribution systems. Investigation 
of the causes of complaints was part of the AwwaRF research project #2764, "Data 
Integration for Water Quality Management" (Martel et al, 2005), as the approach was 
selected as a demonstration tool. This paper therefore presents the main results of all 
investigations into the causes of coliform occurrences, HPC events and customer 
complaints in several systems through the use of a data integration approach based on 
data querying and visualization. With the USEPA's upcoming revision to the Total 
Coliform Rule (Rotert and Warn, 2005), the identification of the factors that can lead to 
coliform occurrences can certainly provide some insights into the most appropriate 
strategies for prevention, control and monitoring in distribution systems. 
5.2 OBJECTIVES 
The data integration approach was used to investigate water quality events in seven 
distribution systems, with the following objectives: (i) validation of the feasibility of the 
approach (depending on the data management practices in place) and of its applicability 
(depending on occurrence and type of water quality problems) in each water utility; (ii) 
assessment of the efficacy of the data integration approach in explaining water quality 
variations as a function of the available information; and (iii) identification of the main 
causes of water quality variations, mainly positive coliform samples, HPC events, and 
customer complaints in several systems, in order to eventually determine the proportion 
attributable to O&M activities. 
5.3 METHODOLOGY 
5.3.1 Details of the water quality events investigated 
The data integration approach was tested in seven water utilities in Canada, the 
United States and Europe with their different types of water, operating characteristics 
and water quality problems. These utilities are described in Table 5-1. The main criteria 
for utility participation were: (i) distribution systems with water quality issues typically 
represented by events with monitored parameter values outside normal ranges; (ii) the 
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availability of databases on network structure, water quality, O&M, and hydraulic 
modeling; and (iii) the willingness to collaborate in a research-oriented project. 
Three types of water quality variations were investigated using the data integration 
approach in the participating distribution systems over time periods varying from 21 
months to 4 years: 140 positive coliform samples in five systems, 48 HPC events in four 



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































While positive coliform samples are easy to identify (with their coliform count > 0 
CFU/100 ml), the definition of HPC events is more complicated. As illustrated in Figure 
5-2, for each distribution system sampling location, HPC concentrations can vary over 
time, depending on: (i) the baseline HPC concentration, which often varies with seasonal 
patterns and sampling point characteristics such as residence time, disinfectant 
concentration, temperature, etc.; (ii) the background noise around the seasonal pattern; 
and (iii) the peak variations reflecting sudden changes in water quality (due to 
contamination, hydraulic disturbances, etc.). The peak variations are defined here as the 
HPC events to be investigated. The temporal variation of the HPCs was studied at each 
sampling point in order to define site-specific thresholds. For the customer complaints, 



















Figure 5-2: Schematic of typical temporal variation of HPC concentration at a 
distribution system sampling point 
5.3.2 Main steps of the data integration approach 
The approach used to study the different water quality events includes a number of 
steps which have previously been explained in detail by Gauthier et al (2001) and 
Besner et al (2005): 
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• Collection of the available databases in the utility. As mentioned previously, in 
addition to water quality data, other types of data must be considered in order to 
be able to explain water quality variations in distribution systems (Table 5-3). 
For each type of data, the information related to the temporal (date) and spatial 
localization (street address) should, ideally, be available; 
Table 5-3: Types of data needed for distribution system water quality investigation 
Type of data 
Water quality (source, 
treatment plant, distribution 
system) 
Treatment plant operation and 
other data 
Distribution system structure 
and hydraulics 
Distribution system O&M 
activities 
Typical parameters 
• Coliform bacteria 
• Heterotrophic plate counts 





• Consumer complaints 
• Treatment plant events 
o Ozone failures 
o Power shutdowns 
• Rainfall/weather events 





o Residence time 
• Pipe material, year of installation 
• Pumping controls 
• Location and operation of storage tanks 
• Hydrant and valve locations 
• Valve/hydrant maintenance program 
• Flushing program 
• Pipe relining and cleaning 
• New pipe installation 
• Pipe leaks and breaks 
• Firefighters interventions 
• Computerized maintenance management 
system data 
• Inspection data 
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• Formatting (validation of format and content) and geocoding (allocation of 
geographical (x-y) coordinates) of the databases for their visualization (using a 
GIS); 
• Use of a hydraulic model to obtain specific hydraulic paths, ie. all the possible 
water paths supplying a selected point in the distribution system (upstream 
route). This is achieved using a search algorithm which verifies for a selected 
node if at any moment of the simulation, water flowed from the upstream pipes 
to the node. The algorithm is stopped when the upstream route reaches the source 
of supply, i.e. the treatment plant. 
• Mining of data using a unique visualization/exploration tool in order to identify 
the relationship between database parameters and water quality events. This is 
performed through database queries and data visualization. 
The visualization/exploration tool that was developed as part of the data integration 
approach is a software prototype referred to as either the IMADSIG tool (Trepanier et al, 
2006) or the Interactive Data Analyzer tool (Besner et al, 2005). This GIS-based tool 
uses software elements such as Microsoft Excel' for data storage, EPANET version 
2.00.10 (Rossman, 2000) for hydraulic modeling and ESRI Arc Explorer2 for GIS 
visualization. Visual FoxPro1 was used for programming and the Structured Query 
Language (SQL) is the code used for database queries. The in-house user interface is 
available in both French and English. A relatively simple tool had to be developed 
because of the participating utilities' specific needs, data availability and data formats, 
established procedures and software for data collection, and hydraulic modeling. This is 
the main reason for the selection of Microsoft Excel, EPANET and ESRI Arc Explorer, 
which are widely available, the last two being free and available for download through 
the Internet. The use of proprietary and other advanced commercial software was 
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possible but not considered, since the approach was designed to be transferred back to 
the water utility staff for their own use after the study had been completed. 
The Interactive Data Analyzer tool's main functions include: (1) examination and 
management of Excel and database format (DBF) databases (which already included 
geo-locations - x and y coordinates); (2) generation of DBF files and GIS shapefiles 
from Excel files; (3) synthesis of EPANET extended period simulation results 
(minimum, maximum and average values for each node/link) and generation of 
corresponding DBF files and GIS shapefiles; (4) determination of the upstream 
hydraulic path for a specified node (all the possible water paths upstream of a node) 
based on statistics obtained from the hydraulic simulation; and (5) definition of database 
queries as multi-table (simultaneous queries in different databases) and multi-criterion 
(according to hydraulic, spatial, temporal and specific parameter values), with direct 
visualization of the results through the GIS freeware, Arc Explorer. The main functions 
are illustrated in Figure 5-3. 
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Figure 5-3: Main functions of the Interactive Data Analyzer tool 
5.3.3 Systematic study of each type of water quality variation was conducted 
Using the Interactive Data Analyzer tool, a systematic study of all the positive 
coliform samples, HPC events and customer complaints in each distribution system (as 
detailed in Table 5-2) was conducted. As an example, for each positive coliform sample 
investigated, trends in water quality data were verified in order to determine whether or 
not the coliform could originate from changes in source, finished or distributed water. 
Available SCADA data were reviewed to assess whether or not the operation of the 
system (changes in water demand) could have caused system disturbances, and database 
queries were performed to determine whether or not any specific system event(s) (such 
as O&M) took place in the same area as the sampling location. Furthermore, the 
upstream hydraulic path was also determined, allowing the theoretical water path from 
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the treatment plant to the sampling location to be identified. Because all this information 
can be directly visualized using the GIS, the Interactive Data Analyzer tool makes it 
possible for the user to select the events that are related in both time and space to the 
occurrence of a water quality variation. However, the impact of each event on water 
quality may be more or less important, depending upon its type, the system hydraulics 
and temporal/spatial/hydraulic proximity. The user of the tool is the one assessing the 
potential impact of each event, using his knowledge and experience. It is clear that the 
result of such an analysis does not provide the origin of the water quality variation with 
certainty, however a "qualitative probability" or a "level of confidence" may be 
associated with each event. Using this approach, three levels of probability that an event 
was the cause of the water quality variation investigated were defined: (i) a low 
probability; (ii) a medium probability; or (iii) a high probability. Human judgment is 
therefore involved here, as the tool was not designed to be an expert system. It was 
primarily intended to support water utility personnel in accessing different types of 
databases, performing queries in them and visualizing the data. The qualitative 
probabilities assigned by the research team were validated by the utility personnel before 
compilation of the results. For each type of water quality variation investigated and for 
each distribution system, the results were compiled and presented in a matrix format 
with the potential causes identified from the data integration study. From this, the main 
O&M activities associated with the occurrence of water quality variations in each 
system could be identified, as well as the proportion of the variations attributable to 
O&M activities. 
5.4 RESULTS 
The seven water utilities in which the data integration approach was tested had very 
different characteristics in terms of the number and type of customers, the type of water 
supplied and the network layout. As a result, the data management practices and the 
types of data available were found to vary from one utility to another. The types of data 
that were available to the research team to perform the data integration approach in the 
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various utilities are listed in Table 5-4. Occasionally, some of the data listed were not 
available for the whole study period. Also, the fact that some data could not be 
transferred to the research team does not necessarily mean that they were not collected 







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































5.4.1 General perfonnance of the approach in identifying causes of water quality 
variations 
The results of the systematic investigation of the positive coliform samples in five 
distribution systems are illustrated in Figure 5-4. The percentage of coliform samples for 
which a potential cause was identified (with a low, medium or high probability of 
causing the coliform occurrence) is illustrated for each utility. An important fraction of 
the positive coliform samples could be explained with a high probability cause in three 
systems (38% in Egham, 43% in Laval and 55% in Caen). The explanation was less 
successful for the Montreal and Moncton systems, as only 14% and 9% of the positive 
samples were linked to documented events identified as high-probability causes. These 
two utilities had the highest level of unexplained cases, with no cause being identified 
for 36% of their positive coliform samples. The number of samples investigated was 
quite similar for four of the systems, varying between 11 and 15, while 88 positive 
samples were studied for Laval. This was mainly due to the fact that the entire 
distribution system in this city was included in the study and that the 12 sampling points 
in the network are monitored from 4 to 7 times a week. Because of the large number of 
samples collected over the 4-year period (n=9946), these 88 positive coliform samples 
still corresponded to only 0.9% of the samples collected. Specific results for this large 
database study are presented and discussed here later. HPC events were investigated in 
four distribution systems, and their numbers were found to vary between 7 and 16 events 
per system. The approach was able to identify high-probability causes for 8% to 31% of 
the events investigated (Figure 5-5). However, the percentage of unexplained HPC 
events (no cause identified) was higher than for the coliform samples, varying from 8% 
to 83% of the events investigated in each system. The study of customer complaints 
(including rusty water, dirty water, taste and odor, and low pressure) was conducted in 
three distribution systems. A high-probability cause was identified for 26% to 36% of 
the customer calls (Figure 5-6). However, from 36% to 53% of the complaints 
investigated in each system were unexplained. Three cases (coliforms, HPC and 
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complaint events) for which high-probability causes were identified are discussed later 
in the paper. 
•HIGH PROBABILITY" CAUSE 
•MEDIUM PROBABILITY" CAUSE 
D 'LOW PROBABILITY" CAUSE 
O NO CAUSE 
Laval Montreal Moncton Egham Caen 
(n=88) (n=14) (n=11) (n=16) (n=11) 
Water utility 
Figure 5-4: Capacity of the data integration approach to identify causes of positive 
coliform samples 
• "HIGH PROBABILITY" CAUSE 
D "MEDIUM PROBABILITY" CAUSE 
D "LOW PROBABILITY" CAUSE 



















"HIGH PROBABILITY" CAUSE 
•MEDIUM PROBABILITY" CAUSE 
"LOW PROBABILITY' CAUSE 
Moncton 
(n=39) 
Figure 5-6: Capacity of the data integration approach to identify causes of customer 
complaints (GCWW: Greater Cincinnati Water Works, DWD: Denver Water Department) 
5.4.2 High-probability causes identified 
The occurrence of coliforms could be associated with pipe replacement (Egham) and 
with spot flushing and valve operation (Montreal). In the Laval distribution system, 
multiple types of high-probability causes were identified: unidirectional flushing, valve 
and hydrant operation, lower pressures in localized area of the system, change in quality 
of the water supply (due to coliforms measured at the water treatment plant (WTP) 
outlet and spring turnover) and peaks in water consumption. In the Caen distribution 
system, coliforms were found to be related to high flow hydrant testing, pipe break 
repair and change in quality of water supply, and in the Moncton system to the 
installation of new pipes and mains cleaning and relining. The high-probability causes 
identified for HPC events were pipe replacement (Egham), pipe break repair (Montreal), 
high flow hydrant testing and change in type of water supply (Caen) and unidirectional 
flushing (Moncton). Unidirectional flushing was also related to most of the explained 
customer complaints in the Moncton distribution system. Mains repair and hydrant 
maintenance were the other high-probability causes identified in this system. Valve 
operation, mains repair and fire flow tests were associated with complaints in the 
Greater Cincinnati distribution system, and work related to fire hydrants (replacement, 
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routine maintenance, flushing) was the type of cause that explained most of the 
complaints in the Denver system. A summary of the high-probability causes identified 
for the three types of water quality variations investigated is provided in Table 5-5. 
Table 5-5: High-probability causes identified through the application of the data 
integration approach 
LAVAL 
(TC samples = 88) 
MONTREAL 
(TC samples = 14) 
(HPC events = 12) 
MONCTON 
(TC samples = 11) 
(HPC events = 13) 
(complaints = 39) 
# of coliform samples 
with cause identified 
38 
See Table 6 
2 
Valve operation & spot flushing (2) 
1 
New main installation & cleaning/relining 
# of HPC events 





# of complaints 
with cause identified 
14 
Unidirectional flushing (12) 
Pipe repair (1) 
Hydrant maintenance (1) 
CAEN 
(TC samples = 11) 
(HPC events = 16) 
EGHAM 
(TC samples = 16) 
(HPC events = 7) 
GCWW 
(complaints = 138) 
6 S 
Change in quality of water supply (1) Disturbances in DS hydraulics and water turbidity (1) 
Pipe repair (1) Change in type of water supply (2) 
High flow hydrant testing (4) High flow hydrant testing (2) 
6 
Pipe replacement (6) Pipe replacement 
36 
Valve operation (16) 
Pipe repair (14) 
Pipe repair & valve operation (5) 
Fire flow test & valve operation (1) 
DWD 11 
(complaints = 40) Hydrant replacement/maintenance (4) 
Valve operation for hydrant testing (3) 
Pipe repair (2) 
B Hydrant replacement & spot flushing (2) 
DS: Distribution system; DWD: Denver Water Department; GCWW: Greater Cincinnati Water Works; 
TC: Total coliforms 
5.4.3 Approach permitting the establishment of links between water quality data and 
O&M activities 
In the Laval distribution system, a strong link was established between low pressure 
events in a section of the system and five positive coliform samples during the summer 
1999 at three sampling locations (R8, RIO, R12) in the disrupted area (Figure 5-7a). At 
that time, construction work was going on in the eastern part of the Laval system. The 
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work was actually conducted on the sewer system, but it resulted in the intermittent 
closure of a drinking water main (400 mm-(16 in.)) supplying the area, limiting the 
supply of this part of the system to a single pipe from WTP A. Field pressure 
measurements at two of the sampling stations (RIO, R12) indicated pressures sometimes 
lower than 20 psi (138 kPa) during that period (data not shown). In combination with 
lower system pressures, four out of the five positive coliform samples in this area were 
found to have been collected during periods of increased water consumption (summer). 
Moreover, for two of these samples, the operation of system valves was also identified 
as being a key factor in the explanation of the occurrence of coliforms. Database queries 
helped to reveal that, a few days before the occurrence of coliforms at sampling station 
RIO, three valves had been operated on the other 350/400 mm (14/16 in.) pipe supplying 
the area, which resulted in changes in flow direction in this part of the distribution 
system (Figure 5-7b). According to the pressure field measurements available, very low 
pressures (close to 0 psi) were briefly recorded at sampling stations R10 (at around 3 
a.m.) and R12 (between 1 a.m. and 4 a.m.), which suggests that the two mains supplying 
the area were possibly closed at the same time for a very short period. This combination 
of events (low system pressures, increased water consumption and valve operation) was 
therefore strongly associated with the coliform occurrences taking place in this 
distribution system area, which was characterized by low or non-detectable free chlorine 
residuals at that time. The lower pressures could have led to the intrusion of 
contaminated material into the pipes (Kirmeyer et al, 2001) and major flow reversals 


















































































































































































































































































In the Montreal distribution system, an HPC event (340 CFU/ml) was investigated 
and the high-probability cause of this event was identified as the repair of a water main 
break. HPC concentrations at this sampling location are usually very low, with 95% of 
the samples having HPC concentrations of less than 14 CFU/ml for a 4-year period 
(n=201). For this same period, all but two of the samples had HPC concentrations of less 
than 70 CFU/ml. Using the Interactive Data Analyzer tool, the hydraulic path upstream 
of the sampling point was first identified, along with any maintenance events that had 
taken place in the previous months. The visualization of the database query results 
obtained led to the identification of a 200 mm (8 in.) pipe repair that took place the day 
prior to the HPC event, a few blocks upstream of the sampling point (Figure 5-8). It was 
therefore concluded that, because of the very good temporal and hydraulic proximity, 
this repair was a high-probability cause for this localized microbial degradation. 
Unfortunately, the repair procedures used by the field crew (whether or not the repair 
was done under pressure, what were the flushing and disinfection practices in place) are 
not known from the available data. 
Figure 5-8: HPC event having the repair of a water main as a high probability cause 
(Montreal distribution system) 
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In the Denver distribution system, a dirty water complaint (brown water and 
particulates) was received on August 21, 2000 (Figure 5-9). According to the 
investigation by Denver Water staff (available through the complaint report), red 
particles, which appeared to be iron flakes, were found in the customer's water and in a 
nearby fire hydrant. The staff associated this situation with deterioration of the water 
main supplying the area, which, it was found, was installed circa 1904. The investigation 
using the data integration approach showed that, on the same day the call was received, 
two major excavations for hydrant replacement took place nearby, which could very 
well explain the occurrence of colored water following the induced disturbance. 
Unfortunately, the skeletonized hydraulic model did not permit determination of whether 
or not these excavations were upstream of the complaint location. However, the 
comments of the field crew performing hydrant flushing the day after the complaint was 
received (Figure 5-9), would tend to corroborate this hypothesis. 
Figure 5-9: Events related to the occurrence of a dirty water complaint in Denver Water 
distribution system (DW: dirty water; FH: Fire hydrant; H: High probability cause) 
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5.4.4 Investigation of a large set of coliform data 
As mentioned previously, 88 positive coliform samples were investigated in the Laval 
distribution system for the 1997-2000 period. A high-probability cause was identified 
for 38 samples, corresponding to 43% of the samples investigated. The causes identified 
could include a single event or a combination of events, as listed in Table 5-6. Coliforms 
measured in the treated water (at the WTP outlet) and higher turbidity in the source 
water are considered as WTP events, and were associated with the occurrence of 8 
positive coliform samples, which represents 9% of the total number of cases 
investigated. Seventeen coliform samples were associated with an increase in water 
consumption in the system, corresponding to 19% of the investigated cases. However, it 
is rather difficult to classify higher water consumption events as strictly WTP- or 
distribution system-originating events, as the change in water quality could equally well 
originate from the WTP or the network. Moreover, the data available for this study did 
not permit differentiation among the possible origins, and, as a result, higher demands 
are here considered as a combination of WTP and distribution system events. Five 
coliform samples were associated with a combination of higher consumption and 
distribution system events, such as valve operation, lower system pressures and pipe 
flushing, and 8 samples were directly related to distribution system events 
(unidirectional flushing, hydrant operation and lower system pressures). Consequently, 
15% of the 88 positive coliform samples investigated were directly related to the 
occurrence of distribution system events in the Laval network over the 1997-2000 
period. 
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Table 5-6: Type of events identified as having a high probability of causing coliform 
occurrence in the Laval distribution system 
Type of event 
WTP 
WTP and/or DS 




Description of event 
Total coliforms in treated 
water 
High turbidity in source water 
(spring turnover) 
Increased water consumption 
Increased water consumption 
+ few valve operation + lower 
DS pressures 
Increased water consumption 
+ lower DS pressures 
Increased water consumption 
+ pipe flushing 
Lower DS pressures 
Pipe flushing 
Few hydrant operation 
TOTAL 
Number of positive 
coliform samples 

























DS: Distribution system; WTP: Water treatment plant 
5.5 DISCUSSION 
With the type of approach used for this study, there is obviously some expertise 
involved in the process of assigning a "qualitative" probability or confidence level to an 
event in causing a water quality variation. For this reason primarily, trends rather than 
specific numbers should be used to interpret the results presented. For the investigation 
of historical positive coliform samples, satisfactory results (more than about 40% of the 
cases explained by a high-probability cause) were obtained for three distribution systems 
out of five. In all the systems where customer complaints were investigated, about a 
third of the complaints in each system could be assigned a high-probability cause. 
Finally, HPC events seemed to be the most difficult type of events to explain using such 
an approach. The rate at which they were explained reached 31% in one system, while 
reaching only 8% and 14% in the other distribution systems. While it is known that an 
increase in shear stress due to modifications to the network hydraulic conditions is 
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certainly a factor leading to the detachment of cells from pipe biofilm (Servais et al, 
2004), it was not often possible to link distribution system events with an increase in 
HPC concentrations, at least for the data that were available. Moreover, HPCs are often 
more representative of disinfection efficacy, regrowth and biofilm formation in a system 
than total coliforms (Laurent et al, 2005), making it more difficult to relate HPC events 
to specific distribution system events. 
It was expected that the data integration approach developed here would not be able 
to explain 100% of the investigated cases (for all types of water quality variations). The 
limitations associated with a study based on data analysis are numerous, as only 
available data can be considered. Limiting factors are the following: 
Some information can either be known, but not archived (emergency hydrant 
uses for fire fighting, etc.), or simply unknown (undetected leaks, illegal cross-
connection, etc.). 
WTP data, especially those related to operational events at the plant (power 
failure, shutdown of a treatment component, cleaning of the installation, etc.) are 
rarely archived in a systematic way. Only one participating water utility had this 
information, but the details were often only partial. 
Some available data may be improperly dated (erroneous temporal location) or 
geocoded (erroneous spatial location) because of incorrect data validation. 
Depending on system management, the number of water quality samples and 
their frequency of collection may be too small to effectively determine the onset 
of a water quality variation, and hence the events associated with it. 
The hydraulic model, which is an essential part of this approach, may only give 
an approximate view of system hydraulics, due to: the updating process for 
describing long-term (system development) and short-term (main closure during 
rehabilitation) changes in hydraulic configuration, the detailing of water 
consumption, the use of extended-period simulations, the use of a skeletonized 
vs. an all-mains model and the intensity of the model calibration effort. 
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The cause of the water quality variation investigated may not be identifiable 
through the use of standard collected data (e.g. internal plumbing problem for 
complaints or regrowth of HPCs in water mains). 
It is not possible to compare the results obtained in the various distribution systems, 
as they are totally dependent on the data that were available for each participating water 
utility. The heterogeneity observed in the types of data available for each system 
reflects: (i) different plant and system management practices (e.g. unidirectional flushing 
is not performed in all systems); (ii) different regulations in place (e.g. yearly storage 
tank cleaning is compulsory in some countries such as France (Ministere de l'Emploi et 
de la Solidarity, 2001)); and (iii) different data management systems (centralization and 
computerization of data, use of SCADA systems). The application of the approach on 
several systems therefore highlighted different types of causes resulting in water quality 
degradation. 
Because of the nature of the data available (mostly related to distribution system 
events), a large part of the explained cases are related to O&M activities conducted in 
the network, as illustrated in Table 5-5. The results obtained therefore show a minimal 
fraction of positive cases for which O&M activities likely played a role in water quality 
variation in the different systems. For the occurrence of positive coliform samples, 
events related to O&M can explain at least 9% of the cases in Moncton, 14% in 
Montreal and 38% in Egham. For two systems, some causes were related to events at the 
WTP or changes in the quality of the water supplied. Consequently, at least 45% of the 
positive coliform samples were related to distribution system events in Caen, and, in 
Laval, a minimum of 15% of the 88 coliform samples investigated were directly related 
to distribution system activities (considering only the 13 samples identified as being 
associated with distribution system events (Table 5-6), and not the other 17 samples 
associated with increased water consumption that could also be linked to the system in 
some way). Lehtola et al (2004) have shown that increased water consumption in a 
Finnish distribution system was the cause of lower water quality (increased iron and 
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bacteria concentration, increased turbidity) due to the disturbance of old soft pipe 
deposits. For Laval, considering these 17 supplementary samples would link distribution 
system events to up to 34% of the 88 positive coliform samples investigated. 
The role of O&M activities on the occurrence of coliforms in distribution system 
therefore seems to vary from one system to another. However, the development of 
improved strategies for conducting system work identified as a highly probable cause of 
coliform occurrences (pipe replacement, pipe flushing and cleaning, etc.) would 
certainly help reduce water quality disturbances. In Moncton, water mains were initially 
cleaned mechanically with high-speed water flows, causing disturbances in the upstream 
distribution system area (pipe scouring, increased water turbidity and possibly total 
coliforms). When the utility performed similar work subsequently, the contractor used 
an alternative cleaning method, thus avoiding major hydraulic disturbances to adjacent 
water mains. 
For the other types of water quality variations, a constant fraction (about a third) of 
the customer complaints investigated in each of the three systems studied could be 
associated with O&M work, while the association with HPC events was negligible in 
most systems. However, the results obtained here most likely represent the minimal 
fraction of cases explained by distribution system events, and are based on available data 
sets. As an example, for the Denver distribution system, four complaints that could not 
be explained using the data integration approach were associated with the installation of 
new mains by the utility staff (as described in the available complaint reports). The data 
set related to the installation of new mains was unfortunately incomplete for the study 
period, and, as a result, this cause could not genuinely be related to complaints. 
Moreover, the role of O&M activities on the occurrence of coliforms and HPC events 
may also be underestimated, as monitoring of water quality only takes place at fixed 
sampling points (except for the Egham system). O&M work is very often conducted in 
distribution system areas where no monitoring takes place on a routine basis, making it 
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more difficult to assess the real impact of these activities unless specific sampling 
campaigns are conducted. 
Although these research findings may highlight temporary and local negative impacts 
that maintenance work (such as pipe replacement or unidirectional flushing) may have 
on water quality, this should not be interpreted as having a major detrimental effect 
leading to the value of these activities being questioned. There is no doubt that 
unidirectional flushing and pipe replacement are necessary and beneficial in maintaining 
distribution system reliability and integrity. However, the short-term detrimental impacts 
of the O&M activities found to be responsible for water quality degradation should be 
identified and understood by water utility staff in order that appropriate strategies can be 
developed for the prevention and control of potential future contamination (targeted 
water quality samplings, improved working procedures, etc.). 
5.6 CONCLUSIONS 
In this study, a data integration approach was applied to investigate historical data 
related to coliform occurrence, HPCs and customer complaints in several distribution 
systems. The results obtained led to the identification of some of the main causes of 
water quality variations in these systems. The explained cases led to the assessment of 
the minimal proportion of water quality events associated with O&M activities. 
However, the degree to which these cases can be explained using such an approach is 
totally dependent on the availability of high-quality data which provide a comprehensive 
analysis and a highly accurate diagnosis. Data on water quality, network hydraulics and 
distribution system operations, including all operations that may cause a significant 
hydraulic disturbance, must be available for the approach and the proposed tools to be 
applied to their full potential. Missing information, erroneous temporal and spatial 
localization of collected data, water quality sampling strategies and hydraulic model 
issues are some of the limitations associated with this type of analysis. 
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After this study was completed, the data integration approach and associated tools 
were transferred back to the staff of the participating water utilities. For some, the 
implementation of automatic geocoding for new data and the motivation to maintain 
well formatted and geocoded databases resulted from their participation in these research 
projects. The approach was therefore not only found useful for investigating water 
quality variations, but also for data management. The Veolia Water Company has 
implemented such a data integration approach in the city of Metz (France). Technical 
knowledge (better use of different types of information, better understanding of water 
quality in distribution systems), commercial benefits (technological showcase, 
development of GIS aspects, modeling) and the legal obligations of water providers 
under the revised regulations drove the application of the approach by the company. 
The proposed approach is a first step in trying to establish links between O&M 
activities and changes in water quality. In order to refine the results obtained through 
data integration in relation to the impact of O&M activities on water quality (as the 
results obtained only give a picture of what is taking place close to routine sampling 
points for coliforms and HPCs), a subsequent field study was initiated with two 
Canadian water utilities, in which the impact of selected O&M activities on water 
quality is being monitored through extensive field samplings at the time work is 
conducted. To this day, the impact on water quality of sixteen water main repairs, ten 
pipe flushings, two hydrant pressure tests, routine pump operation and one transmission 
main closure has been assessed. It is anticipated that this will allow a more complete 
understanding of the risk of contamination associated with these distribution system 
activities. 
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CHAPTER 6 
PUBLICATION #3: IMPACT OF WATER MAIN REPAIRS 
ON WATER QUALITY 
From the results obtained through the general literature survey and the in-depth 
review of intrusion experiments as well as from the database study on the impact of 
O&M activities, repair sites were identified as one critical pathway for possible system 
contamination. This chapter therefore presents the results of our field study during which 
planned repairs of water main leaks were monitored in two full-scale distribution 
systems. Evaluation of water quality was performed both inside and outside the repair 
area in order to provide information that is not yet available in the scientific literature. 
This chapter is a paper that has been submitted to the Journal of the American Water 
Works Association for publication. 
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Abstract: The investigation of 16 planned repairs of pipe leaks in the distribution 
systems of two Canadian cities was performed in 2004-2005. The objective was to study 
the occurrence of microbial intrusion in full scale distribution systems associated with 
repair activities. Samples of soil and water were collected in pipe trenches while 
distribution system water was collected at customer houses and flushed hydrants. The 
frequency of faecal microbial indicators detection in the soil and water surrounding the 
mains was low. Evidence of intrusion (using total coliforms, E.coli and aerobic 
endospores in distribution system water) was obtained at seven sites out of 16 but the 
results suggest that adequate pipe flushing after a repair is completed is effective to 
minimize contamination for the type of repair investigated. The positive samples were 
almost all collected during the flushing operation. Variations in chlorine residuals and 
turbidity were also observed outside of repair areas. 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
The last few years have seen an increasing interest in better understanding the impact 
of routine operations (e.g., pump, hydrant or valve actions, main repairs, etc.) on the 
water quality within a distribution system. The possibility of the contamination of 
drinking water with pathogenic organisms is a concern for any water purveyor and some 
conditions or activities in distribution systems may influence the potential for pathogen 
intrusion. Drinking water main repair sites appear as particularly vulnerable locations for 
intrusion because of the operational characteristics involved as part of this maintenance 
activity (loss of system's physical integrity, repair procedure, operation of valves and 
hydrants). As such, new and repaired water mains have been ranked as a high 
priority/risk level pathogen route of entry by Kirmeyer et al (2001) and by the National 
Academies' Water Science and Technology Board Committee (NRC, 2006). 
Conclusions from a literature review of numerous studies specifically investigating the 
fate of microorganisms introduced into experimental systems showed that conditions 
experienced when pipe break repairs are conducted in full-scale distribution systems are 
likely the most favorable to pathogen persistence in a water system (Besner et al, 
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2007a). Nygard et al (2007) observed that breaks and maintenance work with presumed 
loss of water pressure in distribution systems in Norway caused an increased risk of 
gastrointestinal illness among water recipients with a risk ratio of 1.58 in exposed 
households. 
Data available to assess the importance of pipe repairs in terms of pathogen intrusion 
mostly rely on the occurrence of waterborne disease outbreaks (Deshayes et al, 2001; 
Geldreich et al, 1992) and surveys among water utilities (Pierson et al, 2001; Kirmeyer 
et al, 2001; Haas et al, 1998). Requirements and procedures to limit microbial 
contamination during construction, repair and replacement of water mains have also 
been provided (Pierson et al, 2001; Burlingame and Neukrug, 1993). However, detailed 
field data related to water quality parameters during repairs are usually missing. The 
number of sanitary release samples after new main installation is the most common type 
of data available (Haas et al, 1998). 
A list of the potential sources or pathways of microbiological contamination during 
pipe repair has been compiled by Pierson et al (2001) from the input of water utility 
personnel. The authors determined that pre-installation exposure, installation or repair 
activities and post-repair conditions were susceptible to lead to water contamination. 
During the repair activities, points of concern of 250 water utilities surveyed by Haas et 
al (1998) were mainly unsanitary construction practices (for nearly 40% of the utilities 
surveyed) and contamination from soil and trenchwater exposure (for 20% of the 
utilities). Soil and water samples from trenches can be potentially contaminated with 
faecal microorganisms and even human enteric viruses (Karim et al, 2003; Harris, 1959). 
Other factors that are likely to influence the potential for contamination during repair 
include shutdown time, nature of the excavation, method of repair, storage or cleanliness 
of materials, and size of the job (Haas et al, 1998). Flushing, disinfection (according to 
AWWA Standard C651), and water quality testing are the recommended actions for 
contamination control after a repair is completed (Pierson et al, 2001). Haas et al (1998) 
reports that another potential source of contamination may come from stagnant water 
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created by closed valves adjacent to the area of the construction or repair. However, no 
field data are provided and the impact of repair procedures outside of the isolated 
distribution system area is hardly addressed in the existing literature. 
The general aging and deteriorating state of the infrastructure used to distribute water 
is a threat to the integrity of distribution systems and increases the vulnerability of 
distribution systems to water contamination to a level that is not known today. Kirmeyer 
et al (2001) estimated that about 237,600 water main repairs are performed annually in 
the U.S. The number of repairs is likely to stay high and may even increase: (i) the 
American Society for Civil Engineers allocated a D- for the poor state of drinking water 
infrastructures in the U.S (ASCE, 2005) and, (ii) the results of a Canadian municipal 
infrastructure survey conducted in 1995/96 showed that 59% of the water distribution 
networks were in unsatisfactory condition at that time (Mirza and Haider, 2003). 
Consequently, a field study to actually monitor changes in distributed water quality 
when pipe repairs are conducted is needed to assess the risk of contamination linked to 
this activity. 
6.2 OBJECTIVES 
In order to evaluate the potential for contamination associated with pipe repairs in 
drinking water distribution systems, a study was undertaken involving field 
investigations of hydraulic and water quality parameters during planned repair work in 
two full-scale distribution systems. This project was conducted over two years (summers 
of 2004 and 2005). The objectives of this study were to develop a sampling protocol that 
could be tested in full-scale distribution system in order to assess the risk of 
contamination associated with the repairs of water mains. 
6.3 METHODOLOGY 
The sampling protocol developed to assess the impact of pipe repairs on water quality 
has been tested in two full-scale distribution systems located in the province of Quebec 
(Canada). The first water utility (Utility A) provides drinking water to about 380,000 
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consumers. The distribution system services mostly customers inhabiting single-family 
dwellings and could be classified as of a "suburban type". An active pipe leak detection 
program has been in place at this utility for over 15 years. Most of the repairs in this 
system are scheduled and conducted rapidly after indications of a leak are reported by 
the field crews. The second water utility (Utility B) provides drinking water to about 1.8 
million consumers and is divided into 27 districts. The distribution system of one 
district, supplying water to a population of 128,440, was selected as the study area. This 
district is among the five more densely populated districts in the city and the majority of 
housing is composed of multiple-dwelling structures. For the selected district, no 
specific program exists to detect pipe leaks such that repair work can be classified as 
generally more reactive than preventive. 
For logistic reasons, only planned repairs were investigated for this study. 
Notification by the field crews of the time and place at which the repair would take place 
was therefore possible. A total of 16 repairs were monitored. During summer 2004, 11 
repairs were monitored in system A and during summer 2005, three repairs were 
investigated in system A and two repairs in system B. 
6.3.1 Collection of soil and water samples from pipe trenches 
Soil samples were collected in the vicinity of the exposed main using a sterile trowel. 
The samples were put into large plastic (Ziploc® type) bags. Water samples were 
collected using four autoclaved one-liter plastic bottles. Samples were kept in a cooler 
and received by the laboratory within a few hours of collection (usually less than 5 
hours). For soil samples, particle size analysis was conducted using the hydrometer 
method (ASTM D 421, 1998). 
6.3.2 Bacteriological analyses conducted on soil and water from pipe trenches 
For bacteriological analysis, 20 grams of soil were mixed with 200 mL of saline and 
stirred on a magnetic stirrer for 1 minute. The sample was left to stand for 30 minutes 
and the supernatant was then recuperated for bacteriological and coliphages analysis. 
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For water, the 1-liter samples were pooled and stirred on a magnetic stirrer for 1 minute, 
left to stand for 30 minutes and 250 mL of supernatant were recuperated for 
bacteriological and coliphages analysis. 
Samples were assayed for the presence of aerobic endospores, Clostridium 
perfringens, E. coli and total coliforms (total coliforms were not assayed in 2004) within 
24 hours of sampling using membrane filtration methods. Two 10 mL and two 1 mL 
portions (or appropriate dilutions) of the sample were assayed on each culture media. 
Tryptic soy broth (Difco Laboratories) with 0.01% triphenyl tetrazolium chloride was 
used to enumerate aerobic endospores. Samples were filtered on a membrane, placed in 
a 50 mm Petri dish containing a pad saturated with the medium, pasteurized during 15 
minutes at 75°C in a water bath and incubated at 35°C for 24 hours. Red colonies were 
counted as aerobic endospores (Barbeau et al, 1997), and the vast majority of these 
organisms are species of Bacillus. The method described by Armon and Payment (1988) 
was used to enumerate C. perfringens by membrane filtration using mCP agar and 
incubation at 45°C for 18-24 hours. In 2005, MI (Difco Laboratories) agar was used for 
the simultaneous detection of E. coli and total coliforms after 24 hours at 35°C (USEPA, 
2002a). Blue colonies were reported as E. coli and fluorescent colonies under longwave 
ultraviolet light (366nm) (including the blue colonies under ambient light) as total 
coliforms. In 2004, E.coli were detected with mTEC agar by membrane filtration 
(USEPA, 2002b). The dishes were incubated at 35 ± 0.5°C for 2 h. After a 2h incubation 
at 35 ± 0.5°C, the plates were transferred at 44.5 ± 0.2°C for 22-24 h. After incubation, 
the membranes from mTEC Agar were transferred on absorbent pads saturated with 
Urea Substrate Medium and kept at room temperature for 15-20 min. Yellow, yellow-
green, or yellow-brown colonies were counted as E. coli. Results are reported as colony 
forming unit (cfu) per 100 mL or per 100 g. 
6.3.3 Coliphages assay 
Method 1602 of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (USEPA, 2001a) was 
used with E. coli CN-13 as host strain for somatic coliphages and E. coli F-amp as host 
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strain for male-specific coliphages. Volumes of 1 and 10 mL were assayed for each 
coliphages in duplicate. The results were reported as plaque forming unit (pfu) per 100 
mL or per 100 g of sample. 
6.3.4 Virus detection in soil and water from pipe trenches 
Soil (100g) was weighed, mixed for 30 minutes with 400 mL of 3% beef extract and 
then centrifuged for 15 minutes at 3000 x g. The supernatant was transferred into a 
sterile bottle for organic flocculation (pH 3.5 and FeCl3 0.1%) followed by 
centrifugation for 15 minutes at 4°C at 3000 x g. The supernatant was discarded, the 
pellet resuspended in glycine buffered medium (pH 9) and the volume completed to 15 
mL with Minimum Essential Medium (MEM) with antibiotics (1% penicillin-
streptomycin and 0.1% gentamicin). The pH was adjusted to 7.2 and the concentrate 
stored at -80°C until the viral assay was performed. For water, a sample of 4 liters was 
centrifuged for 15 minutes at 3000 x g. The supernatant and the pellet were treated 
separately. 
6.3.4.1 Supernatant 
A final concentration of 0.05M MgCb was added to the supernatant that was then 
adjusted to pH 6 with HC1 1.2N and filtered on a series of 142 mm filters: an AP25 
prefilter (Millipore), a 0.45 urn and a 0.25 um (Duo-Fine media, Filterite Corp). The 
filters were eluted using 150 mL of beef extract (1.5%, pH 9.75) and reconcentration 
was done by organic flocculation (pH 3.5 and FeCU 0.1%) followed by centrifugation 
for 15 minutes at 4°C at 3000 x g. The supernatant was discarded, the pellet resuspended 
in glycine buffered medium (pH 9) and the volume completed to 15 mL with Minimum 
Essential Medium (MEM) with antibiotics (1% penicillin-streptomycin and 0.1% 
gentamicin). The pH was adjusted to 7.2 and the concentrate stored at -80°C until the 
viral assay was performed. 
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6.3.4.2 Pellet 
The pellet was weighed and beef extract (3%) was added in a 1:4 ratio and mixed for 
30 minutes to elute the viruses, and then was centrifuged at 3000 x g for 15 minutes. 
Viruses were concentrated from the supernatant by organic flocculation (pH 3.5 and 
FeCl3 0.1%) followed by centrifugation for 15 minutes at 4°C at 3000 x g. The 
supernatant was discarded, the pellet resuspended in glycine buffered medium (pH 9) 
and the volume completed to 15 mL with Minimum Essential Medium (MEM) with 
antibiotics (1% penicillin-streptomycin and 0.1% gentamicin). The pH was adjusted to 
7.2 and the concentrate stored at -80°C until the viral assay was performed. 
6.3.4.3 Virus assay 
Before the assay, every concentrate was treated with 1,1,2 trichlorotrifluoroethane 
and 5% penicillin-streptomycin 100X and centrifuged to remove toxic compounds, 
contaminants and debris. MA-104 (African green monkey kidney cells) cells were 
grown until they produced a confluent monolayer in 25 cm2 plastic flasks. One milliliter 
of the concentrate (or an appropriate dilution) was placed on the cells and the flasks 
were incubated at 37°C for 60 minutes on a rocker platform. Ten mL of culture media 
containing antibiotics (1% penicillin-streptomycin and 0.1% gentamicin) were then 
added to each flask. Flasks were incubated at 37°C for 11 days, freeze-thawed at -20°C 
and a second passage was performed for 7 days on fresh cell cultures in 24 well plates 
(using one well for each first passage flask). The cells were fixed with absolute methanol 
containing 1% hydrogen peroxide (to destroy indigenous peroxidase). The fixed 
monolayers were submitted to an immunoassay developed in our laboratory using 
commercial hyper-immune human serum globulins to detect viruses in infected cells 
(Payment and Trudel, 1987). Infected cells appear dark brown under an inverted 
microscope making it easy to detect the viral infection even in the absence of a 
cytopathic effect. The number of viruses in the original samples was calculated using the 
number of positive (cytopathic effect or immunoperoxidase positive) and negative wells 
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after the second passage and estimating the most probable number of infectious unit per 
liter as described previously (Payment and Trudel, 1987). 
6.3.5 Collection of water samples from distribution system pipes 
In order to monitor the impact of pipe repair, water samples were collected at 
different times and locations within the distribution system. As the closure of valves 
usually takes place in order to isolate a section of the leaking main (Figure 6-1), 
customer houses located both inside (House In) as well as outside (House Out) of the 
isolated area were used for sample collection. A flexible PVC hose (disinfected with 
chlorine) connected to the external hose bib was used for water sampling at customer 
houses (flow was set to approximately 5 L/min). Other sampling locations included the 
hydrant used for flushing when the repair is completed. In 2005, a second house outside 
of the isolated area (House Out2) was added as well as one customer house on the 
isolated section of main to study possible service line contamination (House SL). These 
are all illustrated in Figure 6-1. To simplify the analysis, results of the 2 sampling 
locations outside of the repair area are considered together and referred to as House Out 
only. 
House 


















Figure 6-1: Sampling locations at site of water main repair 
154 
During the repair, the water sampling sequence was as follows: 
1. sampling at House In, House Out and House SL before valve closure, ie. initial 
system condition (To); 
2. sampling at House Out when valves were closed to isolate the section of main to 
be repaired; 
3. sampling at House Out prior to the opening of the first valve to start flushing; 
4. sampling at House In, House Out and at the Hydrant during flushing; 
5. sampling at House In, House Out and Hydrant prior to the closure of the hydrant; 
6. sampling at House SL (first flush) immediately after the hydrant closure and 
sampling at House In and House Out 15 minutes after the hydrant was closed. 
The field crews did not perform any chlorination of the repaired mains, only pipe 
flushing was conducted to remove any possible contamination. Water samples were 
collected in 1L autoclaved plastic bottles (with 0.01% (w/v) sodium thiosulfate). For 
steps (2) and (4), six samples were collected at 1, 2, 4, 7, 10 and 15 minutes after valve 
closure or start of flushing. One water sample was collected at each location for the 
other steps. 
6.3.6 Parameters analyzed in distribution system water 
The microbiological parameters that were analyzed in distribution system water 
(collected from House In, Out, SL and Hydrant) included the presence/absence of total 
coliforms and E. coli using the Colilert®1 detection method. Aerobic endospores were 
enumerated using the membrane filtration method developed by Barbeau et al (1997) 
(Trypticase soy broth culture medium, pasteurization at 75°C for 15 minutes followed by 
incubation at 35°C for 24 hours). Heterotrophic plate counts (HPC) were enumerated 
using the membrane filtration method using R2A agar incubated at 35°C for 48 hours 
(method 9215D, APHA and AWWA (1998)). HPC were only monitored in 2004 as they 
were not found useful for detection of intrusion. 
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The physico-chemical parameters were analyzed using the methods described in 
APHA and AWWA (1998): free chlorine residuals using the DPD-FAS method (method 
4500-C1 G), pH (method 4500-H+ B), temperature, conductivity (method 2510), 
turbidity by the nephelometric method (method 2130B) and total iron analyzed using the 
phenantroline colorimetric method (method 3500-Fe B). 
Pressure in the distribution system was also monitored at one or two locations nearby 
the repair site. Two types of high-speed pressure transient data loggers were connected 
to fire hydrants (model HPR21 from Telog Instruments2 and model RDL 1071L/3 from 
Radcom Technologies ). These are able to measure up to 4 and up to 20 readings/sec 
respectively and were used in order to capture transient pressure events that could be 
associated with system operations during the repair. 
Statistical analysis of the results (Student's t-test, Mann-Whitney test, Wilcoxon 
matched pairs test) was performed using the Statistica4 version 7.1 software. The level of 
significance was set at p<0.05. 
6.4 RESULTS 
Sixteen pipe repairs were monitored for this study. Fourteen repairs were in fact 
repairs of circumferential leaks, requiring the installation of repair sleeves. One repair 
was on a valve and one repair involved the installation of a new section of main (about 4 
m (13 ft) long). Thirteen repairs were on 150 mm (6 in.) diameter mains and 3 repairs 
were on pipes with diameter of 200 mm (8 in.). Unlined cast-iron was the dominating 
pipe material. The duration of repairs, from the first valve closure to the closure of the 
hydrant after flushing, varied between 2 hours 45 minutes to 9 hours, with an average of 
5 hours. Not all repairs were conducted under pressure. 
6.4.1 Potential for contamination originating from pipe trenches 
For the 16 repair sites, a total of 17 soil samples and 11 water samples could be 
collected from pipe trenches. For one site, two distinct simultaneous repairs were 
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conducted on the same isolated portion of main, explaining the additional soil sample 
collected. The lower number of water samples is explained by the fact that some of the 
repairs were conducted in almost dry excavations. For each repair site, results for the 
concentrations of microorganisms detected in soil and water samples from the trenches 
are listed in Table 6-1 and Table 6-2. 





















































































































































































cfu: colony forming unit; ipiu: immunoperoxidase infectious unit; NA: not available; pfu: plaque forming 
unit 
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cfu: colony forming unit; cone: concentration; ipiu: immunoperoxidase infectious unit; NA: not available; 
pfu: plaque forming unit; Shaded cells: no water sample collected 
Only one soil sample out of 16 had a concentration of E. coli superior to the samples 
detection limits with lxlO3 cfu/100 g. All the water samples had E. coli concentrations 
below the samples detection levels. The maximum concentration of total coliforms 
detected was 2.7xl04 cfu/100 g in soil samples and 2.7xl03 cfu/100 mL in water 
samples. Total coliforms were detected in all three water samples analyzed and in three 
soil samples out of five. The number of samples analyzed for total coliforms is low as 
testing was initiated only in 2005. Aerobic endospores were detected in all soil and 
water samples (these microorganisms are part of the normal flora of soil), in 
concentrations ranging from 104-106 cfu per 100 g of soil and 103-105 cfu per 100 mL of 
water. C. perfringens were detected in four soil samples out of 16 in concentrations 
varying between 50 and lxlO3 cfu/100 g of soil. They were detected in only two water 
samples out of 11 at 5 cfu/100 mL and 250 cfu/100 mL. Somatic and male-specific 
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coliphages were not detected in any samples and human enteric viruses were not 
detected in the nine soil and six water samples analyzed. Figure 6-2 illustrates the 
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Figure 6-2: Percentage of soil and water samples from pipe trenches positive for 
microbiological indicators 
For the soil samples, particle size analysis was performed on seven samples (A2004-1 
to A2004-6 and A2004-9). Percent of clay particles in the samples varied between 6.4% 
and 16.3%, and percent of silt was from 11.1% to 17.2%. The percent of sand and gravel 
were similar with values between 27.0% to 51.4% and 28.3% to 52.8% respectively. 
6.4.2 Microbial indicators detected in distribution system water 
Total coliforms, E. coli and aerobic endospores were used as microbial indicators of 
contamination in piped water during main repairs. Considering all sampling locations 
and repair steps at which water samples were collected, a total of 17 samples out of 424 
(4.0%>) were positive for total coliforms (Table 6-3). 
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Table 6-3: Occurrence of total coliforms in distribution system water 
Repair step 
Before valve closure 
(To) 
When valves are 
closed 
Before valve opening 
During flushing 
Prior to hydrant 
closure 
After hvdrant closure 
Number of samples 
analyzed for total 
coliforms 
% of positive total 
coliform samples 































































—: No total coliform analysis performed 
The majority of positive samples were collected during the flushing step of the repair 
(16 out of 17 samples), predominantly at the hydrant itself (11 samples out of 16). Only 
one sample was found positive for total coliforms once the repair was completed 
(collected at House In). Among the positive total coliform samples, only one was found 
positive for E. coli. This sample was collected at the hydrant used for flushing the 
repaired main, one minute after flushing was started (this case is presented in detail 
below). Five water samples out of 424 (1.2%) had concentrations of aerobic endospores 
significantly higher (p<0.1) than the background concentration in routine flushing water 
(Cartier et al, 2007). Aerobic endospore concentrations varied between 240 and 3130 
cfu/L in these samples. These samples were also all collected at the hydrant during 
flushing of the main. Overall, seven repair sites out of 16 had microbial indicators 
detected in distribution system water (Table 6-4). Water temperatures at all sites varied 
between 12.3°C and 26.0°C. 
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6.4.3 Link between microbial content of pipe trenches and microbial indicators 
detected in distribution system water 
The potential for contamination at repair sites can be evaluated based on the 
microbiological content of the pipe trenches. Overall, seven repair sites had only aerobic 
endospores detected in soil and in water (when present in the trench). Nine sites had 
total coliforms and/or faecal indicators (E. coli or C. perfringens) in addition to aerobic 
endospores in the soil/water from the excavation. The link between the microbiological 
content of the trenches and the detection of indicators (total coliforms, E. coli, aerobic 
endospores) in distribution system water during a repair, is given in Table 6-5. 
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Table 6-5: Microbial content of pipe trenches and microbial indicators detected in 
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intensity of response corresponds to the percentage of positive (total coliform or aerobic endospore) 
samples in distribution system water. Number of samples collected in DS during a repair could vary 
between 20 and 40 samples. 
Concentrations of aerobic endospores significantly higher than background concentrations in routine 
flushing water 
DS: distribution system 
For the seven sites where only aerobic endospores were detected in the pipe trench, 
three sites had microbial indicators detected in distribution system water, corresponding 
to 43% of the sites. Similarly, the same percentage of sites with indicators in piped water 
(44%) was obtained when the excavation was found to have aerobic endospores 
combined to other microbial indicators. The percentage of positive (total coliform or 
aerobic endospore) samples in distribution system water (intensity of the positive 
response) is about the same (between 2% and 14% of the samples collected during a 
repair, the number of which could vary between 20 and 40 samples) whether or not the 
pipe trench has total coliforms and /or faecal indicators in addition to the aerobic 
endospores. For one case, 30% of the collected water samples during the repair (n=23) 
were found positive for total coliforms. This site was the one for which two 
simultaneous repairs were conducted on the same isolated portion of main. 
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Unfortunately, because total coliforms were only measured in samples collected in 
2005, it is possible that six sites out of seven with aerobic endospores only in pipe trench 
may also contain total coliforms. If this was the case, up to 15 repair sites would have 
pipe trenches with microbial indicators among which six sites with microbial indicators 
detected in distribution system water (40% of the sites). For one repair (A2005-3), only 
spores were detected in the pipe trench while 2.4% of the distribution system water 
samples were positive for total coliforms. 
Contamination of distribution system water may also be influenced by the presence of 
muddy water in the bottom of the pipe trench when conducting the main repair. Ten 
repair sites had muddy water and 50% of these had microbial indicators of 
contamination detected in the piped water in comparison to 33% of the dry excavations 
sites. This difference is not statistically significant. 
6.4.4 Impact of chlorine residual and turbidity on detection of microbial indicators in 
distribution system water 
The seven repair sites where microbial indicators were detected in distribution system 
water had a lower median chlorine residual level (0.19 mg/L) prior to the start of the 
repair work (House In, before valve closure) than the nine repair sites where none were 
detected (0.38 mg/L) (Figure 6-3). However, this difference is not statistically 
significant (Student's t-test, p=0.131). The same comparison was made for residual 
chlorine measured at the flushed hydrant before closure. In this case, the chlorine 
residual was significantly lower (Student's t-test, p=0.018) at the sites where microbial 
indicators were detected in distribution system water (median free chlorine 
concentration = 0.11 mg/L) in comparison to the other repair sites (median free CI2 of 
0.48 mg/L) (Figure 6-3). Prior to hydrant closure, the median turbidity value measured 
at the repair sites with microbial indicators in piped water was 3.5 NTU. This was higher 
but not statistically different (Mann-Whitney test, p=0.7) than the median turbidity at the 
other sites (0.81 NTU). Flushing times and repair duration were not significantly 
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different for the sites with or without microbial indicators detected in the water 
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Figure 6-3: Box and whiskers plot of free chlorine residuals measured at repair sites 
with/without microbial indicators detected in distribution system water (prior to repair 
work and before closure of hydrant after flushing) 
6.4.5 Detection ofE. coli in flushing water for one repair 
Out of the 16 repairs investigated, only one repair led to the detection of E. coli in 
flushing water. This repair (A2005-1) took place at the extremity of distribution system 
A, in an area with very low free chlorine concentrations (mostly below 0.05 mg/L). 
Total coliforms were detected in the soil and water from the pipe trench and C. 
perfringens were detected in the soil. The concentrations of these indicator 
microorganisms were the highest obtained from all the repair sites. In contrast to the 
other repairs investigated, this repair consisted in removing a leaking valve. Instead of 
replacing the gate valve by a new one, only the valve bonnet (along with the disk) was 
removed and the opening was capped with a plate as illustrated in Figure 6-4. As listed 
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in Table 6-4, five positive total coliform samples (among which one was E. coli 
positive) and three aerobic endospores samples were collected during flushing, 
indicating that a contamination has taken place. 
Figure 6-4: Pipe opening (A) created by removal of gate valve bonnet (with disk) (B) 
and installation of a plate to cap the opening (C). 
6.4.6 Impact on water quality in surrounding repair area 
The closure of valves to isolate the main to be repaired sometimes result in hydraulic 
variations outside of the repair area. According to the network configuration, changes in 
flow direction and dead-ends can be created while the repair is conducted. This was in 
fact the case for seven repair sites, where the House Out sampling location could be used 
to monitor the impact that such hydraulic changes had on water quality. Free chlorine 
residuals were found to decrease at sites where a change in flow direction and a dead-
end was created at House Out (Figure 6-5). This trend was not observed at the sites 
where such hydraulic changes did not take place. Turbidity peaks were observed at two 
sites out of seven where a change in flow direction and a dead-end were created by the 
valve closure (Figure 6-6). Maximum turbidity values reached 39 NTU for repair site 
A2004-6 and 18 NTU for repair site A2004-9. While for most of the sites where no 
hydraulic changes took place the turbidity did not vary significantly following the valve 
closure, a peak in turbidity reaching 34 NTU was observed at site A2004-11. This was 
explained by the sequence of actions performed by the field crew: the hydrant was first 
opened followed by the closure of valves to isolate the main to be repaired. For the other 
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repairs, the usual procedure involved the closure of valves and then the opening of the 
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Figure 6-5: Free chlorine variation outside of the repair area (a) when a change in flow 
direction and creation of a dead-end takes place at House Out; (b) when no such changes 
take place 
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Figure 6-6: Turbidity variations outside of the repair area following valve closure (a) 
when a change in flow direction and creation of a dead-end takes place at House Out; (b) 
when no such changes take place 
Flushing of the main after the repair work may also be a cause of hydraulic 
disturbances outside of the repair area. Figure 6-7 illustrates the turbidity values 
measured at House Out during flushing of the repaired main. At one site, turbidity 
values up to 200 NTU (upper detection limit of turbidimeter used) were measured. In 
general, the first 15 minutes of flushing resulted in turbidity values below or close to 20 
NTU in the vicinity of the repair area. 
00:00 00:07 00:14 00:21 00:28 00:36 00:43 00:50 00:57 01:04 01:12 01:19 01:26 01:33 01:40 01:48 
Time after start of flushing 
Figure 6-7: Turbidity variations outside of the repair area during flushing 
The repairs conducted in the distribution systems clearly had an impact on water 
turbidity outside of the repair area. As illustrated in Figure 6-8, the turbidity values 
measured at House Out were significantly higher at the end of the repairs (Wilcoxon 
matched pairs test (n=12 sites with paired turbidity values), p=0.0096) than the initial 
values collected prior to the beginning of work. The free chlorine concentrations were 
not significantly different (Student's t-test, p=0.44). The same analysis was performed 
for the customer houses located on the isolated portion of main (House In sampling 
locations). There was no significant difference between the free chlorine concentrations 
at the beginning and end of the repair (Student's t-test, p=0.687). The turbidity values 
after the repairs were also not statistically different (Wilcoxon matched pairs test (n=16 
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Figure 6-8: Impact of repair on free chlorine residual and turbidity outside of the repair 
area 
6.5 DISCUSSION 
6.5.1 Microbial occurrence in pipe trenches 
The protocol used for sampling and analysis of soil and water samples from pipe 
trenches was similar to the one used in a previous investigation conducted by Karim et al 
(2003). These authors performed a similar study on approximately 30 soil and 30 water 
samples collected near excavated water mains. As in this study, total coliforms and B. 
subtilis spores were frequently detected both in soil and water samples (greater than 58% 
of the samples). The results for C. perfringens were also similar with approximately 20-
30% of samples containing this microorganism. Coliphages were not detected in this 
study and were only detected in water samples by Karim et al (2003) but at a low rate 
(two samples out of 30). However, the biggest difference between the two studies 
concerns the faecal coliform and virus loads detected in the soil and water. These 
authors had a greater percentage of their soil and water samples positive for 
thermotolerant coliforms (50% and 42.8% respectively) while only one soil sample 
contained E. coli (corresponding to 6% of the samples) in this study. They also had 
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9.3% of their soil samples and 10% of water samples positive for culturable enteric 
viruses while no viruses could be detected in this study. They also assayed the samples 
for viral RNA by RT-PCR for detection of enteroviruses, hepatitis A and Norwalk 
viruses, which was not done here. Overall, they found that 56.2% of their investigated 
sites (18 out of a total of 32) were positive either by cell culture or RT-PCR for one of 
the three viruses tested. In this study, for public health risk assessment purposes, cell 
culture of enteric viruses was prioritized in order to detect infectious virus particles 
(Payment and Trudel, 1985). This cannot be assessed using PCR analysis (Choi and 
Jiang, 2005; Borchardt et al, 2003; Sobsey et al, 1998; Kopecka et al, 1993) where 
positive results do not necessarily indicate that the viruses are infectious. 
Evidence of faecal pollution and enteric viruses was therefore low in the two 
distribution systems investigated. The microbial concentrations detected were also lower 
than in the Karim et al (2003) study. The distance between the sewer lines and the 
drinking water mains is not known. However, the single E.coli positive sample collected 
in soil resulted from a location where the storm sewer main was directly located over the 
drinking water main being repaired. At all the other sites, the sewer mains were not 
visible in the excavation. This is in accordance with the results of a survey by Kirmeyer 
et al, 2001 who reported that 20 utilities out of 26 indicated that less than 5% of the 
sewer and drinking water mains are usually located in the same trench. The distance 
between the sewer and drinking water pipes, the less-saturated soil conditions and the 
geological structure are factors that could possibly explain the difference obtained in the 
level of faecal contamination between the two studies. The percentage of clay particles 
in the seven soil samples analyzed was below 20% (range: 6.4% to 16.3%) which is 
significantly lower than the percent of clay particles in the soil samples analyzed by 
Karim et al (2003) who had 82% of the samples with a clay content above 20%. Because 
of its properties (such as large surface area and high cation exchange capacity), clay 
minerals usually favor increased virus sorption (Sobsey et al, 1980). 
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6.5.2 Repair work and detection of microbial indicators in distribution system water 
Overall, 4.0% of all the water samples collected throughout the 16 investigated 
repairs (n=424) were positive for total coliforms. This can be considered as low as it is 
even less then the actual TCR requirement of 5.0% of total coliform positive samples for 
a monthly violation (USEPA, 2001b). The positive coliform samples were almost all 
collected at the hydrants during the flushing operation. This shows that planned repairs 
(usually involving small leaks in pipe trenches that are generally "clean") do not 
generally lead to distributed water contamination remaining in the system. Five positive 
coliform samples were collected at sampling houses during flushing. This indicates that 
if a demand is exerted during a flushing operation (by a customer that would be unaware 
of the maintenance activities on the system for example), it can potentially lead to the 
introduction of "contaminant" into the service lines. High turbidity values were not 
necessarily associated with positive coliform samples in these cases with some values in 
the range of 0.31-2.8 NTU. Overall, evidence of intrusion was obtained at seven sites 
out of 16 (44% of the sites). 
Although it is generally recommended to apply the AWWA Standard C651 for 
disinfection after repairs, disinfection was not applied following the repairs investigated. 
In the participating utilities, chlorination is usually applied after the installation of new 
mains and not in the case of leak repairs. The results of the investigation suggest that 
adequate pipe flushing after a repair is completed is in fact effective to minimize 
contamination. Clement et al (2003) reported that utilities practicing flushing, 
disinfection and coliform testing of all pipe repairs and pipe replacements had lower 
total coliform incidence levels in their systems than utilities only practicing two out of 
three of these practices. For 2004 and 2005, the annual positive total coliform rate for 
utility A (where most of the repairs were investigated) was 0.3%. 
On one occasion, E. coli along with total coliforms and aerobic endospores were 
detected in water being flushed from the hydrant. Two hypotheses are possible to 
explain this contamination: (i) possible unsanitary repair procedures conducted by the 
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field crew and (ii) broken hydrant. During the repair, the parts used to cover the opening 
left by the removal of the old valve bonnet (Figure 6-4) were put down directly on the 
soil in the trench. These parts were not disinfected prior to installation and faecal 
contamination was observed in this trench (with the detection of an elevated 
concentration of C. perfringens and also total coliforms). Once installed (Figure 6-4C), 
these parts were in direct contact with the standing water in the main (Figure 6-4A). 
Consequently, basic actions such as the disinfection of the parts used for repair or the 
localized addition of chlorine (through the pipe opening) could have minimized the risk 
of contamination. The second hypothesis for contamination is the possible backflow of 
groundwater through the leaking drain valve of the flushed hydrant. This dry-barrel 
hydrant was operated on the morning of the repair in order to install a pressure recorder. 
However, this could not be done as water was coming out from the auxiliary valve, 
indicating a problem with the integrity of this hydrant. It is therefore possible that 
remaining water in the ground was forced back into the hydrant when flushing started. 
This emphasizes the importance of well maintained equipment in the system. A 
preventive boil water order was issued to this distribution system sector and the results 
of additional water samples were all negative for coliforms and E. coli. In their 
investigation of the impact of low pressure episodes on the occurrence of gastrointestinal 
illnesses, Nygard et al (2007) found an increased risk for exposed households and report 
that only one sample was positive for E. coli. However, water samples were obtained for 
only 18 episodes out of 88, details regarding the location and time of sample collection 
are not available and no chlorine concentrations are reported. It is therefore difficult to 
relate their results to water quality parameters. 
Aerobic endospores were also used as indicator of potential intrusion during repair 
work because they are part of the soil normal flora and found in large concentrations 
while their concentrations in treated water are usually very low (below 10 cfu/L for 
Utility A). Five water samples collected during flushing at repair sites had aerobic 
endospore concentrations significantly higher than background concentrations found in 
routine flushing water (Cartier et al, 2007), likely indicating soil or dirty water intrusion 
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during the repair. Total coliforms and aerobic endospores were generally not detected 
simultaneously in distribution system water except for one case (repair A2005-1). This 
suggests that both indicators should be used by water utilities if a verification of the 
water quality following repair work is necessary. Furthermore, the laboratory methods 
for these two indicators are relatively simple and inexpensive. The use of aerobic 
endospores as indicators of loss in system's physical integrity has also been suggested 
by other authors (Karim et al, 2003; APHA and AWWA, 2005). LeChevallier et al 
(2006) established a link between the detection of coliphages in a chloraminated system 
and the occurrence of main breaks. The use of such an indicator would not be applicable 
here because of the free chlorine disinfectant residual (coliphages are more resistant to 
chloramines than free chlorine (USEPA, 1999)) and its absence in the soil and water 
surrounding repaired water mains. 
Soil and water from pipe trenches are clearly a possible source of contamination 
when repair work is conducted. Although there is some uncertainties regarding the 
microbial content (total coliforms) of six pipe trenches, the percentage of sites with 
microbial indicators in distribution system water is about the same: 43% when the pipe 
trench only contains aerobic endospores (three sites out of seven - assuming the six 
samples do not include total coliforms), 44% when the pipe trench includes endospores 
and other indicators (four sites out of nine) and 40% if the pipe trench include 
endospores and other indicators (six sites out of 15 - assuming the six samples do 
include total coliforms). Consequently, about 40% of the sites had microbial indicators 
detected in distribution system water, whether or not the trench was "contaminated". 
Results show that even if no total coliforms are detected in the soil/water surrounding 
the repaired water main, these indicators can be detected in distribution system water 
with a low intensity (2.4% of positive total coliform samples in this case). The highest 
percent of positive total coliform samples in distribution system water was 30.4% for 
repair A2004-10. This site was the one for which two simultaneous repairs were 
conducted on the same isolated portion of main, which would indicate that such a 
practice should be avoided if possible. If not, precautions should be undertaken. When 
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muddy water was present in the bottom of the excavation during repair work, half of the 
sites had microbial indicators in distribution system water in comparison to a third of the 
sites with dry excavations. Although this difference is not significant, the use of a pump 
to remove the excess water is recommended. 
Other sources of contamination include intrusion from transient pressures induced by 
valve and hydrant operation during the repair. This seems unlikely as pressure 
monitoring during 10 repairs showed no sign of very low or negative transient pressures 
associated with valve closure and flushing operation (Besner et al, 2007b). Unsanitary 
practices may also lead to contamination and the role of field crews is major in 
minimizing the occurrence of such contamination events. The strict follow-up of defined 
working procedures should be enforced. The province of Quebec drinking water quality 
regulations require (as of December 1st, 2005) that at least one field crew member 
involved in any distribution system related work had successfully completed a training 
course on system operation and maintenance. 
The sites where microbial indicators were detected in distribution system water had 
lower free chlorine residual concentration at the beginning of the repair work in 
comparison to the other sites. Although the difference was not statistically significant at 
that time, it became significant prior to hydrant closure at the end of the flushing. This 
could be due to the consumption of the residual because of the presence of dirt in the 
repaired main or it could also be explained by the lower free chlorine in the water used 
for flushing. A decrease in the residual was observed in areas outside of the repairs in 
some cases. However, it is also possible that the detection of indicator microorganisms 
in water was increased by the lower free chlorine concentrations initially present at those 
sites. 
6.5.3 Water quality outside of the repair area 
The closure of valves and flushing operation conducted as part of the repairs of water 
mains had an impact on free chlorine residuals and turbidity outside of the isolated 
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distribution system area. A decrease of free chlorine (up to 0.9 mg/L) was observed 
when changes in flow direction and dead-end mains were created by valve closures. No 
bottle tests were conducted on these water samples to determine the chlorine bulk 
reaction coefficient but the presence of unlined cast-iron or unlined ductile iron pipes 
increases the chlorine reaction rate (Digiano and Zhang 2005; Hallam et al, 2002; Kiene 
et al, 1998). Peaks in turbidity were observed in some cases when valves were closed at 
the beginning of work. It is well documented that hydraulic disturbances may cause 
sediment resuspension in water (Slaats et al, 2003; Prince et al, 2001). After the repairs 
were completed, the only significant difference in water quality parameters (To versus 
Tend) was for the turbidity outside of the repair area. Flushing of the repaired mains 
created upstream disturbances resulting in increased turbidity. Consequently, very high 
flushing velocities should not necessarily be targeted after the repairs of water mains 
since this type of flushing is not unidirectional in nature (from a cleaned section to a 
"dirty" section). Both distribution systems investigated do not have a systematic 
unidirectional flushing program. Utility A performs some routes at various frequencies 
while Utility B does not practice unidirectional flushing. Consequently, loose particles 
may accumulate in some areas and be re-entrained and resuspended due to higher flow 
velocities when flushing is conducted after water main repairs. 
6.6 CONCLUSION 
This study showed that planned repairs, usually involving small leaks in pipe trenches 
that are generally "clean" (with low level of faecal microorganisms), do not generally 
lead to distributed water contamination remaining in the system. The positive coliform 
samples (4% of all samples) were almost all collected during the flushing operation. 
Evidence of intrusion was obtained at seven sites out of 16 but the results suggest that 
adequate pipe flushing after a repair is completed is effective to minimize 
contamination. Care should be taken not to directly extend these conclusions to new 
main construction and emergency repairs, where the field conditions may be different 
and chlorination necessary. 
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Although these results show minimal contamination, the detection of E. coli on one 
occasion under the applied sampling program indicates that it still can happen under 
real-life field conditions. The sustained vigilance of field crews is necessary and strict 
follow-up of defined working procedures would minimize the occurrence of such 
contamination events. 
Water quality variations are observed in distribution system area having uninterrupted 
water supply in the vicinity of a repair. Changes in chlorine residuals and turbidity 
mainly result from the operation of valves and hydrants rather than from the repair work 
itself. Although these short-term changes do not have direct public health impacts, they 
may lead to increased customer complaints. 
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ADDITIONAL RESULTS: NEGATIVE PRESSURE EVENTS 
AND WATER QUALITY 
Microbial intrusion is possible due to a loss of physical system integrity (as in the 
case of water main repairs as studied in the previous chapter). However, compromised 
hydraulic integrity may also lead to potential system contamination. For this reason, the 
occurrence of low and negative pressures in full-scale distribution systems has been 
investigated. Pressure monitoring was conducted under both normal system operation 
and some selected O&M activities. 
A draft of a paper to be submitted to a peer-reviewed journal is presented in this 
Chapter. The content of this paper includes the results of the research work related to the 
characterization of potential pathways of microbial intrusion and occurrence of negative 
pressures in the Laval distribution system. This distribution system was specifically 
targeted as it is where the two epidemiological studies by Payment et al (1991, 1997) 
were conducted. To complement the field work, a section on transient analysis and 
modeling is also included. In its actual version, this draft paper includes the modeling of 
only one low pressure event out of nine that took place at the Pont-Viau WTP during the 
study period. It is intended to model the nine events and compare the results obtained 
prior to the submission of the paper for publication. 
During the pressure monitoring period, the closure of a transmission main took place 
in the area under study. This event led to sustained negative pressure in the distribution 
system. Increased pressure monitoring and a field campaign to assess water quality 
during this event were conducted. This case-study is available in Appendix A. 
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TRANSIENT NEGATIVE PRESSURES AND POTENTIAL INTRUSION VOLUMES 
AT THE SITE OF THE PAYMENT'S DRINKING WATER EPIDEMIOLOGICAL 
STUDIES (draft version) 
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Abstract: The epidemiological studies by Payment et al. suggested that the increase in 
gastrointestinal illnesses observed in a system, meeting all water quality regulations, 
could be associated with distribution system deficiencies. The possibility of microbial 
intrusion in this distribution system was assessed by (i) characterizing potential 
pathways of intrusion, (ii) monitoring the frequency and magnitude of negative 
pressures, and (iii) modeling low pressure events to assess potential volumes of 
intrusion. Pressure monitoring showed that power failure affecting the operation of 
pumps was the main cause of negative pressures in this distribution system. Transient 
modeling of the system showed that flooded air-vacuum valve vaults were critical 
locations for intrusion. Larger intrusion volumes, high frequency of recovery and higher 




In the 1990's, two epidemiological studies were conducted by Payment et al. (1991; 
1997) in a Canadian distribution system of a water utility. The first study (Payment et 
al., 1991) compared the rate of gastrointestinal (GI) illnesses between a group 
consuming tap water (307 households) and a group consuming the same water filtered 
through a reverse-osmosis (RO) unit (299 households). After a 15-month period, the 
estimated annual incidence of GI illness was 0.76 among tap water drinkers compared 
with 0.50 among filtered water drinkers. It was therefore estimated that at least 35% of 
the reported GI illnesses among the tap water drinkers were water-related. In their 
second study, Payment et al. (1997) used four groups of 350 households drinking either: 
(i) tap water, (ii) tap water from a continuously purged tap, (iii) bottled plant water, and 
(iv) purified bottled water (tap water treated by RO or spring water). After 16 months, 
the excess of GI illnesses associated with tap water was 14% in the tap group and 19% 
in the tap-valve group with respect to the purified water group. This rate was higher for 
children 2-5 years old with an excess of 17% in the tap group and 40% in the tap-valve 
group. Water produced from the treatment plant met or exceeded the water quality 
standards at the time and the distribution system was found to be in compliance for both 
coliforms and chlorine. Because there was no significant difference in the rate of GI 
illnesses between the bottled water groups, the authors suggested that the distribution 
system might be partly the source of the differences observed with the tap water groups. 
These results raised questions about the integrity of distribution systems and the 
likelihood of their contamination during normal operations. Numerous conditions that 
can compromise water quality during distribution have been identified. Loss of 
physical/hydraulic integrity may be caused by a variety of factors such as: cross-
connections, repairs, loss of pressure, etc (NRC, 2006). Public health concerns regarding 
the occurrence of transient negative pressures in full-scale distribution systems have 
been expressed as it was suspected that a high potential risk of introduction of 
pathogenic microorganisms into distribution systems exists when transient negative 
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pressure events occur in water mains (LeChevallier et al., 2003). Several studies have 
monitored pressure in distribution systems and reported the occurrence of low or 
negative pressures (Kirmeyer et al., 2001; LeChevallier et al., 2004; Gullick et al., 2004; 
Gullick et al., 2005; Hooper et al., 2006). These transient events may originate from 
routine activities (pump starting or stopping, rapid opening or closing of valves and 
hydrants, hydrant flushing), main breaks or loss of power (Kirmeyer et al., 2001). 
Kirmeyer et al. (2001) conducted transient pressure modeling of the distribution 
system studied by Payment et al. They found that the system was prone to low and 
negative pressures. In one case, 90% of the modeled nodes were drawing pressures 
below 5 psi under a modeling scenario of a power outage affecting the pumps at all 
treatment plants, representing extreme conditions (note: the water utility has three water 
treatment plants and the distribution networks are partly interconnected). Transient 
modeling was conducted on a portion of the system only which can be problematic as 
the interface nodes (with the rest of the distribution system) must be modeled in a way 
that properly reflects the dynamic effect of the balance of the system on the piece being 
analyzed. A verification of the results obtained by Kirmeyer et al. (2001) is needed by 
using a model of the entire distribution system. 
In their review of the Payment's epidemiological studies, the National Academies' 
Water Science and Technology Board Committee (NRC, 2006) concluded that low 
disinfectant residuals and a vulnerability of the distribution system to pressure transients 
(suggesting intrusion as a possible mechanism of contamination) could account for the 
observed illnesses. 
7.2 OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY 
The first Payment's study was conducted almost 20 years ago and obviously, some 
operating conditions for both the water treatment plants and the distribution system are 
likely to have changed. However, the transient modeling performed by Kirmeyer et al. in 
2001 indicated that the system was vulnerable to negative pressures. In order to assess 
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this vulnerability, the NSERC Industrial Chair on Drinking Water returned to this 
distribution system and designed a study with the following objectives: (1) to 
characterize some potential pathways of microbial intrusion; 2) to determine the 
frequency and magnitude of transient low and negative pressures in the same area 
studied by Payment et al. and 3) to evaluate the link between negative pressure and 
potential intrusion and changes in water quality. 
7.3 METHODOLOGY 
7.3.1 Description of the distribution system 
The distribution system where this study was conducted provides drinking water to 
about 350,000 consumers. The average annual water demand is about 210,000 m /d 
(52.8 MGD) and is supplied by three water treatment plants (WTPs) using surface water 
as their raw water source. Each WTP supplies specific network areas that are not 
delimited by isolation valves, making the distribution systems partly interconnected. 
Apart from the clearwells at the WTPs, no storage tank nor pump station is located on 
the distribution system because of the ground topography. The distribution system has a 
total length of about 1 590 km (988 miles) and includes pipe materials such as cast-iron 
(41% of the total pipe length), ductile iron (35% of the total pipe length), concrete 
(hyprescon) and PVC (10% and 8%, respectively). 
The distribution system area studied is mostly supplied by a single WTP and 
corresponds to the same area where Payment et al. conducted their epidemiological 
studies. Location of the households who participated to the second epidemiological 
study (drinking tap water and tap water from continuously purged taps) is illustrated in 
Figure 7-1. 
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Figure 7-1: Studied distribution system area corresponding to location of households in 
the epidemiological study of (Payment et al., 1997) 
7.3.2 Characterization of potential pathways of intrusion 
7.3.2.1 Soil / Shallow groundwater surrounding buried water mains 
Soil and shallow groundwater samples were collected during repairs of water mains 
that took place during the summer of 2004 and 2005. Soil samples were collected in the 
vicinity of the exposed main using a sterile trowel. The samples were put into large 
plastic (Ziploc® type) bags. Trench water samples were collected using four autoclaved 
one-liter plastic bottles. 
7.3.2.2 Water from flooded air-vacuum valve vaults 
A list of the location of valve vaults where either (i) an air-release valve; (ii) an air-
vacuum valve; or (iii) a combination air-valve was positioned was provided by the water 
utility. These sites were visited during summer 2007 and water samples were collected if 
some standing water was found in the vaults. When completely flooded, a pump was 
used to pump the excess water and verify that the valve was in fact an air-valve. Water 
samples were collected using seven autoclaved one-liter plastic bottles (with 0.01% 
(w/v) sodium thiosulfate to neutralize residual chlorine if necessary). When possible, 
water samples were collected directly by dropping the bottle into the standing water. 
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When not possible, a manual pump (Attwood, Lowell, MI) and 6 mm (0.25 in.) PVC 
tubing were used to fill the sampling bottles. 
7.3.2.3 Bacteriological and coliphages analyses conducted on soil/water from pipe 
trenches and water from flooded air valve vaults 
For soil samples, 20 grams of soil were mixed with 200 mL of saline and stirred on a 
magnetic stirrer for 1 minute. The sample was left to stand for 30 minutes and the 
supernatant was then recuperated for bacteriological and coliphages analysis. For water, 
the 1-liter samples were pooled and stirred on a magnetic stirrer for 1 minute, left to 
stand for 30 minutes and 250 mL of supernatant were recuperated for bacteriological and 
coliphages analysis. 
Samples were assayed for the presence of aerobic endospores, Clostridium 
perfringem, E. coli, total coliforms (not assayed in 2004) and Enterococci (only in water 
from flooded valve vaults) within 24 hours of sampling using membrane filtration 
methods. Two 10 mL and two 1 mL portions (or appropriate dilutions) of the sample 
were assayed on each culture media. Tryptic soy broth (Difco Laboratories) with 0.01% 
triphenyl tetrazolium chloride was used to enumerate aerobic endospores. Samples were 
filtered on a membrane, placed in a 50 mm Petri dish containing a pad saturated with the 
medium, pasteurized during 15 minutes at 75°C in a water bath and incubated at 35°C 
for 24 hours. Red colonies were counted as aerobic endospores (Barbeau et al., 1997), 
and the vast majority of these organisms are species of Bacillus. The method described 
by Armon and Payment (1988) was used to enumerate C. perfringens by membrane 
filtration using mCP agar and incubation at 45°C for 18-24 hours. In 2005 and 2007, MI 
(Difco Laboratories) agar was used for the simultaneous detection of E. coli and total 
coliforms after 24 hours at 35°C (USEPA, 2002a)). Blue colonies were reported as E. 
coli and fluorescent colonies under longwave ultraviolet light (366nm) (including the 
blue colonies under ambient light) as total coliforms. In 2004, E.coli were detected with 
mTEC agar by membrane filtration ((USEPA, 2002b). The dishes were incubated at 35 
± 0.5°C for 2 h. After a 2h incubation at 35 ± 0.5°C, the plates were transferred at 44.5 ± 
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0.2°C for 22-24 h. After incubation, the membranes from mTEC Agar were transferred 
on absorbent pads saturated with Urea Substrate Medium and kept at room temperature 
for 15-20 min. Yellow, yellow-green, or yellow-brown colonies were counted as E. coli. 
Method 1600 of the U.S. EPA was used for the detection of Enterococci (mEI agar, 
41°C for 24 hours) (USEPA, 2002c). Blue colonies or colonies with a blue halo were 
counted as Enterococci. 
For the coliphages assay, method 1602 of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 
(USEPA, 2001) was used with E. coli CN-13 as host strain for somatic coliphages and 
E. coli F-amp as host strain for male-specific coliphages. Volumes of 1 and 10 mL were 
assayed for each coliphages in duplicate. The results were reported as plaque forming 
unit (pfu) per 100 mL or per 100 g of sample. 
7.3.3 Pressure monitoring in distribution system 
Continuous pressure monitoring of the study area, using high-speed pressure transient 
data loggers, was started in June 2006. Four distinct monitoring periods were conducted 
as described below: 
Phase 1 (June 2006 to September 2006): Exploratory phase with 12 pressure 
sensors installed all over the distribution system area studied. 
- Phase 2 (September 2006 to October 2006): Targeted phase with 9 pressure 
sensors installed in distribution system area prone to negative pressures. 
Phase 3 (October 2006 to June 2007): Reduced monitoring due to wintertime 
(pressure sensors cannot be installed on fire hydrants due to cold weather and 
freezing conditions). Only two pressure sensors could be installed inside 
buildings in area prone to negative pressures. 
Phase 4 (June 2007-November 2007): Repeat targeted sampling with 12 pressure 
sensors installed in area prone to negative pressures. While this phase lasted until 
November 2007, only the results obtained prior to July 25, 2007 are considered 
here. 
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From June 2006 to November 2007, pressure was continuously monitored at the outlet 
of the supplying water treatment plant. Figure 7-2 illustrates the locations of the pressure 
sensors during the different monitoring periods. 
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Figure 7-2: Locations of high-speed pressure transient data loggers in distribution 
system 
Pressure monitoring was conducted using two types of high-speed pressure transient 
data loggers. The RDL 1071L/3 model from Radcom Technologies (Woburn, MA) that 
can read up to 20 pressure values per second within a range of -15 psi to 225 psi was 
installed either directly on transmission mains (via corporation stops), on sink's taps 
inside buildings, or on fire hydrants. The HPR31 model from Telog Instruments (Victor, 
NY) can read up to four pressure values per second within a -15 psi to 200 psi range and 
was used to monitor pressure on fire hydrants. The Radcom loggers were zeroed to 
atmospheric pressure according to the manufacturer's instructions before installation. 
Pressure values were read every second and a tolerance of ±2 psi (1.4 m) was set for 
recording of pressure readings. The Telog loggers were set at four pressure readings per 
second, with the maximum and minimum pressure values recorded over intervals of 15 
seconds. 
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7.3.4 Transient pressure modeling 
Transient (or surge) pressure modeling was performed using the InfoSurge software 
(MWH Soft, Arcadia, CA). Transient modeling was performed to simulate one low 
pressure event at the water treatment plant that was recorded on June 27, 2006. 
Preliminary steps for the transient pressure model construction included the 
skeletonization of the extended period simulation (EPS) model from the water utility in 
order to reduce the number of links below 20,000 (actual size was 29,213 nodes and 
32,266 links). This was achieved by (i) eliminating the interior nodes of all series pipes 
with same diameter, and (ii) trimming the dead-end pipes shorter than 50 m. After the 
skeletonization, the model size was reduced to 8,132 nodes and 11,185 pipes. Typical 
wave velocity values were assigned to cast-iron mains (1060 m/sec), ductile iron mains 
(1200 m/sec), concrete mains (600 m/sec), PVC mains (300 m/sec) and steel mains 
(1200 m/sec). This approximation was considered better than using a single wave speed 
value for all the pipes included in the model. In order to simulate a low pressure event, 
transient conditions were created by simulating a pump closure using a change in the 
pump speed. Simulation time was set to 300 seconds. 
The intrusion module of the InfoSurge software was used to simulate the potential 
intrusion volumes in the distribution system under various assumptions (intrusion at all 
demand nodes based on a specified rate of leakage rate, intrusion at location of flooded 
air valve vaults). For intrusion using a leakage rate, intrusion at all demand nodes is 
computed when the exit head value (head of water above pipe - fixed by the user) is 
above the internal pipe pressure value. The leakage factor is used to set the size of the 
orifice. Leakage values between 5 and 25% were simulated along with exit heads of 0 
(atmospheric pressure) and 2 psi (1.4 m). Intrusion through flooded air-valve vaults were 
simulated using one-way feed tanks, where the water is only allowed to flow from the 
tank into the system. For the simulations, different numbers of flooded vaults were 
assumed according to the results from the field study. The height of water above the air-
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vacuum valve was assumed to be 0.5 m. Different air-vacuum valve outlet diameters 
were also tested (12, 100 and 150 mm). 
The transport of the intruded contaminant (assumed conservative) was then simulated 
using an extended period simulation performed using the InfoWater software (MWH 
Soft, Arcadia, CA). 
7.4 RESULTS 
7.4.1 Detection of faecal indicators of contamination in soil/water from pipe trenches 
and water from flooded air-valve vaults 
Soil and water samples surrounding water mains were collected at 14 repair sites. 25 
water samples were collected from flooded air-valve vaults out of a total of 36 vaults 
visited (overall, 30 water samples were collected out of 45 vaults visited but the 
microbiological results for the last five samples were not available as of mid-november 
2007). In nine vaults, the air-valve was completely submerged under water while 16 
vaults had stagnant water levels below the air-valve outlet. The location of collected 
samples is illustrated in Figure 7-3. 
*""£> 
t Water treatment plant 
• Air valve chambers with water sample (n=25) 
• Air valve chambers without water sample (n=11) 
© Sites of pipe repairs (n=15) 
Figure 7-3: Location of samples collected from pipe repair sites and air-valve vaults 
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The detection of the targeted microorganisms was more frequent in the water samples 
collected from the air-valve vaults that in the soil/shallow groundwater surrounding 
water mains (Figure 7-4). While a large proportion of the soil/trench water/water from 
valve vaults was positive for the detection of aerobic endospores and total coliforms, the 
frequency of detection of E. coli and Clostridium was significantly higher in the water 
from the air-valve vaults than in the soil samples (p=0.0008 and 0.0677 respectively) 
and the trench water samples (p=0.0021 and 0.0399 respectively). Enterococci were not 
analyzed in the soil/trench water samples but were detected in 24 samples out of 25 in 
the water collected from the air-valve vaults. Coliphages (somatic and male-specific) 
were detected in 10% of the water samples from valve vaults while none were detected 
in soil or trench water. Human enteric viruses were not detected in any soil or trench 
water samples (see Chapter 6 for the detailed methodology). The results of virus 
analyses are not yet available for the samples from the valve vaults. 
% of positive 
• Soil(n=15) 
D Trench Water (n=10) 
B Water Valve Chambers (n=25) 
Water Valve Chambers (n=25) 
Trench Water (n=10) 
Soil(n=15) 
Figure 7-4: Percent of positive samples in the pathways of intrusion investigated 
The mean concentrations for the microorganisms detected in the soil and water 
samples collected are listed in Table 7.1. The geometric mean was used for calculation 
and 1/10 of the detection limit was used as the concentration value when the measure 
was given as below the detection limit. Concentrations of microorganisms in soil were 
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initially expressed as per 100 g of soil. They were modified and reported as per 100 mL 
for comparison with the water samples. Geometric means of total coliforms and E. coli 
concentrations in the water from the valve vaults were higher than in the soil or trench 
water samples while the geometric means of Clostridium and aerobic endospores were 
lower in the water from the valve vaults. The concentration of coliphages (geometric 
mean) was about the same for the different pathways investigated. 
Table 7-1: Geometric mean of microorganism concentrations in soil, trench water and 

























































7.4.2 Occurrence of negative pressures in distribution system 
7.4.2.1 First phase of pressure monitoring 
During the first monitoring period (June-Sept 2006), pressures lower than 20 psi were 
recorded at 11/12 sites and negative pressures at 7/12 sites in the distribution system. 
Contamination through intrusion may take place under both low and negative transient 
pressures if the pressure of the water surrounding the water main exceeds the internal 
pressure. The average, minimum and maximum pressure values recorded at each site are 
illustrated in Figure 7-5. 
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Figure 7-5: Pressures recorded in distribution system during phase 1 (June -Sept 2006) 
These results are strongly influenced by a planned water main closure that took place 
during the observation period (Besner et al., 2007a). Overall, 11 negative pressure 
events (defined as when one or more loggers recorded negative pressure) took place. 
Four events were related to power failure at the WTP causing pumps shutdown. 
Negative pressures were recorded at up to four locations in the distribution system 
(Telog 2-10-11-12) during these events. These four sites are all located at higher ground 
elevation with a static pressure of about 40 psi (Figure 7-5). Operating pressures at the 
treatment plant before the pump shutdowns were between 76 and 89 psi. Minimum 
transient pressures following these events varied between 5 and 25 psi at the plant and a 
2-3 minute period was necessary for full recovery of the initial pressure. The worst event 
occurred on August 22, 2006 around 08:20 when pressure at the WTP dropped from 89 
psi to 5 psi resulting in negative pressures during one minute at four distribution system 
sites with the lower pressure recorded corresponding to -7.3 psi (Figure 7-6). 
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Figure 7-6: Transient pressure induced by power failure at WTP and resulting pressure 
at one distribution system (DS) site 
Four negative pressure events were related to the closure of a transmission main. This 
closure caused major hydraulic disturbances affecting a smaller zone of the system. 
During the repair, the affected area was supplied by another water treatment plant, 
resulting in reversal in flow directions and low pressures. Distribution system sites 
where the Telog 3-6-7-8-9 were installed had low pressures recorded (<20 psi) while 
negative pressures were recorded at the Telog 5 site. Because this maintenance activity 
had a significant impact on the water pressures, about 15,000 customers were put under 
a preventive boil-water order during the repair work. 
Finally, three negative pressure events were related to repairs of isolated water mains. 
Negative pressures were recorded at Telog 6-9-12 under such conditions for periods 
varying between 28 minutes and 4 hours. Such negative pressures cannot be classified as 
transient events as the monitored hydrant was located inside the isolated section for 
repair. 
The first phase of monitoring allowed the identification of the sector of the 
distribution system that was more susceptible to transient negative pressures. The 
successive phases of pressure monitoring were therefore established in the area where 
the Telog 1-2-10-11-12 were installed. 
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7.4.2.2 Subsequent phases of pressure monitoring 
From September 8, 2006 to July 25, 2007, negative pressure events in the distribution 
system were recorded on five occasions as listed in Table 7-2. Three of these events are 
not considered as transient in nature since they lasted from 3 to 32 minutes (Nov 20, 
2006 and July 11, 2007). It is suspected that these events probably originate from 
construction work in the area of the pressure monitoring sites as no other sites were 
affected by low pressures. 
Table 7-2: Negative pressure events in distribution system 
Phase 
1 
June 20 to Sept 8, 2006 
2 
Sept 8 to Oct 12. 2006 
3 
Oct 12, 2006 to June 14. 2007 
4 
June 14 to July 25, 2007 
# negative pressure 








































Power failure at WTP 
Power failure at WTP 
Power failure at WTP 
Power failure at WTP 
Repair in D S area (no pressure for 34 minutes} 
Repair in D S area (no pressure for 4 hours 26 
minutes) 
Possible repair in DS area? (no pressure for 28 
Transmission main closure 
Transmission main closure 
Transmission main closure 
Transmission main closure 
Repair in D S area? (no pressure for 32 minutes) 
? 
? 
Hydrant use by construction crew doing 
work in adjacent building? mo pressure for 6 
Hydrant use by construction crew doing 
work in adjacent building? (no pressure for 3 
minutes) 
From September 8 2006, pressure values below 35 psi were recorded five times at the 
WTP. These were susceptible to lead to low or negative pressure in distribution system 
and all occurred during phase 3 where pressure monitoring was reduced in the 
distribution system (only the Radcom 3-4 were installed inside public buildings). These 
five events did not result in negative pressures at the Radcom sites but pressures below 
20 psi were recorded for each event at the Radcom 4 site. Because the static pressure is 
higher at the Radcom 4 site in comparison to the Telog 2-10-11-12 (about 10-15 psi 
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difference), it is therefore suspected that the network area where those Telog are usually 
installed experienced negative pressures. 
During phase 4, that started in June 2007 (up to July 25), the lowest pressures were 
recorded at the Telog 2-10-11 sites with 16.6, 20.9 and 20.7 psi respectively. Localized 
negative pressures were recorded at the Telog 12 location (Table 7-2) on July 10 and 11. 
Some construction work was going on in the area close to the hydrant used for pressure 
monitoring. It is therefore suspected that the hydrant could have been operated by 
construction crews. Incidentally, the hydrant was closed on July 12 without the city 
knowing about it. 
7.4.2.3 Pressures recorded during specific O&M activities 
In this distribution system, targeted pressure monitoring was performed during repair 
of water mains in order to assess the amplitude of transient low pressures associated 
with the operation of valves and hydrants during such a maintenance activity. Pressure 
measurements were conducted during nine planned repairs of water main leaks that were 
performed on pipe diameters of 6-8 inches (150-203 mm) (Besner et al., 2007b). The 
initial static pressure values at the 10 sites monitored (one site with two pressure 
loggers) varied between 42.7 psi and 74.8 psi. The pressure drop induced by the onset of 
main flushing varied between 4.5 and 55.8 psi. In this last (and only) case, the pressure 
during flushing was below 20 psi (16.9 psi) for 17 minutes 35 seconds. Overall, the 
minimum pressures recoded at the various sites during the repair varied between 16.9 
and 46.8 psi. 
Pressure monitoring was also performed for three routes of a unidirectional flushing 
(UDF) program taking place in the eastern part of the studied area in July-August 2006 
(Besner et al., 2007b). High-speed pressure transient data loggers were installed on 
hydrants either on or in the vicinity of the route being flushed. Because these UDF 
routes were located in a distribution system area with relatively high static pressures 
(between 74.1 and 84.3 psi), the impact of hydrant opening and main flushing on 
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transient pressures were relatively low. The maximum downsurge measured was 21.6 
psi and the minimum pressure recorded from all sites was 56.9 psi. 
From these results, although transient pressures were observed during flushing and 
pipe repair activities, the main cause of negative pressure in the studied distribution 
system, under standard operating conditions, is when the pump operation at the WTP is 
affected by power failures. Sustained negative pressures were also experienced due to 
major work in the system when a transmission main was closed. A total of nine low 
pressure events were recorded at the WTP during the first year of monitoring (June 
2006-June 2007) resulting in four confirmed and five suspected transient negative events 
in the distribution system. 
7.4.3 Modeling of low pressure events at the water treatment plant 
Transient (or surge) modeling was used to simulate the low pressure events recorded 
at the WTP during the first year of monitoring. The use of transient modeling is 
necessary as the low pressure events are usually of a short duration, in the order of 
minutes. Extended period simulation cannot be used to model such events. 
To this day, one event, taking place on June 27, 2006 has been modeled out of the 
nine events recorded at the WTP. The transient event was simulated by modeling a 
pump closure using a change in the pump speed. The pump speed change curve is a 
model input and was fitted in order to obtain the same pressure out of the WTP as the 
profile measured. These two curves are illustrated in Figure 7-7. 
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Figure 7-7: Pressure measured out of the WTP and pressure obtained from pump speed 
change curve entered in model 
Because field pressure data were available at some locations in the distribution 
system, results obtained from the model could be compared with the field data. Figure 7-
8 illustrates the model and field data obtained from two locations in the distribution 
system. 
Figure 7-8: Pressure profiles obtained from field and model data at two distribution 
system locations 
The agreement between the pressure values obtained from the model and the ones 
measured in the field is considered good. As shown in Figure 7-8, the negative pressure 
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values obtained from the model are worst than the pressure values measured using the 
sensors. In the model, negative pressures go down to -64 psi. This is unrealistic as 
cavitation (when liquid flashes into vapor) usually occurs when the pressure in the pipe 
drops below the vapor pressure of the water (0.35 psi at 20°C-absolute pressure, 
corresponding to -14.35 psi gage pressure) (Streeter and Wylie, 1985). However, the 
pressure profiles obtained from the model when cavitation was set to occur at -14.35 psi 
were difficult to interpret because cavitation was found to occur at several locations 
(which in fact indicates that the model gives lower pressures than measured in the field 
since cavitation was not observed from the field data). In order to simplify and observe 
the transient response, the cavitation value was therefore lowered in the model. 
The area of negative pressure in the distribution system predicted by the model is 
illustrated in Figure 7-9. The demand at the nodes experiencing negative pressure 
corresponded to 9% of the total demand in the system. 
Figure 7-9: Area of negative pressure in distribution system for low pressure event at 
WTP #1 (red dots indicate node with negative pressure) 
Potential intrusion volumes obtained through the use of a leakage factor and an exit 
head are illustrated in Figure 7-10. Percent of leakage in the distribution system were 
assumed from 5% to 25% and two exit heads ((height of water above the water main, 
creating an external pressure) were tested (0 and 1.4 m or 2 psi). Under such conditions, 
the model considers that all the nodes (with an assigned demand) where the internal 
pressure is below the external specified pressure will experience intrusion. Intrusion 
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volumes varied from a minimum of 41 liters to a maximum of 218 liters in the 
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Figure 7-10: Intrusion volumes in distribution system when a leakage factor and exit 
head are used 
Potential intrusion volumes obtained from the simulation of intrusion through 
submerged air-vacuum valves are illustrated in Figure 7-11. All the vaults visited were 
assumed to contain air-vacuum valves, which is a worst-case scenario. In reality, some 
vaults only contained air-valves that are not specifically designed to let air into the pipe 
in case of negative pressures (but they can let some air in). Different scenarios were 
tested (data for the complete valve vaults investigation (n=45 vaults) were included 
here): (i) all 45 vaults that were visited were flooded, (ii) the 30 vaults where a water 
sample was collected were flooded, (iii) the 10 vaults where the air-valve was actually 
found submerged under water were flooded. The diameter of the one-way feed tank used 
to simulate the flooded vault was set to a very large value in order to keep a constant 
level of water. For comparison, a simulation was also run with a tank diameter of 2 m (to 
represent more closely the field situation) and this was shown not to affect the results 
(Figure 7-11). 
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Figure 7-11: Intrusion volumes in distribution system through submerged air-vacuum 
valves (air-vacuum valve outlet diameter = 12, 100 and 150 mm; height of water above 
valve outlet = 0.5m) 
For the 10-flooded valves scenario (probably the more realistic one), total intrusion 
volume in the distribution system varied between 37 liters to 2339 liters according to the 
air-vacuum valve outlet diameter. 
For the two types of intrusion simulated, two worst cases were selected for 
comparison of the total number of microorganisms introduced into the distribution 
system (as the level of contamination differed in the pathways of intrusion). Case 1 is 
the simulated intrusion through 10 submerged air-vacuum valves with a valve outlet 
diameter of 150 mm. Case 2 is the intrusion through all the demand nodes with an 
internal pressure lower than 2 psi under a 25% leakage rate in the system. The geometric 
mean was used for the value of microorganism concentration in the soil/trench water and 
water from air-valve vaults. These results are provided in Table 7.3 
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Table 7-3: Total number of microorganisms intruded in distribution system for two 
cases of intrusion 
# of nodes with intrusion 








Case 1-10 submerged 
air-vacuum valves 










Case 2 - 25% leakage 
and 2 psi exit head 










A series of investigations were conducted in the same distribution system where 
Payment and colleagues conducted their epidemiological studies. This work was 
achieved in order to better understand the vulnerability of this system to occurrence of 
low and negative pressures and potential intrusion, these factors being often associated 
with the results obtained during the epidemio studies. From their second study, Payment 
et al. (1997) concluded that the distribution system could be a likely source of the 
increased level of GI illness observed in the population drinking tap water. 
7.5.1 Pathways of intrusion 
The soil and shallow groundwater in the vicinity of buried mains and the submerged 
air-vacuum valves are two potential pathways of intrusion that were characterized during 
this study. The frequency of detection of microbial indicators of faecal contamination 
was higher in the water collected from the air-vacuum valve vaults than in the soil and 
trench water samples collected during repairs of water mains. The standing water found 
in the air-valve vaults could originate from two potential sources: infiltrated 
groundwater due to the vault (and water main) being located below the water table or 
street runoff following wet weather events. However, the delimitation between these two 
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sources is not clear. The studied system is located on an island, and is therefore 
surrounded by water. Some vaults located close to the river (with elevation of about 15 
m) had no water while some other vaults located within the center of the island (at 
elevations up to 51 m) were found to have standing water above the orifice of the air-
vacuum valve. It is possible that some of the vaults without standing water located close 
to the river are more watertight than the others. However, it is unlikely that the vaults 
located at higher elevations are below the water table. Makepeace et al. (1995) reports 
the detection of total coliforms, E. coli, Enterococci, other bacteria and even viruses in 
urban storwater as well as multiple chemicals such as mercury, total polycyclic aromatic 
hydrocarbons and tetrachloroethylene. The lower concentrations of aerobic endospores 
detected in the water from the air-valve vaults (440 cfu/100 mL versus 12,582 and 
20,930 cfu/100 mL in soil and trench water on average) correlates well with a 
contamination originating from faecal sources. 
The lowest level of faecal contamination observed in the soil and trench water 
samples could be explained by the distance between the sewer lines and the drinking 
water mains. Although this distance is not known, the sewer mains were not visible in 
any excavation except at one site. This site was in fact the only location where a soil 
sample was positive for E.coli and the storm sewer main was directly located over the 
drinking water main being repaired. 
7.5.2 Frequency of negative pressure 
The occurrence of power failures affecting the operation of pumps at the WTP is the 
main cause of negative pressure events in the distribution system studied. When the 
pressure at the plant drops below 35 psi, negative pressure is likely to occur in the 
distribution system. The most susceptible area for negative pressure is located at higher 
elevation since this system has no storage tank or pumping station out in the system. 
Adequate pressure is provided by the high-pressure pumps at the WTPs. 
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During the first year of monitoring (June 2006 to June 2007), nine low pressure 
events (<35 psi) were recorded at the WTP which resulted in four confirmed and five 
suspected negative pressure events in the distribution system. Apart from the (sustained) 
negative pressures created by the closure of a transmission main, the other negative 
pressure events in the distribution system were found to affect single sensor locations, 
very often linked with the occurrence of maintenance work in the system. Since June 
2007, no low pressure event was recorded at the WTP. 
Other researchers have performed pressure monitoring in full-scale distribution 
systems using high-speed pressure transient data loggers. Gullick et al. (2004) observed 
15 surge events that resulted in negative pressure in four systems out of eight monitored 
over a total period of 4524 days (12.4 years). Most of these events were caused by a 
sudden shutdown of all the pumps at a pump station. In a subsequent study of the 
Davenport (Iowa) distribution system, Gullick et al. (2005) monitored the system during 
1.4 years and observed nine occasions when pressures were less than 20 psi in the 
distribution system. No negative pressures were observed. Finally, Hooper et al. (2006) 
monitored pressure in a distribution system for four months (0.3 year) and found 11 low 
pressure events with three of these resulting in readings of 0 psi (lowest value read by 
sensors). For the sake of comparison, the number of zero or negative pressure events 
recorded in these studies can be reported for a one year period and frequencies of 
negative pressure events would correspond to 1.2/year (but in multiple distribution 
systems) (Gullick et al., 2004), 0/year (Gullick et al., 2005) and 10/year (Hooper et al., 
2006). However, one must be careful here as the frequency of recording negative 
pressure events is totally dependent on factors such as the number and location of sensor 
available, the period of the year (power failures may be more frequent during 
summertime), and the level of maintenance activities performed in the system. 
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7.5.3 Transient pressure modeling 
The simulation of one low pressure event occurring at the WTP on June 27, 2006 
showed that the transient model was predicting lower negative pressures than observed 
from the field data. The following factors could explain this: 
(i) the demands included in the model correspond to average-day demands at the 
17 hr time-step (which corresponds to the time at which the event occurred 
(17:20)). These demands were multiplied by a factor in order to correspond 
with the total demands measured in the system prior to the low pressure event. 
Consequently, the repartition and values of the assigned node demands in the 
model are different than the ones experienced on June 26. 
(ii) Typical wave speed values have been assigned to the different pipe materials 
in the system. However, the wave speed depends on the pipe diameter and 
pipe wall thickness, which has not been considered here. The magnitude of 
the pressure wave is affected by the wave speed into the system. 
(iii) Air-vacuum valves, which are surge protection devices, have not been 
included in the model as such (although potential intrusion through these 
devices has been studied). The air-vacuum valves are not all submerged under 
water and some are actually working correctly. Consequently, these devices 
help in reducing the amplitude of the negative pressure in the system. 
Despite these differences in the prediction of the level of negative pressure, the 
pressure profiles obtained at various sites in the distribution system fitted well with the 
field data. Of course, it is expected that the area and number of nodes experiencing 
negative pressure in the model is larger than in reality. 
Potential intrusion volumes have also been assessed for two modeling scenarios. The 
volumes obtained are likely to be worst than in reality for the following reasons: 
- the model is predicting negative pressures that are higher in amplitude than what 
was measured in the field 
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the intrusion module included in the model (predicting intrusion through pipe 
leaks) predicts that all nodes subjected to a lower internal pressure than the 
specified exit head will experience intrusion. As an example, if the exit head is 
set to 0, the model will consider that all the nodes experiencing negative pressure 
will experience intrusion. In reality, this is highly unlikely as the area subject to 
negative pressure is typically located at higher elevation in this distribution 
system. The likelihood that these locations are below the groundwater table is 
very low. The modeling scenario considering the 2 psi (1.4 m) exit head was 
therefore selected as a worst-case scenario. 
Intrusion through submerged air-vacuum valves is a more serious threat for this 
system. The intrusion volumes obtained via this pathway (considering the 
location of the 10 flooded vaults as found in summer 2007) are higher than for 
the intrusion through leaks. Intrusion volumes are about 10 times higher through 
submerged air-vacuum valves than through pipe leaks. However, care must be 
taken when considering the number of liters intruded. Many assumptions make 
the situation worst in the model than in reality: (i) air-vacuum valves have been 
assumed in all the vaults while this is not the case in the distribution system. Air-
release valves (with typical outlet diameters smaller than % in. (6 mm) may also 
be located in these vaults; (ii) the actual diameter of the air-vacuum valve outlets 
are not known; (iii) modeling the flooded vaults with a one-way feed tank 
requires the assignation of a resistance factor based on a coefficient of discharge 
(Ca) that depends on the shape of the orifice. This value is unknown and a Cd of 
0.6 was used. 
In the Kirmeyer et al. (2001) study, transient modeling of a section of this distribution 
system was performed. These authors obtained intrusion volumes following a loss of 
flow (changing the speed of supplying pumps from full to zero in five seconds) of 55, 
98, 140 and 247 liters during four simulations. These values were obtained using leakage 
percent of 5, 10, and 15 and an equivalent orifice diameter of 1/8 in. (3.2 mm) in the last 
case (all with an exit head of 1 m). It is difficult to compare these values to the volumes 
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obtained in this study because of the different simulating conditions used in the two 
studies. The intrusion volume is totally dependent upon the negative pressure magnitude 
and duration obtained from the model. 
Because both the level of faecal contamination and the volumes of intrusion were 
found to be higher for the submerged air-vacuum valve pathway, a comparison was 
made regarding the total number of microorganisms that would find their way into the 
system under two worst-case conditions of intrusion through submerged valves and pipe 
leaks. According to the model, intrusion through submerged air-valves located in the 
area of negative pressure would lead to an additional load of microorganisms into the 
system varying between 0.5 to 2 log (Table 7-3). However, there is no assessment here 
on the potential impact of the residual free chlorine present in the distribution system on 
the inactivation of the microorganisms. The numbers of microorganisms listed in Table 
7-3 are intruded through multiple nodes. It must also be remembered that these numbers 
were obtained from two worst-case contamination scenarios as discussed above. 
Flooding of air-valve vaults is not specific to this system. Kirmeyer et al. (2001) 
report that 12 utilities out of 26 surveyed had information on flooding of meter and valve 
vaults. For these 12 utilities, the number of flooded vaults (not only air-valve vaults) 
varied widely, between 0 to 80% of total vaults. These authors also report on a water 
utility finding standing water in 100% of the air-valve vaults inspected. Good 
engineering practices for the installation of air valves should include an open ended pipe 
that extend 0.3 m above grade, fitted with a screened, downward facing elbow 
(Ministere de l'Environnement du Quebec, 2002). In the distribution system studied, a 
regular inspection program should be put in place in order to eliminate this potential 
source of contamination in the distribution system. The zone identified as being 
susceptible to negative pressure should be prioritized. 
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7.6 CONCLUSION 
The possibility of microbial intrusion in the distribution system where Payment et al 
conducted their epidemiological studies was investigated. Potential pathways of 
intrusion were characterized, frequency and magnitude of negative pressures were 
monitored in the system and transient modeling of low pressure events was conducted to 
assess potential volumes of intrusion. 
The monitoring of distribution system pressures during one year showed that a part of 
the system was vulnerable to negative pressures when power failures occurred at the 
WTP, affecting the operation of pumps. Although transient pressures were measured 
during the monitoring of targeted maintenance activities (operation of valves and 
hydrants), these were not associated with the occurrence of low or negative pressure at 
the monitored sites. 
One low pressure event at the WTP that was found to result in negative pressure in 
the distribution system was simulated using transient modeling. Although the model 
predicted lower negative pressures than measured, the pressure profiles at various 
locations showed a good correspondance between field and model data. Potential 
intrusion volumes during this event could be simulated under different scenarios. 
Intrusion through submerged air-vacuum valves was found to be more important than 
intrusion through pipe leaks. Moreover, the microbial characterization of these two 
pathways of intrusion indicated that faecal contamination was recovered more frequently 
and at higher levels in the water from the flooded air-vacuum valve vaults than in the 
soil or trench water. Intrusion volumes obtained from the model are likely to be higher 
than in reality, however, such results indicate that air-valve vaults should be prioritized 
in term of inspection and maintenance, in order to minimize the risk of intrusion in this 
distribution system. 
The transient modeling performed as part of this study intends to present the first 
steps of what could later be used to develop a risk assessment methodology on microbial 
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intrusion due to transient negative pressures in distribution systems. The modeling work 
presented may certainly be refined and should be considered as exploratory work. 
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This general discussion highlights the main findings obtained through this PhD 
research. The concept and benefits of data integration will first be discussed. Results and 
challenges related to the investigation, in full-scale distribution systems, of losses in 
physical integrity and hydraulic integrity will then be reviewed. Finally, the benefits of 
such study for the water industry will be presented. 
The results presented in this thesis come from a total of seven different water 
distribution systems. Through the data-based study, data were obtained from seven water 
utilities (Laval, Montreal, Moncton, Caen, Egham, Cincinnati and Denver) and field 
investigations were also conducted in two of these distribution systems (Laval and 
Montreal). The Laval distribution system, and more specifically the area of the system 
where Payment and colleagues conducted their epidemiological studies, is where the 
majority of the field work took place. Therefore, part of the discussion is devoted to this 
specific system. 
8.1 INTEGRATION OF DATA WAS FOUND USEFUL TO EXPLAIN WATER 
QUALITY VARIATIONS 
In the past, prediction of total coliform occurrences in drinking water distribution 
systems (both in time and space) has been attempted. A review of four models was 
provided in Besner et al. (2002) and these models were mostly based on the 
consideration of the classical water quality parameters associated with regrowth: water 
temperature, total count of bacteria, residual chlorine and organic matter. However, 
because water quality parameters are clearly insufficient to explain the occurrence of 
conforms in distribution systems (Besner et al., 2002), it was suggested that the use of 
dynamic visualization/data-based approach could be useful to better understand water 
quality variations. 
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The data integration approach developed during this project is based on the 
combination and simultaneous consideration of water quality data, network structural 
data, system O&M data, information from a hydraulic model and a geographical 
information system (GIS) for data visualization. Data analysis was performed using the 
Interactive Data Analyzer tool that was developed in collaboration with Professor 
Trepanier of the MADITUC group at Ecole Polytechnique. At the time of development, 
and because of the constraints related with the participation of several water utilities, all 
with different database management strategies, a software tool as "simple" as possible 
was elaborated (based on widely available components). Figure 5-3 of Chapter 5 
provides a good overview of the tool capabilities. 
Using such an approach, it was therefore possible to examine the potential causes of 
historical water quality variations in a distribution system. Occurrence of coliform 
samples is one type of water quality problem that was investigated. From the results 
obtained, the proportion of coliform samples attributable to O&M activities could then 
be established. Based on the available data provided by the water utilities, a total of 140 
total coliform samples in five distribution systems were investigated. The results showed 
that the role of O&M activities on the occurrence of coliforms was variable from one 
system to another, explaining a minimum of 9% and up to 45% of the number of 
coliform cases investigated in each system. This study provided some spatio-temporal 
(and hydraulic) evidences of a link between O&M and coliform occurrences. However, 
most of the samples included in this study were collected from routine sampling 
locations by the water utility. Therefore, the results are providing a limited view of the 
real impact of O&M on water quality since O&M work can be conducted in any part of 
the distribution system, not only in area where routine sampling points are located. A 
field evaluation of some O&M activities was then required. 
The Laval distribution system was included in this study and results showed a link 
between low pressure events and coliform occurrence in summer of 1999. The affected 
area was characterized by low or non detectable free chlorine residuals at that time. 
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Fifteen percent (15%) of the positive total coliform samples collected in this distribution 
system between 1997 and 2000 were associated with events taking place in the 
distribution system (lower pressures, pipe flushing, hydrant operation and times of 
increased water consumption associated with lower pressures, valve operation and pipe 
flushing). 
8.2 LOSS IN SYSTEM'S PHYSICAL INTEGRITY: FIELD ASSESSMENT OF 
THE IMPACT ON WATER QUALITY 
The field investigation of the impact of pipe repairs on water quality was driven by 
the following evidences: 
A loss in distribution system's physical integrity (through repairs or installation 
of water mains) has been identified as a potential source of contamination (NRC, 
2006). 
Our in-depth review of simulated intrusions in various experimental settings 
(Chapter 4) showed that when the intrusion took place under no- or low-flow 
conditions or when there was a delay between the time of intrusion and the time 
of application of the disinfectant, these conditions were likely to result in 
increased persistence of microorganisms in the water system. Such conditions 
can in fact be related to field conditions experienced during pipe repairs in full-
scale distribution systems. 
Detailed field data related to water quality parameters during repairs are usually 
missing in the literature. The number of sanitary release samples after new main 
installation is the most common type of data available (Haas et al., 1998). 
8.2.1 Challenges of conducting experimentation in full-scale distribution systems 
Conducting field work in full-scale distribution systems presents organizational 
challenges. The setting for experimentation is not a controlled environment (in 
comparison with a laboratory setting for example). The selection of sampling locations 
for the monitoring of pipe repairs was totally dependent upon the site conditions and 
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customers' acceptance of having their water sampled during the event. The utility field 
crews were in general very collaborative but sometimes procedures such as valve or 
hydrant operations were conducted without notice, making the field measurements more 
difficult. The number of repairs investigated depended on the number of repairs 
performed by the water utility and the constraints associated with laboratory work 
(availability to perform microbiological analyses - within 24 hours of the repair). 
Monitoring of pipe repairs was quite labor-intensive as it required the participation of a 
group of four to six people in order to collect the required water samples at the various 
locations. 
Despite these challenges, monitoring in full-scale systems provides measurements of 
actual water quality changes due to operations. The protocol developed for the 
investigation of pipe repairs and their impact on water quality is a first and allowed the 
identification of effects both inside and outside of the isolated repair area. To the 
knowledge of the author, no comparable study has been published on this topic. 
8.2.2 Low contamination associated with planned repairs of water mains 
Out of 16 repair sites investigated, evidence of microbial intrusion (total coliforms, 
E. coli, aerobic endospores) was observed at seven sites (44% of the sites). Considering 
all sampling locations and repair steps at which water samples were collected, a total of 
17 samples out of 424 (4.0%) were positive for total coliforms. The majority of positive 
samples were collected during the flushing step of the repair (16 out of 17 samples), 
predominantly at the hydrant itself (11 samples out of 16). Only one sample was found 
positive for total coliforms once the repair was completed (collected at House In) and 
among the positive total coliform samples, only one was found positive for E. coli 
(collected at hydrant during flushing). These results show limited contamination 
associated with the type of repairs investigated and suggest that adequate pipe flushing 
after a repair is completed is in fact effective to minimize contamination. 
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In comparison, van Lieverloo et al. (2006) report that 28 out of 50 faecal 
contamination events reported for the 1994-2003 period in the Netherlands were related 
to operations in mains (18 replacements, 8 repairs and 2 cleaning operations). Most of 
these cases were detected through targeted sampling (within the first day after the mains 
were cleaned), performed by the water companies (however, no details regarding site 
conditions are available). It is noted that water supply was started immediately after the 
operations, but not before the mains were flushed and in some cases disinfected. 
Systems providing water in the Netherlands are characterized by the distribution of 
water without a disinfectant residual, which can probably explain the recovery of faecal 
indicators. In our study, if faecal contamination would have been more common, it is 
expected that more samples would have been positive for E. coli during flushing. 
Although chlorine residuals were not measured in the first samples collected during 
flushing, the likelihood that a chlorine residual was present in those samples is very low. 
These samples were often characterized by an elevated turbidity. 
Soil and water samples from pipe trenches had a low level of faecal contamination, 
which could explain the results obtained. Our results differ from the ones obtained by 
Karim et al. (2003) who performed a similar investigation in several U.S. water systems. 
Frequency of recovery of faecal contamination in the soil and trench water samples 
collected by Karim et al. (2003) was much higher with the detection of human enteric 
viruses (detected using both cell-culture and PCR) in some samples. In our study, only 
one soil sample was found positive for E. coli, and this was the only occasion a sewer 
main could be observed in the same trench as the repaired main. Recent samplings 
(during summer of 2007) of soils and trench water samples during repairs of water 
mains were conducted in different distribution systems (St-Jean-sur-Richelieu and 
Repentigny, Quebec). Although few samples are available (n=3), results indicate that E. 
coli was again detected in trench water of the only site where a large diameter sanitary 
sewer main was found to cross over the repaired drinking water main. These results 
indicate that sites where the drinking water mains are located in the vicinity of sewer 
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mains are especially vulnerable to contamination, either during repairs or through 
intrusion if pipe leaks are present. 
The fact that the repairs investigated were planned repairs of pipe leaks is also a 
factor that could influence the results obtained. The field conditions experienced under 
emergency repairs, when water is flowing and potentially flooding the streets and 
buildings, may be quite different. For such cases, there is a need for the field crews to 
act rapidly in order to limit potential damages. Such situations were not investigated 
during this study, mainly because of logistical constraints (unknown time of event, 
sampling equipment as well as a team of four to six persons ready at all times). The 
number of repairs completed each year (from 1985 to 2004) in the Laval distribution 
system is illustrated in Figure 8-1. Using the available information for the 2000-2004 
period, it was found that 52% to 60% of the repairs (performed during a year) were 
performed on the same day as the pipe failure was detected. Although it is strongly 
suspected that the repairs conducted on the same day as a failure is detected do not all 
represent major pipe failure events, we can therefore conclude that the situations 
investigated during this study (planned repairs) likely represent the conditions 
encountered during 40-50% of the repair work conducted in this system (corresponding 
to about 200 repairs per year on average). 
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Figure 8-1: Yearly number of distribution main repairs conducted in the Laval 
distribution system (1985-2004) 
The results obtained from the field study are in agreement with the results obtained 
from the data-based study conducted for the Laval distribution system. From the 
historical data analysis, pipe repairs were not identified as a high-probability cause of 
the explained coliform occurrences in this system. However, even if the field results 
showed limited contamination, field crews must remain cautious regarding the sanitary 
practices during repairs. A lack of sanitary precautions is one hypothesis suggested for 
the detection of E. coli in one water sample collected from a flowing hydrant. 
Consequently, even if flushing was found to be adequate to remove intruded 
contamination, minimal disinfection (of the tools and other equipment used during the 
work) could easily be performed and provides an additional barrier in preventing 
potential contamination of the system. This is applicable to planned repairs such as the 
ones investigated during this study. 
8.3 LOSS IN SYSTEM'S HYDRAULIC INTEGRITY: FIELD ASSESSMENT 
OF THE IMPACT ON WATER QUALITY 
The evaluation of the risk of intrusion associated with low or negative pressures due 
to standard system operation or occurrence of maintenance activities in full-scale 
distribution systems was an important part of this PhD work. Accordingly, the three 
conditions necessary for intrusion to take place were investigated: (i) occurrence of 
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negative pressure; (ii) available pathway for intrusion; and (iii) source of contamination. 
Although some of the pressure measurements were conducted in the Montreal 
distribution system (hydrant flow tests, monitoring of pump operation), the majority of 
the work was performed in the Laval distribution system, in the same system area where 
Payment and colleagues (1991, 1997) conducted their epidemiological studies. 
Continuous pressure monitoring was performed from June 2006 up to November 2007 
in this distribution system. 
Power failures affecting the operation of pumps at the water treatment plant were 
identified as the main cause of transient negative pressure in the Laval distribution 
system. Sudden shutdown of pumps has also been reported by Gullick et al. (2004) as 
being the main cause of negative pressures in at least three systems out of four where 
negative pressure was recorded. Operational practices such as valve and hydrant 
operations associated with repair or flushing activities, were found to induce transient 
pressures but no negative pressure resulted. The pressure monitoring in the Montreal 
system showed similar results with larger transient pressures induced by pump operation 
(resulting in pressures of 83 kPa (12 psi) at the monitoring location). Apart from 
pumping operations, most of the O&M activities monitored took place in area of the 
systems where the initial pressures were relatively high (with average initial pressure 
between 290 and 558 kPa (42 and 81 psi) (Besner et al., 2007). Pressure drops varying 
from 14 kPa up to 379 kPa (2 to 55 psi) were measured such that there is a potential for 
these operations to create negative pressures when conducted in distribution system area 
where the initial pressure is low. In the literature, there is no report of measured negative 
pressure associated with these operations (flushing, hydrant flow tests, fire fighting 
flows, pipe breaks). 
The Laval distribution system study area was found to be vulnerable to low and 
negative pressures with nine events of low pressure at the WTP during the first year of 
monitoring (June 2006-July 2007). Negative pressure mainly resulted at locations of 
higher elevations due to the absence of storage tanks and pump stations in the 
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distribution system. It is not known if such system's characteristics (high-pressure 
pumps at the WTP only and absence of storage tank in distribution system) are 
commonly found in other systems. Such a setting increases the vulnerability to negative 
pressures, especially at locations of higher elevations. 
When low or negative pressures occur, microbial intrusion in the Laval distribution 
system may take place through pipe leaks or other orifices (as in all distribution systems) 
but also through submerged air-vacuum valves that are located in flooded vaults. A 
survey of 45 vaults showed the presence of water in 30 vaults among which 10 vaults 
were flooded with water submerging the air-vacuum valve orifice. For the pipe leaks, it 
is estimated that 20% of the water is lost through these. Soil, trench water and water 
from the flooded vaults were characterized to determine their level of faecal 
contamination. The frequency of recovery and concentrations of faecal microbial 
indicators were higher in the water from the valve vaults, making this pathway of 
intrusion, a critical one in this distribution system. 
8.3.1 Establishing the link between negative pressure and water quality changes 
Establishing a link between the occurrence of negative pressure in a full-scale system 
and resulting changes in water quality is a big challenge. Even if the three conditions for 
intrusion are in place in the Laval system (negative pressure, pathway, source of 
contamination), these conditions have to occur simultaneously at a location for intrusion 
to take place. As previously discussed, negative pressure affects the higher elevation 
area of the system where it is unlikely that the pipes will be submerged under water. 
However, some flooded air-valve vaults are located in this area and of course, the 
location of potential cross-connections is unknown. 
Water quality sampling during transient pressure events cannot be planned as it is 
impossible to predict the time of occurrence of a negative pressure event. Moreover, 
these events are usually transient in nature, having a duration of less than a few minutes. 
To offset such a constraint, an automatic water sampler, able to collect 150 liters of 
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water following a low pressure event, was installed (in July 2007) inside a city building 
in the area vulnerable to negative pressures. Results regarding this part of the study were 
only recently obtained and are very preliminary. Hence, they are not presented nor 
discussed in this thesis. However, we think it is worthwile to mention that such a field 
initiative was attempted. 
The occurrence of a sustained negative pressure event in an area of the Laval 
distribution system associated with the planned closure of a transmission main 
(Appendix A) represented a "unique occasion" to sample water following the occurrence 
of a negative pressure event in a full-scale system. The flushing operation of the 400 mm 
(16 in.) diameter main at the end of the first closure induced negative pressure for two 
episodes lasting more than five minutes each at a site where water quality was being 
sampled. As detailed in Appendix A, even if larger volumes were sampled (1 L) and 
analyzed for the microbial indicators of intrusion used (total coliforms/^. coli, aerobic 
endospores) no microbial contamination could be detected at this site. The free chlorine 
residual after the pressure loss (0.18-0.20 mg/L) was about the same as before the flow 
was stopped. Water quality samplings at two other sites in the affected area showed no 
significant evidence of microbial contamination as only one sample was positive for 
total coliforms and happened to be collected 30 hours after the end of the first closure 
but still in the middle of the second closure. However, the free chlorine residual was 
below the detection level for this sample. To our knowledge, this is the first attempt 
where water quality could be evaluated following the occurrence of a major negative 
pressure event in a full-scale system. 
If this sustained negative pressure event resulted in an intrusion (as the theory, 
literature and some of our previous results would likely suggest), it could therefore not 
be detected. Some hypotheses for this can be offered: 
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grab water samples were collected and the time of collection did not coincide 
with the time at which the contamination was transported to the sampling 
location 
the residual chlorine in the system was able to offer some protection and 
inactivated the intruded microorganisms (at least the indicators) 
viable but nonculturable (injured) bacteria could not be detected with the 
detection methods used during this study (Colilert - enzymatic method for total 
coliforms and membrane filtration for the aerobic endospores). However, aerobic 
endospores are more resistant to disinfection (Rice et al., 1996; Barbeau et al., 
1999) and therefore less subject to chlorine injury. This last hypothesis reflects 
the same concerns expressed regarding the detection methods used in the studies 
reviewed in Chapter 4. The use of a detection technique such as the DVC-FISH-
ScanRDI allowing the detection of nonculturable Enterobacteriaceae cells would 
have been possible as the equipment was available in our laboratory. However, it 
was decided not to use such a method since past experience showed that the 
maximum volume of distribution system water that could be filtered was 100 
mL, assuming a low turbidity of the water sample. The distribution system water 
samples analyzed in the past (Baudart et al., 2005) also contained a very low free 
chlorine concentration (<0.1 mg/L). 
Free chlorine concentrations in the Laval distribution system have significantly 
increased over the years (Figure 8-2). This figure illustrates box plots (min, 25th 
percentile, median, 75th percentile and max values) summarizing the daily 
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Figure 8-2: Free chlorine concentrations at the outlet of the Pont-Viau WTP 
For the year 2006 (up to the end of October), the free chlorine residual at the outlet of 
the plant resulted in the concentrations illustrated in Figure 8-3 for the three routine 
monitoring sites in the distribution system supplied by the Pont-Viau WTP. Free 
chlorine was always detectable at the site located at the greatest distance from the plant 
and usually close to 0.2 mg/L for the lowest values although some values were at about 
0.1 mg/L. 
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Figure 8-3: Free chlorine concentrations in distribution system (January-October 2006) 
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Under such conditions, the detection of microorganisms becomes more difficult 
because of their potential inactivation and relative scarcity in the system. As an example, 
the occurrence of total coliform positive samples originating from the routine collection 
of water samples is at its lowest level since 2004 (Figure 8-4). In 2004 and 2005, only 
one sample was found positive for total coliforms in the distribution system. 
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Figure 8-4: Percentage of positive total coliform samples from routine water quality 
monitoring in the Laval distribution system 
In order to increase the chance of detecting an indicator of intrusion during the 
sustained negative pressure event, larger volumes of water were collected for analysis. 
Instead of the usual 100 mL sample used for total coliform/E'. coli detection, volumes of 
1L were used for filtration, increasing by a factor of 10 the likelihood of detecting total 
coliforms in the sample (900 ml were filtered through a 0.45um filter and the filter was 
then placed in 100 mL of sample to which the Colilert reagent was added). The issue of 
large volume sampling for detection of microorganisms in distribution system is an 
ongoing issue. There are no defined sampling procedures in place at this time. Studies 
using multiple 250 mL samples (Owen et al., 2007) to trials where up to 20 L of water 
could be filtered using a filtration capsule or module (McCuin et al., 2007) were recently 
or are currently conducted. In the context of a field study with simultaneous sampling at 
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different locations, such as the one presented here, field constraints may limit the 
amount and type of equipment that can be used. 
The results obtained from this investigation, showing limited contamination linked to 
the occurrence of sustained negative pressure, would therefore suggest a low health risk. 
However, this is in contradiction with the studies conducted by Hunter et al. (2005) and 
Nygard et al. (2007) which report an association between gastrointestinal illness and 
low-pressure events in distribution systems in England and Norway. Both studies are 
based on episodes of diarrhea reported by water recipients in several distribution 
systems. Very few water quality data are available and there is no information regarding 
the level of residual disinfectant used in these distribution systems. Although this cannot 
be ascertained in this case, water is often distributed with a lower disinfectant residual in 
European countries compared to the practices in place in North-American systems 
(Chapter 4). If this is in fact the case, this could certainly explain some of the differences 
observed. 
8.3.2 Transient modeling as a tool to understand the risk of intrusion 
Because of the difficulties associated with the actual measurements of intrusion 
volumes in full-scale distribution systems, the vulnerability of a system to contamination 
may be evaluated using transient modeling. In the past, transient flow analysis has 
mostly been used to evaluate peak positive and negative pressures in pipe systems in 
order to select appropriate strength pipe materials and appurtenances and for the design 
of effective surge control devices (Ghidaoui et al., 2005). As noted by these authors, 
water qualtity predictions in potable water system is an emerging application in water 
hammer analysis. It is therefore expected that the hydraulic parameters allowing the 
simulation of intrusion will be refined in the future. This is an area where interesting 
developments are likely to take place. 
As previously discussed in Chapter 7, intrusion volumes simulated for one low-
pressure event at the WTP are likely to be higher than in reality because (i) the model is 
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predicting worst negative pressures than measured in the field; (ii) the orifice equation 
used to model intrusion predicts that all nodes subjected to a lower internal pressure than 
the specified exit head will experience intrusion; and (iii) uncertainties about the 
simulation of air-vacuum valves exist. Despite these constraints, the use of transient 
modeling helped in identifying a critical pathway for intrusion in the distribution system 
studied (the submerged air-vacuum valves). Simulation of intrusion was mostly 
performed through pipe leaks in previous studies (Kirmeyer G.J. et al., 2001; 
LeChevallier et al., 2004; Mclnnis, 2004). To our knowledge, this is the first study 
where two potential pathways (with information on their respective level of 
contamination) are compared. 
The next step will be to simulate the transport of the intruded contaminant into the 
system. This can be achieved by the use of the extended period simulation model. 
However, it is imperative that the residual disinfectant effect be taken into consideration 
in order to obtain a realistic understanding of the impact of the negative pressure events 
in the distribution system studied. Further work will consist in defining the risk of 
infection in the population, associated with consumption of contaminated drinking water 
due to an accidental intrusion. The model proposed by Mclnnis (2004) could be used as 
a basis. Based on the QMRA concept, the work presented in this thesis may therefore be 
considered as new information allowing a more accurate characterization of the 
exposure. 
8.4 BENEFITS FOR THE WATER INDUSTRY 
The nature of the research conducted during this project is very practical. The data 
integration approach and the interactive analyzer tool were transferred back to the staff 
of the participating water utilities once this part of the project was completed. For most 
of the utilities, the data-based study highlighted the need for a well-managed database 
with adequate information on the spatio-temporal location of events. A real-life 
application of the data integration approach is now in place in the city of Metz (France) 
distribution system, managed by Veolia Water (The N° 1 company worldwide for water 
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services with an annual revenue, in 2006, of 10.1 billion euros). Technical knowledge 
(better use of different types of information, better understanding of water quality in 
distribution systems), commercial benefits (technological showcase, development of 
GIS aspects, modeling) and the legal obligations of water providers under the revised 
regulations drove the application of the approach by the company. In 2007, the city of 
Toulouse (France) was added as a new pilot site for the application of the approach. The 
approach also raised some interest from the research community as it was included in 
two research projects funded by the American Water Works Association Research 
Foundation (AwwaRF) One study is already published (Martel et al., 2005) and one is 
currently conducted (AWWARF 3116 - Strategy to manage and respond to total 
coliforms and E. coli in the distribution system). 
The results obtained through the field studies will benefit the water utilities by 
allowing them to improve their daily O&M activities. The work presented provides 
support to identify and control vulnerable distribution system locations. 
Finally, regulatory agencies now have access to scientific knowledge to elaborate 
guidelines or regulations on distribution system operation and better assess the 
importance of intrusion associated with system operational practices and maintenance 
activities. The work presented can be considered as background work that can be used to 
assess the importance of intrusion in terms of public health. In such a process, this PhD 
work brings new information allowing a more accurate characterization of the exposure. 
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CHAPTER 9 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
This PhD work resulted in the following conclusions regarding the link between 
distribution system O&M activities and potential distribution system contamination: 
• The investigation of the causes of 140 historical coliform occurrences in five 
water distribution systems showed that some O&M activities could be associated 
with the subsequent detection of coliform positive samples. The likely causes 
identified included: pipe replacement, spot flushing and valve operation, 
unidirectional flushing, valve and hydrant operation, lower pressures in localized 
area of the system, high flow hydrant testing, pipe break repair, installation of new 
pipes and mains cleaning and relining. 
• The results obtained from the data-based study are totally dependent on the 
availability of high-quality data which provide a comprehensive analysis and a 
highly accurate diagnosis. From the available data, it was found that the role of 
O&M activities on the occurrence of coliforms in distribution systems varies from 
one system to another, explaining a minimum of 9% and up to 45% of the number 
of coliform cases investigated in each system. 
• Evidence of intrusion (using total coliforms, E.coU and aerobic endospores in 
distribution system water) at sites of pipe repairs was obtained at seven sites out 
of 16. However, the results suggest that adequate pipe flushing after a repair is 
completed is effective to minimize contamination for the type of repair 
investigated. Almost all the positive total coliform samples (17 samples out of 424 
(4.0%)) were collected during the flushing operation and at the hydrant 
predominantly. Detection of E. coli in flushing water occurred on a single 
occasion. The low level of faecal contamination of the soil and trench water in the 
two distribution systems studied may explain some of these results. 
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• During the time period necessary for a repair to be completed (usually less than 10 
hours), variations in chlorine residuals and turbidity can be observed outside of 
the repair area when changes in flow direction and dead-end mains are created by 
valve closures. 
• The frequency and magnitude of negative pressures associated with both system 
operation and some targeted maintenance activities were evaluated, with the 
majority of the work taking place in the Laval distribution system. Pressure 
monitoring showed that transient pressures were recorded under all events 
monitored. However, power failure affecting the operation of pumps was the main 
cause of negative pressures in this distribution system. The frequency of these 
events was quite high during the first year of monitoring. Nine low pressure 
events were recorded at the water treatment plant 
• A "unique occasion" to sample water following the occurrence of sustained 
negative pressure in the Laval distribution system showed limited microbial 
contamination associated with this event. Total coliforms could be detected in 
only one water sample even if larger sample volumes were used. 
• Transient and intrusion modeling were used to assess the potential level of 
intrusion associated with negative pressure events in the Laval distribution 
system. Although adjustments should be made to the model, the results showed 
that flooded air-vacuum valve vaults were critical locations for intrusion in this 
distribution system. Combining the results from the model and the field sampling, 
these locations are characterized by larger intrusion volumes, high frequency of 
recovery and higher concentrations of faecal indicators. 
The initial question that this research seeked to answer was: what is the risk of 
microbial contamination in a drinking water distribution system when routinely 
conducted operation and maintenance activities take place? The data-based study 
showed that a link could be established between O&M activities and total coliform 
occurrences. The results from our field studies showed limited contamination linked 
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with planned repairs and (one) sustained negative pressure event. Based on this, the risk 
of contamination associated with repairs (planned repairs in relatively "clean" pipe 
trenches) can be estimated as low. However, evidences are less straightforward for the 
negative pressure event. It can be suspected that indicator microorganisms would have 
been detected in more than one sample if the situation was critical. The free chlorine 
residual in the area of the distribution system studied was shown to increase significantly 
over the years, which can probably offer a certain level of protection. However, transient 
modeling highlights the risk of intrusion from submerged air-vacuum valves during 
negative pressure events. This pathway of intrusion should and can easily be eliminated 
by the systematic inspection and maintenance of the valve vaults. 
Additional research is therefore needed to assess with confidence the risk of intrusion 
associated with the occurrence of transient negative pressures and assess the effect of the 
residual disinfectant. Because the modeling work performed during this study was rather 
exploratory, this part should be expanded. In the context of the study presented here, 
future work should include adjustments to the actual transient model in order to obtain 
results that would be more representative of the field data. Sensitivity analyses should be 
conducted for the model parameters that cannot be directly assessed. For the simulated 
scenarios of intrusion, transport of the intruded microorganisms should be coupled to the 
inactivation provided by the residual disinfectant. A model such as the EPANET-MSX 
model, which considers the fate and transport of multiple constituents in distribution 
system could be used. Such results would give a much refined input into a QMRA 
model designed to evaluate the risk of infection in the population, associated with the 
consumption of contaminated drinking water due to an accidental intrusion. Transient 
modeling of the sustained low pressure event would also be very interesting in order to 
confirm (or not) the results that were obtained from the field. 
O&M activities in a distribution system include a wide range of operations. 
Unfortunately, all of these could not be evaluated in the framework of this study. As 
more attention is now devoted to the distribution system as the last barrier against 
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potential contamination, research should continue in order to provide a more accurate 
view of the impact of such operations. 
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APPENDIX A 
CASE STUDY: 
NEGATIVE PRESSURE AND WATER QUALITY 
ASSESSMENT DURING THE CLOSURE OF A 
TRANSMISSION MAIN IN THE LAVAL DISTRIBUTION 
SYSTEM 
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Abstract: The magnitude of low and negative pressures induced by the closure and 
repair of a transmission main in a distribution system was investigated along with the 
potential for intrusion and changes in water quality associated with these low/negative 
pressures. Field equipment included high-speed pressure transient data loggers, on-line 
turbidimeters and grab samples that were analyzed for total coliform bacteria, E. coli, 
aerobic endospores, residual chlorine, temperature and conductivity. Results of the 
monitoring showed that the closure of the transmission main was the cause of significant 
and sustained negative pressures in the DS under study. However, the water quality 
monitoring did not reveal significant water contamination. The specific conditions of the 
system under study and the inability to detect contamination in chlorinated systems with 
the current analytical methods could explain such results. 
INTRODUCTION 
Negative or low pressures in water mains are problematic as they can result in the 
introduction (backflow) of untreated water into the main if an available pathway is 
present (pipe fracture or orifice, cross connection, leaking joints, etc.). 
The general aging and deteriorating state of the infrastructure used to distribute water 
is therefore a threat to the integrity of distribution systems and increases the 
vulnerability of distribution system to water contamination. The American Society for 
Civil Engineers allocated a D- for the poor state of drinking water infrastructures in the 
U.S. (ASCE, 2005). It is also estimated that about 30% of the produced water in 
Canadian distribution systems is lost through pipe leaks (Environment Canada, 2005), 
providing multiple potential entry points for intrusion of microbes into treated drinking 
water during negative or low pressure events. 
Low or negative pressure events have been reported in many studies (Kirmeyer et al., 
2001; LeChevallier et al., 2004; Gullick et al., 2004; Gullick et al., 2005; Hooper et al., 
2006). These events are usually transient in nature, having a short duration mostly in the 
range of seconds. It has been stated that a high potential risk of introduction of 
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pathogenic microorganisms into the distribution system exists when transient negative 
pressure events occur in pipelines (LeChevallier et al., 2003). 
The case study presented here is part of a larger study consisting in evaluating the 
frequency and amplitude of transient low and negative pressures in the distribution 
system area where Payment et al. (1991; 1997) measured an increased rate of 
gastrointestinal illnesses associated with the consumption of tap water. These authors 
indicated that between 14 and 40% of the gastrointestinal illnesses, in the distribution 
system under study, were related to tap water meeting the current water quality 
standards and that the distribution system appeared to be partly responsible for this 
endemic level of illnesses. These findings raised questions about the integrity of 
distribution systems and the likelihood of their contamination during normal operations. 
OBJECTIVES 
The main objective of the case study reported here was to determine the magnitude of 
low and negative pressures induced by the closure and repair of a transmission main. 
The potential for intrusion and changes in water quality associated with these 
low/negative pressures were also assessed. 
METHODOLOGY 
During summer 2006, continuous pressure monitoring of a distribution system area 
was performed during 80 days using 12 high speed pressure transient data loggers 
(Figure A-l). This distribution system area is supplied by a single water treatment plant, 
without any storage tank in the system. 
In August 2006, a major planned repair (closure of a 400 mm (16 in.) transmission 
main) was conducted, affecting about 15,000 customers in a sub-area of the monitored 
network (Figure A-l). This pipe closure was expected to cause major hydraulic 
disturbances (flow reversals, low pressures) in this sub-area of the distribution system as 
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water supply would be provided by another treatment plant under the repair conditions 
(WTP B instead of WTP A). As low pressures were predicted by hydraulic modeling, 
six additional high-speed pressure data loggers were installed, for a total of 12 pressure 
sensors in the affected distribution system sub-area. 
Figure A-l: Distribution system area where continuous pressure monitoring was 
conducted (pressure loggers are the red dots); (A) Flow conditions under normal system 
operation; (B) Flow conditions under repair conditions (shaded area represents affected 
sub-area) 
Pressure monitoring was conducted using two types of high-speed pressure transient 
data loggers. The first type is the RDL 1071L/3 model from Radcom Technologies 
(Woburn, MA) that can read up to 20 pressure values per second within a range of -103 
to 1551 kPa (-15 psi to 225 psi). A Radcom logger was installed directly on one 
transmission main at the outlet of WTP A and on fire hydrants in the distribution system. 
The other type of recorder used is the HPR31 model from Telog Instruments (Victor, 
NY). This logger can read up to 4 pressure values per second within a -103 to 1379 kPa 
(-15 psi to 200 psi) range and was used to monitor pressure on fire hydrants. The 
Radcom loggers were zeroed to atmospheric pressure according to the manufacturer's 
instructions before installation on the field while no specific operation was required for 
the installation of the Telog loggers. 
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In order to monitor water quality variations during the closure of the transmission 
main, four online turbidimeters (1720E Low Range Turbidimeter, Hach, Loveland, CO) 
were used. Three were installed inside buildings owned by the city and one was installed 
directly on a fire hydrant (with a continuous purge to allow higher flows out of the 
hydrant). This last setting is illustrated in Figure A-2. 
Figure A-2: Hydrant setting used for on-line turbidimeter and grab water samples 
Grab samples were also collected at three locations (2 hydrants and 1 routine 
sampling location) and analyzed for: 
total coliforms and E. coli with the Colilert (IDEXX Laboratories) detection 
method. Instead of the standard 100 ml sample, 1L water samples were used. 
Aerobic endospores (membrane filtration, TSB culture medium, pasteurization at 
75°C-15 min, incubation at 35°C-24h), 1L water samples were filtered. 
- residual free chlorine, temperature, turbidity and conductivity. 
The location of the high-speed transient pressure data loggers, the on-line 
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Figure A-3: Location of high-speed transient pressure data loggers, on-line 
turbidimeters and grab samplings during the 1st transmission main closure. 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
The initial closure of the transmission main for its repair was performed on August 23 
at 23:00 and lasted until 05:40 the following morning. The work was performed at night 
in order to minimize the impact on the customers and as the demand on the system is 
lower. The 15,000 customers that were affected by the main closure were put under a 
preventive boil water order. Because of difficulties encountered during the repair, two 
successive closures had to be performed. The transmission main was closed from August 
24, 23:00 to August 25, 20:00 and again on September 6, from 22:00 to September 8, 
15:45. A temporary distribution system was installed consisting of a 200 mm (8 in.) 
diameter pipe running along the closed transmission main. However, this temporary 
system was not in place for the 1st closure. 
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Low and negative pressures 
As expected, low pressures were measured in the affected distribution system area 
during the three closures. Low pressures are considered here as pressure below 138 kPa 
(20 psi) as it is usually recommended to operate DS at pressure greater than 138 kPa. 
Negative pressures were also measured for an extensive period of time (Table A-l). The 
average operating pressure at WTP B was 598 kPa (86.8 psi) during the first closure. 
This pressure was increased to 625 kPa (90.7 psi) and 647 kPa (93.9 psi) during the 2n 
closure but this was not enough to prevent the occurrence of negative pressure in the 
system. 

























































































Two distribution system sites located nearby (Telog 5 and Radcom 4) were 
particularly affected by the occurrence of negative pressures. These two sites had 
negative pressures during a total of 91 minutes over the 3 closures (-1 to -28 kPa (-0.2 to 
-4.1 psi)). These sites were located near the closed transmission main and therefore were 
the farthest from WTP B. The pressure profiles obtained over the 3 closures at the Telog 
5 location are illustrated in Figure A-4. 
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Figure A-4: Pressure profiles at the Telog 5 location 
For the first and second closures, the very low and negative pressures were recorded 
when pipe flushing was conducted before the transmission main was returned to service. 
For the third closure, negative pressures were recorded 20 minutes after the transmission 
main was closed and at time of increased water consumption (during the evening peak). 
Water quality during first transmission main closure 
Detailed water quality monitoring was conducted during the first transmission main 
closure only. Among the three locations where grab water samples were collected, one 
was the site #1 (Figure A-3), a fire hydrant that was directly located between the Telog 5 
and Radcom 4 locations, a bloc away from each other. These two sites had two periods 
of negative pressures during the first closure lasting about 6 and 7 minutes each where 
the flow completely stopped. A total of 11 liters of water were collected at this hydrant 
over the closure period (before, during and after the closure was performed). For 
instance, 3 liters of water were collected directly after the 6 and 7 minutes of pressure 
loss (first flow from the hydrant). Analysis of these samples showed no microbiological 
contamination (absence of total coliforms and no significant concentration of aerobic 
endospores (max 1 UFC/L), the two indicators of intrusion that were used). The free 
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chlorine residual after the pressure loss (0.18-0.20 mg/L) was about the same as before 
the flow was stopped. The water temperature was 21°C. 
One on-line turbidimeter was also installed at site #1. The signal obtained showed a 
peak (max of 2.3 ntu) at the moment of the pressure drop (Figure A-5). This was the 
maximum turbidity value recorded by the four on-line turbidimeters during the 1st 
closure. However, it was found very difficult to interpret the turbidity measurements as a 
signal of potential intrusion into the system. This type of on-line equipment is very 
sensitive to inflow and usually has to operate within a 200-750 ml/min range. When the 
inflow stops because of pressure reduction or total loss, turbidity values are still 
recorded because there is still water into the turbidimeter body. When the pressure is 
restored and flow is restarted, an increase in turbidity is automatically recorded. 
Consequently, it is difficult to differentiate a potential turbidity peak that would be 
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Figure A-5: Pressure and water quality at DS site #1 during first transmission main 
closure 
Out of a total of 34 liters of water analyzed for total coliforms/£'. co/z'/aerobic 
endospores at the 3 distribution system sites where grab samples were collected, only 
271 
one sample was positive for total coliforms. This sample was collected at site #2, 30 
hours after the end of the first closure but still in the middle of the second closure, with a 
free chlorine residual below the detection level. This site is located directly downstream 
of the repaired transmission main. During the first closure, this site was characterized by 
a gradual loss of free chlorine over time (0.86 down to 0.57 mg/L) and a rapid drop to 
0.12 mg/L when the transmission main was reopened. 
During the period of closures (Aug 23-Sept 8), the conductivity values at WTP B 
(range 163-177 uS) were significantly higher than at WTP A (range 126-132 |iS). While 
the conductivity measurements at sites #1 and #2 during the 1st transmission main 
closure were in the same range as those of WTP A, an increase in the conductivity 
values at site #3 (from 133 to 176 uS) was measured when the transmission main was 
being flushed at the end of the repair. This indicates that the increase in demand caused 
by the opening of hydrants to flush the main resulted in the supply by WTP B of the area 
where site #3 is located. 
In the afternoon of August 24, while the transmission main was opened since 5:30 
am, a major turbidity peak was recorded at site #1. This peak lasted for about 6 hours 
(from 12:00 to 18:00) and reached a maximum value of 8.2 ntu at about 15:00. While no 
other water quality measurements are available at this site during that time, the utility 
collected nine water samples on August 24 for analysis of total coliforms in the whole 
area affected and no sample was found positive. Overall, the utility collected 55 water 
samples during the 3 closures period and no coliforms were detected. 
CONCLUSIONS 
The closure and repair of a transmission main was found to be the cause of significant 
and sustained negative pressures in the distribution system under study. However one of 
the main challenges is to link these negative pressures with intrusion and changes in 
water quality. 
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The results obtained regarding water quality point to minimal contamination during 
this major widely spread negative pressure event related to the transmission main repair. 
Microbiological analyses of water samples did not reveal significant water 
contamination. Out of a total of 34 (1L) samples collected by the research team (among 
which 3 samples were collected right after negative pressure events) and 55 (100 mL) 
samples collected by the water utility, only one sample was found positive for total 
coliforms. 
However our conclusions may reflect: 
the specific conditions of the distribution system investigated. Negative pressures 
were recorded in a residential neighborhood supplied by relatively new ductile 
iron pipes (mostly installed between 1990 and 1995) and where the risk of cross-
connection was relatively low. 
the inability to detect contamination in chlorinated systems with the analytical 
methods used. 
This planned transmission main repair represented a unique opportunity for sampling 
water during a low/negative pressure event in a full-scale distribution system. However, 
the conclusions cannot be extended to all systems. More field investigations using 
advanced monitoring approaches and refined detection methods are needed to assess 
different distribution system conditions. 
